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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN A*TD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
B. N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D. 
SANDERS and CHERYL M. SANDERS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF 
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD 
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY 
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER 
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L. 
HOFFMAN, Mayor of the City of 
Draper, ROBERT BROWN, KIM 
STEVENS AND JOHN DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
civil »o. °\0DC1D23^7 ffc 
>» -%•? ""*• 
Plaintiffs, and each of them, complain of the Defendants, 
and each of them, and allege in support of their Complaint ds 
follows: 
PARTIES AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. That Plaintiffs Joseph D. Sanders and Cheryl M. 
Sanders, hereinafter referred to as "Sanders11, are presently 
residents of San Di ego cjunty, State of California, at other 
i'i A •''. <~ /•> « 
fe K* V V ii i' 
times relevant hereto, they have been residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
2. That Plaintiff B. N. Glanville, hereinafter referred to 
as "Glanville", is a resident of Malheur County, State of Oregon. 
3. That the Plaintiffs, and each of them, are or have been 
at times relevant hereto, possessed of by way of legal and 
equitable ownership, a parcel or parcels of real property located 
at or about the street address commonly referred to as 13735 
Shadow Mountain Lane, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. That the parcels which the Plaintiffs own are more par-
ticularly identified in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incor-
porated herein by this reference. The parcels referred to can be 
identified as parcels .018, .019 and .020. 
5. That parcels .018 and .019 are presently owned by 
Plaintiff B. N. Glanville and shall hereinafter be referred to as 
"the Property". 
6. That the Property is located within the boundaries of 
the City of Draper. 
7. That the City of Draper is a city municipality organ-
ized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of 
Utah. 
8. That Defendants City of Draper Planning Committee, City 
of Draper Board of Adjustment, the City Council of the City of 
Draper, their respective members and Mayor Charles L. Hoffman, 
were duly elected or appointed and as such are commissioned, 
qualified and act as members of their respective municipal or 
2 
administrative bodies at times relevant hereto. These Defendants 
may be referred to from time to time collectively as "Draper 
City". 
9. That Defendants City of Draper Planning Committee, City 
of Draper Board of Adjustment, the City Council of the City of 
Draper, their respective members and Mayor Charles L. Hoffman, at 
all times relevant hereto have purportedly acted within the scope 
of their authority in regards to the actions complained of 
hereafter. 
10. That Defendants Robert Brown and Kim Stevens are both 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and shall herein-
after be referred to respectively as "Brown" and "Stevens". 
11. That Brown and Stevens claim a legal and equitable 
ownership interest in real property which is a adjacent and 
contiguous to the Property. 
12. That Brown and Stevens may own their respective parcels 
of property jointly with others who are unknown presently to the 
Plaintiffs but are designated herein as John Does I through X. 
13. That at all times mentioned herein relevant to Brown 
and Stevens, John Does I through X, together with Brown and 
Stevens have acted jointly, within their respective capacity as 
property owners, and, with regard to John Does I through X, 
within the scope of their agency as to Defendants Brown and 
Stevens. 
14. That B. N. Glanville is currently the owner of the 
Property. 
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15. That prior to B. N. Glanvillefs ownership of the 
Property, the Property was owned by Sanders and conveyed to 
Glanville on or about the 19th day of May, 1988. 
16. That Defendant Draper City, et aJL. is empowered and 
entrusted with the responsibility and authority to manage, 
regulate and police the development and improvement of real 
property within its boundaries pursuant to the laws of the State 
of Utah and its own municipal ordinances. 
17. That in the furtherance of the responsibility and 
authority granted Draper City by the laws of the State of Utah, 
Draper City has established and empowered a planning committee 
and Board of Adjustment to assist in the management, policing and 
regulation of real property and its development within the 
municipality of Draper. 
18. That part of the authority exercised by the City of 
Draper, et al. is the power to control, regulate, approve and 
disapprove the subdivision of real property and to regulate the 
improvements and structures built on real property within the 
boundaries of the City of Draper granting variances and setting 
conditions for the development of real property and the construc-
tion of improvements thereon as might be just and equitable. 
19. That in the furtherance of the power and authority of 
the City of Draper as set forth above, there has been established 
as political subdivisi ons or tna'C municipality, a planning 
4 
committee and a Board of Adjustment to regulate, administer and 
administratively adjudicate petitions and applications relevant 
to real property. 
20. That, among other things, the planning committee has 
the authority and the responsibility to regulate, approve and 
disapprove applications for the subdivision of real property. 
21. That, among other things, the Board of Adjustment has 
the authority to regulate, approve and disapprove applications 
and petitions for variances from zoning ordinances in effect in 
the City of Draper. 
22. That all of the acts undertaken by the City of Draper 
et al. complained of herein, were purportedly undertaken within 
the scope of their authority as represented by the laws of the 
State of Utah and the ordinances of the City of Draper and 
particularly those actions of the City of Draper in awarding 
variances and issuing building permits in regards to the Property 
and adjacent parcels of land. 
23. That the Plaintiffs, at times relevant hereto, claim an 
interest under a deed, or written contract, and their interest in 
the Property is affected by a municipal ordinance and otherwise 
by the actions of the Cicy of Draper. 
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS 
24. That Sanders purchased parcels .018 and .019 from 
individuals known as Martin S. Ovard, Reva S. Ovard, Ben F. Ovard 
and Helen F. Ovard, hereinafter referred to as "Ovard", on or 
about November 8, 1982. 
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25. That Sanders believed that parcels .018 and .019 were 
"lots", as to which a building permit would be issued and appro-
priately subdivided, within the meaning of state statutes and 
City of Draper ordinances. 
26. That Sanders believed this because the home in which he 
was presently residing was also constructed by Ovard. Ovard 
constructed the home pursuant to a building permit issued by 
Draper City as to the one acre parcel. 
27. That he believed that parcels .018 and .019 were 
properly subdivided lots for which he could receive a building 
permit in their present form, because a building permit had been 
previously issued as to parcel .020, the parcel upon which the 
home had been constructed. 
28. That application had been previously made by one Layne 
Newman and others, to subdivide the Property and adjacent par-
cels, but the applications and petitions had been denied by the 
County of Salt Lake and the City of Draper. 
29. That in fact, the Property and adjacent parcels had 
never been properly subdivided receiving the appropriate app-
rovals from City of Draper political subdivisions. 
30. That Sanders purchased parcels .018 and .019 for 
consideration assuming their value to be equivalent to a properly 
and legally subdivided lot as to which he could receive, without 
a variance or subdivision approval, a building permit. 
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31. That Sanders purchased those parcels for $2 6,000. The 
parcels had a market value, for the reasons set forth herein, of 
$8,000. 
32. That in purchasing the Property, Sanders acted inno-
cently and reasonably and in ignorance of the true status of the 
Property, relying upon the representations of the sellers and the 
actions of the City of Draper. 
33. That on information and belief, the City of Draper and 
its political subdivisions granted Ovard a variance to build the 
home that was subsequently purchased by Sanders on an illegally 
subdivided two acre parcel of land. 
34. That the subject home, constructed by Ovard and subseq-
uently purchased by Sanders, was constructed contrary to the 
variance, the building permit and Draper City subdivision regula-
tions because it was located on a one acre parcel. 
35. That the sale of parcels .018, .019 and .02 0 by Ovard 
were illegal and constituted a class B misdemeanor under state 
statutes and Draper City ordinances. All subsequent sales have 
been likewise illegal. 
36. That subsequent to the purchase of the parcels referred 
to above by Sanders, Sanders learned that the parcels were not 
properly subdivided and that the building permit would not be 
issued as to parcel .018 or .019 without further subdivision app-
roval . 
37. That since that time, the City of Draper has attempted, 
contrary to state law and City of Draper ordinance, to grant 
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variances which in effect attempt to approve the subdivision of 
the three parcels. 
38. That the attempts of the City of Draper so to do, have 
been ineffective, and are contrary to state law and City of 
Draper ordinances. 
39. That since the time the City of Draper has become aware 
of the conduct of Ovard which is contrary to state law and City 
of Draper ordinance, the City of Draper has ignored and continues 
to ignore those circumstances and has failed to enforce its laws 
and the laws of the State of Utah or has attempted to enforce 
those ordinances and laws in an ineffective manner. 
40. That the City of Draper has a duty to police, manage 
and regulate the development of real property within its muni-
cipal borders and has utterly failed, in this case, in that duty. 
41. That by reason of the action of Ovard and City of 
Draper, the Plaintiffs are reasonably confused and uncertain 
about their legal rights as regards to the Properry and others. 
42. That, among other things, there is a duty on the part 
of the City of Draper, by way of enforcement of its ordinances 
and the laws of the State of Utah to prosecute violations of 
those laws and ordinances. This duty has been ignored and the 
City of Draper has utterly failed to prosecute these violations. 
43. That on or about July, 1988 the City of Draper, acting 
by and through its Board of Adjustment, attempted to ratify the 
illegal conduct of Ovard by granting a "variance" on the applica-
tion of Mountain West Savings, a banking institution, represented 
by irs purported agent, Ovard. That the so called "variance" 
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further confuses the legal rights and interest of not only the 
Plaintiffs, but the owners of adjacent parcels of land. 
44. That the actions of City of Draper by and through its 
Board of Adjustment are without or beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Board of Adjustment. 
45. That in any event, the City of Draper has ignored the 
enforcement of the conditions attached to the granting of the 
"variance" as they relate to adjacent property owners, all of 
which has damaged the Plaintiffs and created uncertainty as to 
their true legal status in regards to the Property. 
46. That the Plaintiffs have been damaged by virtue of the 
conduct of the City of Draper alleged above, inasmuch as their 
property has been reduced in value, the Sanders have lost the 
ownership and equitable interest in parcel .020 altogether and 
the uncertainty surrounding these properties has resulted in 
litigation was necessary to ascertain the true legal rights and 
standing of the Plaintiffs. In addition, the Plaintiffs have 
been deprived of the full use and enjoyment of the Property. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Writ of Mandate or Mandamus) 
47. The Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 46. 
48. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a Writ of Mandate or 
Mandamus (hereinafter "Mandamus") requiring the City of Draper to 
perform its required duties and actions, and more particularly: 
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(a) To fully prosecute the violations of its laws and 
the laws of the State of Utah set forth above in relation to 
the illegal subdivision and sale of illegally subdivided 
"lots" (the Property). 
(b) To enforce its conditions placed upon the granting 
of zoning variances by way of sanction, fine, a finding of 
nuisance or action authorized by law. 
(c) Take such action as might be necessary through its 
appropriate political subdivisions, namely the planning 
committee, to correctly define the status of the Property. 
(d) To declare null and void the action of the Board 
of Adjustment for the City of Draper insofar as it relates 
to the purported subdivision of the Property. 
(e) To declare null and void the action of the Board 
of Adjustment of the City of Draper insofar as it relates to 
the Property and its action of July, 1988 due to the lack or 
want of jurisdiction for such action. 
49. That the Plaintiffs have attempted to resolve the 
issues raised above informally and directly with the City of 
Draper, but without satisfaction. 
50. That there exists no plain, speedy and adequate remedy 
other than this Complaint for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus. 
51. That the Plaintiffs have sustained damages by virtue of 
the conduct alleged above which should be ascertained and found 
by a jury. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
52. That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this refer-
ence the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 51 of the 
Complaint. 
53. That the Plaintiffs are entitled to and should receive 
a declaratory relief deciding the questions of construction and 
validity under the ordinances and actions of the City of Draper 
and more particularly pursuant to § 78-33-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 
as amended). 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
54. That Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this reference 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 53 of the 
Complaint. 
55. That the City of Draper has been negligent and Plain-
tiffs have sustained damages which were proximately caused by by 
the action or inaction of the City of Draper as alleged above, as 
well as the conduct set forth hereafter: 
(a) The failure of the City of Draper to properly 
police the development and subdivision of real property 
within its boundaries. 
(i>) The de facto approval of the Ovard "subdivision" 
by the issuance of a building permit as well as the inaction 
of the City of Draper after being informed of the illegal 
attempted subdivision by Ovard. 
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(c) The failure of the City of Draper to ascertain 
violations of its ordinances and laws, as well as those of the 
State of Utah, and take reasonable steps to enforce the same. 
56. That in addition to the damages set forth above, the 
Plaintiffs have suffered emotional distress, anxiety and upset to 
their damages in an amount not less than $150,000. 
57. That by virtue of the conduct of the City of Draper and 
as a direct and proximate result thereof, the Plaintiffs have 
suffered the damages more particularly described above, in an 
amount not less than $150,000 and otherwise according to proof. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Trespass) 
58. That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this refer-
ence the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 57. 
59. That Defendants Brown and Stevens and John Does I 
through X ave trespassed on the Property of the Plaintiffs, to-
wit: parcels .018 and .019, in the following particulars: 
(a) As to Defendant Brown, Defendant Brown and those 
acting with him trespass on parcel .019 owned by Plaintiff 
Glanville by their ongoing traverse and use of that parcel 
by way of gaining access to their residence and garage and 
their construction of improvements over and across the 
Property owned by Plaintiff Glanville. Additionally, Brown 
and others have constructed a fence across or surrounding 
parcel .018 and have attempted to convert the same to their 
own use, have utilized the same for personal use, including 
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the grazing and running of horses without the permission or 
consent of Plaintiff* 
(b) As to Defendant Stevens, his trespass consists of 
construction of improvements and the maintenance of improve-
ments which occupy a portion of the Right-of-Way adjecent to 
parcel .019 owned by Plaintiff Glanville. 
(c) Plaintiff has made demand on Defendants Brown and 
Stevens and those acting with them, to cease and terminate 
their ongoing trespass which demands have been utterly 
ignored and disregarded. 
60. That the actions of Defendants Brown and Stevens and 
those acting with them, have not been approved or consented to by 
the Plaintiffs and are in direct and total disregard of their 
ownership and interest in the Property. 
61. That as a direct and proximate resulr of the trespass 
of Defendants Brown and Stevens and those acting with them, the 
Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount not yet determined, but 
no less than $10,000 which should be proven and established at 
the trial of this matter. 
62. That the actions of Brown and Stevens and those acting 
with them, have been intentional, malicious and in total dis-
regard of the rights of the Plaintiffs as herein set forth, and 
as a result thereof, not only has this action been required, but 
the Plaintiff is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in an 
amount not less than $10,000 as to Defendant Brown, and $10,000 
as to Defendant Stevens. 
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63. That inasmuch as Defendants Brown and Stevens and those 
acting with them have disregarded the reasonable requests of the 
Plaintiff heretofore, it would be reasonable for the Court to 
make and enter, without delay and during the pendency of this 
action, on application of the Plaintiff, an injunction restrain-
ing these Defendants and those acting with them from ongoing 
trespass as described above, pending a finding as to the Plain-
tiffs1 damages therefore. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defen-
dants, and each of them, as follows: 
1. As to the City of Draper, et al.; 
(a) A Writ of Mandamus requiring the City of Draper 
and its political subdivisions to comply with the City of 
Draper ordinances and the laws of the State of Utah in the 
policing and management, as well as the enforcement of their 
ordinances and the laws of the State of Utah. 
(b) For damages in connection with the Writ of Man-
damus as provided by law in an amount not less than 
$150,000. 
(c) For declaratory relief fixing and describing the 
rights of the Plaintiff in regards to the Property, both as 
it relates to its current status under the laws of the State 
of Utah and the ordinances of Draper City, as well as 
adjoining and adjacent property owners. 
(d) For judgment in the amount of $150,000 based upon 
the negligence of the City of Draper. 
14 
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2. As to Defendants Brown and Stevens: 
(a) For a judgment finding that the actions of Defen-
dants Brown and Stevens and those acting with them are 
trespass upon the properties of Plaintiffs. 
(b) For the immediate issuance and entry of an injunc-
tion restraining Defendants Brown and Stevens and those 
acting with them from the actions described in the Com-
plaint. 
(c) For judgment in connection with the trespass of 
Brown and Stevens and those acting with them in an amount 
not less than $20,000, in punitive damages and $10,000 in 
general damages. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem 
proper. 
DATED THIS day of April. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Z/MM^ 
'ITODERIClPTr. GREEN 
ftorney for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs Sanders address: 
Kiewit Pacific Company 
13 03 5 Pomerado Road, Suite B 
Poway, California 
Plaintiffs Glanville^ address; 
P, O. Box 128 
Westfall, Oregon 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
B. N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D. 
SANDERS and CHERYL M. SANDERS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF 
DRAPER, et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CIVIL NO. 900902397 PR 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss has been submitted to the 
Court for decision pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. Oral hearing was reguested and was 
heard this date, at which time the matter was taken under 
advisement. The Memoranda of Points and Authorities filed by 
both parties has been reviewed, and the Court rules as follows. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. The said Motion 
is granted for the reasons set forth in defendants' Memorandum 
and Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities. Defendants owe 
no duty to the plaintiffs in regard to the alleged ordinance 
violations and variances. Defendants' duty is to the public, 
not to these individual plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' cause of 
0 0 0 0 3 4 
GLANVILLE V. DRAPER CITY PAGE TWO RULING 
action rests with the seller of the property. The defendants 
cannot be liable for illegal subdivision any more than they 
could be liable for violation of the Uniform Building Code or 
traffic laws. Furthermore, the statute of limitations applies. 
Defendant will p,r<e£ar_£---the Order. 
Dated this / ^daV of November, 1990. /' / 
/ .LEONARD H. RUSSbN"^ ' 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
0 0 0 0 D-o 
GLANVILLE V. DRAPER CITY PAGE THREE RULING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Ruling, to the following, this / day of 
November, 1990: 
Frederick N. Green 
Julie V. Lund 
Attorneys for .Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 528 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jody K. Burnett 
Daniel D. Hill 
Attorneys for Defendants Draper City, 
Draper City Board of Adjustment, 
Planning Commission, City Council, 
and Charles L. Hoffman 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Bruce A. Maak 
Attorney for Defendant Robert Brown 
185 S. State, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Hollis S. Hunt 
Draper City Attorney 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake Cizy, Utah 84111 
^^QanAU^ 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 3 
Order of Dismissal, 11/26/90 
JODY K BURNETT (A0499) 
DANIEL D. HILL (A5202) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Draper City, Draper City 
Board of Adjustment, Planning 
Commission, Draper City Council, 
and Charles L. Hoffman 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
B. N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D. 
SANDERS and CHERYL M. SANDERS, 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF 
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD 
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY Civil No. 900902397PR 
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER 
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L. 
HOFFMAN, Mayor of the City of Judge Leonard H. Russon 
Draper, ROBERT BROWN, KIM 
STEVENS AND JOHN DOES I 
THROUGH X, 
Defendants. 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the above-
entitled court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding, on 
November 5, 1990, for consideration of a Motion to Dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of civil Procedure, 
NOV 2 5 t=S0 
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filed on behalf of defendants Draper City, Draper City Board of 
Adjustment, Draper City Planning Committee and Planning 
Commission, Draper City Council and Charles L. Hoffman as Mayor 
of the city of Draper, 
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel and having 
reviewed the pleadings and memoranda filed with respect to this 
motion, and being fully advised, issued its Ruling dated 
November 7, 1990 in which it determined that the allegations of 
the plaintiffs' Complaint, even viewed in a light most favorable 
to plaintiffs, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted against the defendants for the reasons set forth in the 
Ruling of the Court and as more fully set forth in the 
defendants' memoranda. Based on that Ruling, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss is hereby granted as to all claims made in the 
plaintiffs' Complaint as against defendants Draper City, Draper 
City Board of Adjustment, Draper City Planning Committee and 
Planning Commission, Draper City Council and Mayor Charles L. 
Hoffman, and plaintiffs' Complaint as against said defendants is 
hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits, no cause of 
action. 
DATED this^T^day of~^^(^f) ' , 1990. , 
BY/1THE COURT: 
\ Leonard H. Russor^A^ 
D^istrict Court Judge 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
; ss . 
) 
Sharon Allhands, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martmeau, attorneys 
for defendants Draper City, Draper city Board of Adjustment, 
Planning Commission, City Council and Charles L. Hoffman herein; 
that she served the attached ORDER OF DISMISSAL (Case No. 
900902397PR, Third District Court) upon the parties listed below 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Frederick N. Green 
Julie V. Lund 
GREEN & BERRY 
10 Exchange-Place, #528 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Hollis S. Hunt 
Draper City Atty 
HUNT AND RUDD 
243 E 400 S, #200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Bruce A. Maack 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN 6c GEE 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P. O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
and causing the same to be mailed, first class postage prepaid, 
as indicated, on the / 3 ^ day of November, 1990. 
M^^x (XUJ^JU^ 
Sharon M. Allhands 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
November, 1990. I JA. day of 
My Commission Expires 
y 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
>/l<( 
- ^ 
Residing in the State of Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ws*s*^®\ HARV1 LYNN CHILES 
frf fiC?*!.''* " \ 1 "> E^c^inqe Place. 11th Fl 
Z i * St* C.*w l tah a ^ t l 
U\/ Commission Exptros 
Septembers. 1993 
STATE OF UTAH 
APPENDIX 
ITEM # 4 
Amended Complaint 
GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240) 
JULIE V. LUND (4875) 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
B.N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D. 
SANDERS and CHERYL M. SANDERS, 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF Civil No. 900902397PR 
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD 
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY 
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER 
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L. Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
HOFFMAN, Mayor of the City of 
Draper, ROBERT BROWN, KIM 
STEVENS and JOHN DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, and each of them, complain of Defendants, and 
each of them, and allege in support of their Amended Complaint as 
follows: 
PARTIES AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. That Plaintiffs Joseph D. Sanders and Cheryl M. 
Sanders, hereinafter referred to as "Sanders", are presently 
residents of San Diego County, State of California, at other 
times relevant hereto, they have been residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
<.-»-., i 
: ; i „• J 
#$9134 
2. That Plaintiff B. N. Glanville, hereinafter referred to 
as "Glanville11, is a resident of Malheur County, State of Oregon. 
3. That the Plaintiffs, and each of them, are or have been 
at all times relevant hereto, possessed of by way of legal and 
equitable ownership, a parcel or parcels of real property located 
at or about the street address commonly referred to as 13735 
Shadow Mountain Lane, Salt Lake County, State of' Utah. 
4. That the parcels which the Plaintiffs own are more 
particularly identified in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by this reference. The parcels referred to 
can be identified as parcels .018, .019 and .020. 
5. That parcels .018 and .019 are presently owned by 
Plaintiff B. N. Glanville and shall hereinafter be referred to as 
"the Property". 
6. That the Property is located within the boundaries of 
the City of Draper. 
7. That the City of Draper is a city municipality 
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
8. That Defendants City of Draper Planning Committee, City 
of Draper Board of Adjustment, the City Council of the City of 
Draper, their respective members and Mayor Charles L. Hoffman, 
were duly elected or appointed and as such are commissioned, 
qualified and act as members of their respective municipal or 
administrative bodies at all times relevant hereto. These 
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Defendants may be referred to from time to time collectively as 
"Draper City:'. 
9. That Defendants City of Draper Planning Committee, City 
of Draper Board of Adjustments, the City Council of the City of 
Draper, their respective members and Mayor Charles L. Hoffman, at 
all times relevant hereto have purportedly acted within the scope 
of their authority in regards to the actions complained of 
hereafter. 
10. That Defendants Robert Brown and Kim Stevens are both 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and shall 
hereinafter be referred to respectively as "Brown" and "Stevens". 
11. That Brown and Stevens claim a legal and equitable 
ownership interest in real property which is an adjacent and 
contiguous to the Property. 
12. That Brown and Stevens may own their respective parcels 
of property jointly with others who are unknown presently to the 
Plaintiffs but are designated herein as John Does I through X. 
13. That at all times mentioned herein relevant to Brown 
and Stevens, John Does I through X, together with Brown and 
Stevens have acted jointly, within tneir respective capacity as 
property owners, and, with regard to John Does I through X, 
within the scope of their agency as to Defendants Brown and 
Stevens. 
14. That B. N. Glanville is currently the owner of the 
Property. 
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15. That prior to B. N. Glanville's ownership of the 
Property, the Property was owned by Sanders and conveyed to 
Glanville on or about the 19th day of May7 1988. 
16. That Defendant Draper City, et al. is empowered and 
entrusted with the responsibility and authority to manage, 
regulate and police the development and improvement of real 
property within its boundaries pursuant to the laws of the State 
of Utah and its own municipal ordinances. 
17. That in the furtherance of the responsibility and 
authority granted Draper City by the laws of the State of Utah, 
Draper City has established and empowered a planning committee to 
assist in the management, policing and regulation of real 
property and its development: within the municipality of Draper. 
18. That part of the authority exercised by the City of 
Draper, et al. is the power to control, regulate, approve and 
disapprove the subdivision of real property and to regulate the 
improvements and structures built on real property within the 
boundaries of the City of Draper granting variances and setting 
conditions for the development of real property and the 
construction of improvements thereon as might be just and 
equitable. 
19. That in the furtherance of the power and authority of 
the City of Draper as set forth above, there has been established 
as political subdivisions of that municipality, a planning 
committee to regulate, administer and administratively adjudicate 
petitions and applications relevant to real property. 
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20. That, among other things, the planning committee has 
the authority and the responsibility to regulate, approve and 
disapprove applications for the subdivision of real property. 
21. That, among other things, the Board of Adjustment has 
the authority to regulate, approve and disapprove applications 
and petitions for variances from zoning ordinances in effect in 
the City of Draper. 
22. That all of the acts undertaken by the City of Draper 
et al. complained of herein, were purportedly undertaken within 
the scope of their authority as represented by the laws of the 
State of Utah and the ordinances of the City of Draper and 
particularly those actions of the City of Draper in awarding 
variances and issuing building permits in regards to the Property 
and adjacent parcels of land. 
23. That the Plaintiffs, at times relevant hereto, claim an 
interest under a deed, or written contract, and their interest in 
the Property is affected by a municipal ordinance and otherwise 
by the actions of the City of Draper. 
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS 
24. That Sanders purchased parcels .018 and .019 from 
individuals known as Martin S. Ovard, Reva S. Ovard, Ben F. Ovard 
and Helen F. Ovard, hereinafter referred to as "Ovard", on or 
about November 8, 1982. 
25. That Sanders believed that parcels .018 and .019 were 
"lots", as to which a building permit would be issued and 
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appropriately subdivided, within the meaning of state statutes 
and City of Draper ordinances. 
26. That he believed that parcels .018 and .019 were 
properly subdivided lots for which he could receive a building 
permit in their present form, because a building permit had been 
previously issued as to parcel .020, the parcel upon which the 
home had been constructed. 
27. That application had been previously made by one Layne 
Newman and others, to subdivide the Property and adjacent 
parcels, but the applications and petitions had been denied by 
the County of Salt Lake and City of Draper. 
28. That in fact, the Property and adjacent parcels had 
never been properly subdivided receiving the appropriate 
approvals from City of Draper political subdivisions. 
29. That Sanders purchased parcels .018 and .019 for 
consideration assuming their value to be equivalent to a properly 
and legally subdivided lot as to which he could receive, without 
a variance or subdivision approval, a building permit. 
30. That Sanders purchased those parcels for $2 6,000. The 
parcels had a market value, for the reasons set forth herein, of 
$8,000. 
31. That in purchasing the Property, Sanders acted 
innocently and reasonably and in ignorance of the true status of 
the Property, relying upon the representations of the sellers and 
the actions of the City of Draper. 
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32. That on information and belief, the City of Draper and 
its political subdivisions granted Ovard a variance to build the 
home that was subsequently purchased by Sanders on an illegally 
subdivided two acre parcel of land. 
- 33. That the subject home, constructed by Ovard and 
subsequently purchased by Sanders, was constructed contrary to 
the variance, the building permit and Draper City subdivision 
regulations because it was located on a one acre parcel. 
34. That the sale of parcels .018, .019 and .020 by Ovard 
were illegal and constituted a class B misdemeanor under state 
statutes and Draper City ordinances. All subsequent sales have 
been likewise illegal. 
35. That subsequent to the purchase of the parcels referred 
to above by Sanders, Sanders learned that the parcels were not 
properly subdivided and that the building permit would not be 
issued as to parcel .018 or .019 without further subdivision 
approval. 
36. That since that time, the City of Draper has attempted, 
contrary to state law and City of Draper ordinance, to grant 
variances which in effect attempt to approve the subdivision of 
the three parcels. 
37. That the attempts of the City of Draper so to do, have 
been ineffective, and are contrary to state law and City of 
Draper ordinances. 
38. That since the time the City of Draper has become aware 
of the conduct of Ovard which is contrary to state law and City 
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of Draper ordinance, the City of Draper has ignored and continues 
to ignore those circumstances and has failed to enforce its laws 
and the laws of the State of Utah or has attempted to enforce 
those ordinances and laws in an ineffective manner. 
39• That the City of Draper has a duty to police, manage 
and regulate the development of real property within its 
municipal borders and has utterly failed, in this case, in that 
duty. 
40. That by reason of the action of Ovard and City of 
Draper, the Plaintiffs are reasonably confused and uncertain 
about their legal rights as regards to the Property and others. 
41. That, among other things, there is a duty on the part 
of the City of Draper, by way of enforcement of its ordinances 
and the laws of the State of Utah to prosecute violations of 
those laws and ordinances. This duty has been ignored and the 
City of Draper has utterly failed to prosecute these violations. 
42. That on or about July, 1988 the City of Draper, acting 
by and through its Board of Adjustment, attempted to ratify the 
illegal conduct of Ovard by granting a "variance" on the 
application of Mountain West Savings, a banking institution, 
represented by its purported agent, Ovard. That the so called 
"variance" further confuses the legal rights and interest of not 
only the Plaintiffs, but the owners of adjacent parcels of land. 
£3. That the actions of City of Draper by and through its 
Board of Adjustment are without or beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Board of Adjustment. 
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44. That in any event, the City of Draper has ignored the 
enforcement of the conditions attached to the granting of the 
"variance" as they relate to adjacent property owners, all of 
which has damaged the Plaintiffs and created uncertainty as to 
their true legal status in regards to the Property. 
45. That the Plaintiffs have been damaged by virtue of the 
conduct of the City of Draper alleged above, inasmuch as the 
vacant property has been reduced in value, the Sanders have lost 
the ownership and equitable interest in the home located on 
parcel .020 altogether and the uncertainty surrounding these 
properties has resulted in litigation was necessary to ascertain 
the true legal rights and standing of the Plaintiffs. In 
addition, the Plaintiffs have been deprived of the full use and 
enjoyment of the Property. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Writ of Mandate or Mandamus) 
46. The Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 46 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
47. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a Writ of Mandate or 
Mandamus (hereinafter "Mandamus") requiring the City of Draper to 
perform its required duties and actions, and more particularly: 
(a) To fully prosecute the violations of its laws and 
the laws of the State of Utah set forth above in relation to 
the illegal subdivision and sale of illegally subdivided 
"lots" (the Property). 
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(b) To enforce its conditions placed upon the granting 
of zoning variances by way of sanction, fine, a finding of 
nuisance or action authorized by law. 
(c) Take such action as might be necessary through its 
appropriate political subdivisions, namely the planning 
committee, to correctly define the status of the Property. 
(d) To declare null and void the action of the Board 
of Adjustment for the City of Draper insofar as it relates 
to the purported subdivision of the Property. 
(e) To declare null and void the action of the Board 
of Adjustment of the City of Draper insofar as it relates to 
the Property and its action of July, 1988 due to the lack or 
want of jurisdiction for such action. 
48. That the Plaintiffs have attempted to resolve the 
issues raised above informally and directly with the City of 
Draper, but without satisfaction. 
49. That there exists no plain, speedy and adequate remedy 
other than this Amended Complaint for the issuance of a Writ of 
Mandamus. 
50. That the Plaintiffs have sustained damages by virtue of 
the conduct alleged above which should be ascertained and found 
by a jury. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
51. That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this 
reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 51 of 
the Amended Complaint. 
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52. That the Plaintiffs are entitled to and should receive 
a declaratory relief deciding the questions of construction and 
validity under the ordinances and actions of the City of Draper 
and more particularly pursuant to § 78-33-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 
as amended). 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence of Draper City) 
53. That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this 
reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 53 of 
the Amended Complaint. 
54. That the City of Draper has been negligent and 
Plaintiffs have sustained damages which were proximately caused 
by the action or inaction of the City of Draper as alleged above, 
as well as the conduct set forth hereafter: 
(a) The failure of the City of Draper to properly 
police the development and subdivision of real property 
within its boundaries. 
(b) The de facto approval of the Ovard "subdivision" 
by the issuance of a building permit as well as the inaction 
of the City of Draper after being informed of the illegal 
attempted subdivision by Ovard. 
(c) The failure of the City of Draper to ascertain 
violations of its ordinances and laws, as well as those of 
the State of Utah, and take reasonable steps to enforce the 
same. 
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55. That in addition to the damages set forth above, the 
Plaintiffs have suffered emotional distress, anxiety and upset to 
their damage in an amount not less than $150,000. 
56. That by virtue of the conduct of the City of Draper and 
as a direct and proximate result thereof, the Plaintiffs have 
suffered the damages more particularly described above, in an 
amount not less than $150,000 and otherwise according to proof. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Trespass of Brown and Stevens) 
57. That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this 
reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 57 of 
the Amended Complaint. 
53. That Defendants Brown and Stevens and John Does I 
through X have trespassed on the Property of the Plaintiffs, to 
wit: parcels .018 and .019, in the following particulars: 
(a) As to Defendant Brown, Defendant Brown and those 
acting with him trespass on parcel .019 owned by Plaintiff 
Glanville by their ongoing traverse and use of that parcel 
by way of gaining access to their residence and garage and 
their construction of improvements over and across the 
Property owned by Plaintiff Glanville. Additionally, Brown 
and others have constructed a fence across or surrounding 
parcel .018 and have attempted to convert the same to their 
own use, have utilized the same for personal use, including 
the grazing and running of horses without the permission or 
consent of Plaintiff. 
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(b) As to Defendant Stevens, his trespass consists of 
construction of improvements and the maintenance of 
improvements which occupy a portion
 Qf the Right-of-Way 
adjacent to parcel .019 owned by Plaintiff Glanville. 
(c) Plaintiff has made demand on Defendants Brown and 
Stevens and those acting with them, to cease and terminate 
their ongoing trespass which demands have been utterly 
ignored and disregarded. 
59. That the actions of Defendants Brown and Stevens and 
those acting with them, have not been Approved or consented to by 
the Plaintiffs and are in direct and total disregard of their 
&f*7n&irs&h2p and interest in che Property* 
50. That as a direct and proximate result of the trespass 
of Defendants Brown and Stevens and thqSe acting with them, the 
Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount not yet determined, but 
no le^s than $10,000 which should be proven and established at 
the fecial of this matter. 
51. That the actions of Brown anc} Stevens and those acting 
with them, have been intentional, malicious and in total 
disregard of the rights of the Plaintiffs as herein sat forth, 
and a$s
 a result thereof, not only has this action been required, 
but tiie Plaintiff is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages 
in an amount not less than $10,000 as tQ Defendant Brown, and 
$10,00)0 as to Defendant Stevens. 
%2. That inasmuch as Defendants Brown and Stevens and those 
acting with them have disregarded the reasonable requests of the 
-13-
• 0 ' 0 ' O I S B 
Plaintiff heretofore, it would be reasonable for the Court to 
make and enter, without delay and during the pendency of this 
action, on application of the Plaintiff, an injunction 
restraining these Defendants and those acting with them from 
ongoing trespass as described above, pending a finding as to the 
Plaintiffs' damages therefore. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence of Brown) 
63. That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this 
reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 68 of 
the Amended Complaint. 
64. That Brown and/or the representative of Mountainwest 
knew or should have known of the existence of problems related to 
rhe home due to the following: 
(a) Low asking price; 
(b) Mountainwest's negotiations with the previous 
owner in which they sought to require him to obtain a 
variance from Draper City; 
(c) The survey plat; and 
(d) The counteroffer made to Brown by Mountainwest. 
65. That Defendant Brown disregarded the potential problems 
with the property and took advantage of the bargain price. 
66. That Defendant Brown's purchase of this property has 
damaged the Plaintiffs herein. 
67. That Defendant Brown has been unjustly enriched. 
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SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Illegality) 
68. That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this 
reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 63 of 
the Amended Complaint. 
69. That § 10-9-26 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 
prohibits the sale or transfer of a parcel of property created in 
violation of the subdivision ordinance. 
70. That § 6-6-1(c) of the Draper City Subdivision 
Ordinances also prohibits the sale or transfer of parcels of 
property created in violation of the subdivision ordinance. 
71. That the transfer or sale of the property to 
Mountainwesr was in violation of the above laws and therefore 
illegal. 
72. That the sale of the property by Mountainwest to Brown 
was in violation of the above laws and therefore illegal. 
73. That pursuant to § 10-9-1002 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended) Plaintiff's seek to rescind the sales of this land which 
were made m violation of the above laws. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Private Nuisance) 
74. That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this 
referance the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 73 of 
rhe Amended Complaint. 
75. That Defendants Brown's and Stevens' failure to comply 
with the subdivision requirements have obstructed and interfered 
with Plaintiffs' comfortable enjoyment of their property. 
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76. That pursuant -co § 78-38-1 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended) Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief requiring these 
Defendants to abate the nuisance by complying with the 
subdivision requirements and an award of damages as shall be 
proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the 
Defendants, and each of them, as follows: 
1. As to the City of Draper, et al.; 
(a) A Writ of Mandamus requiring the City of Draper 
and its political subdivisions to comply with the City of 
Draper ordinances and the laws of the State of Utah in the 
policing and management, as well as the enforcement of their 
ordinances and the laws of the State of Utah. 
(b) For damages in connection with the Writ of 
Mandamus as provided by law in an amount not less than 
$150,000. 
(c) For declaratory relief fixing and describing the 
rights of the Plaintiff in regards to the Property, both as 
it relates to its current status under the laws of the State 
of Utah and the ordinances of Draper City, as well as 
adjoining and adjacent property owners. 
(d) For judgment in the amount of $150,000 based upon 
the negligence of the City of Draper. 
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2. As to Defendants Brown and Stevens: 
(a) For a judgment finding that the actions of 
Defendants Brown and Stevens and those acting with them are 
trespass upon the properties of Plaintiffs. 
(b) For the immediate issuance and entry of an 
injunction restraining Defendants Brown and Stevens and 
those acting with them from the actions described in the 
Complaint. 
(c) For judgment in connection with the trespass of 
Brown and Stevens and those acting with them in an amount 
not less than $20,000, in punitive damages and $10,000 in 
general damages. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem 
proper. 
DATED this <2-f day of January, 1993. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
t££^s^ 
GREEN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiff Sander's addrass: 
2717 NE 110 South 
Vancouver, WA 98686 
Plaintiff Glanville's address: 
P.O. Box 128 
Westfall, Oregon 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Tiffanee Paditios, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is Employed in the offices of GREEK & BERRY, 
attorneys for Plaintiffs herein, that she served the attached 
AMENDED COMPLAINT upon the following parties by placing a true 
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Bruce A. Maak, Esq. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State, #13 00 
Salt Lake City, UT? 84111 
Jody K. Burnettr Esq, 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and hand delivering the same on the J^-N day of January, 1993 
1993. 
SUBSCRIBED AIJD SWORN t o before *ae t h i s c ^ d a y of January , 
My C c i m i s s ^ j n ^ ^ p i r e ^ : 
L -s-ew-tvown&Eff.'C&ir ™* "" 
^ Quf^yQ 0. >CuL£i 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 5 
Title 9, Draper City Ordinances 
TITLE 9 
LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS 
Chapter 2 
PROCESSING PROCEDURES AND REGULATIONS 
9-2-1. 
9-9-2. 
9-9-3. 
9-2-4. 
9-2-5. 
9-2-6. 
9-2-7. 
9-2-8. 
9-2-9. 
9-2-10. 
9-2-11. 
9-2-12. 
9-2-13. 
9-2-14. 
9-2-15. 
9-2-16. 
9-2-17. 
9-2-18. 
Name 
Purpose 
Building and Use Permits Required 
Building Official/Zoning Administrator 
Licensing Requirements 
Fees 
Inspection and Approval Required 
Initial Application Process 
Classification as to Use or Development 
Types of Approval Processes 
Appeal of Decision by Building Official/Zoning 
Administrator 
Compliance - A Pre-requisite to Regulatory 
Approval 
Time Computation 
Interpreration 
Conflict 
Repealer 
Penalty for Violations 
Increase Fees 
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TITLE 9 
LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS 
Chapter 2 
PROCESSING PROCEDURES AND REGULATIONS 
9-2-1. Name. 
This title shall be known as the Land Use and Development 
Regulations of Draper City Ordinances, 1990. 
9-2-2. Purpose. 
These regulations are designed and enacted for the 
purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, convenience, 
order, prosperity, and welfare of the present and future 
inhabitants of Draper City, providing for, among other things, less 
congestion in the streets, the allowance and encouragement of 
energy conservation and renewable energy sources, better building 
and development practices, adequate light and air, a logical 
classification of land uses and distribution of land development 
and utilization, protection of the tax base, economy and government 
expenditures, encouragement of agriculture and industrial pursuits 
in appropriate locations and the protection of existing urban 
development. These regulations accomplish these purposes by zoning 
the area lying within Draper City and by regulating the location, 
height, bulk and size of buildings and other structures, the 
percentage of lot which may be occupied, the size of yard, courts, 
and open spaces, the use of buildings and structures for trade, 
industry, residence, recreation, public activities or other 
purposes, and the uses of land for trade, industry, residence or 
other purposes, and regulates the subdivision of land within Draper 
City. 
9-2-3. Building and Use Permits Required. 
Any construction, alteration, repair or removal of any 
building or structure or any part thereof, or the change of use of 
any land or building as provided or as required in this Title shall 
not be commenced, or proceeded with, except after the issuance of 
a written permit for the same by the Building Official of Draper 
City. 
a. Unlawful. 
Any building or structure erected, constructed, 
altered, enlarged, converted, moved or maintained contrary to 
provisions of this Title, and any use of land, building or premise 
1 
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establish, conducted or maintained contrary to provisions of this 
Title shall be, and the same hereby is, declared 9-2-3, (a) 
to be unlawful and a public nuisance. 
b. Restraint of Use or Building. 
Tne City shall upon request of the Building Official 
and with the approval of the City Council at once commence action 
or proceedings for the abatement and removal or enjoinment thereof 
in a matter provided by law, and take other steps as will abate and 
remove such buildings, use, or structure, and restrain or enjoin 
any person, firm, or corporation from erecting, building, 
maintaining or using said building or structure or property 
contrary to the provisions of this Title. The remedies provided 
for herein shall be cumulative and not exclusive. 
9-2-4. Building Official/Zoning Administrator. 
A Building Official/Zoning Administrator shall be 
designated and authorized by the City Council as the officer 
charged with the enforcement of this Title. From time to time, by 
resolution or ordinance, the City Council may entrust such 
administration in whole or in part to any other officer without 
amendment to this Title. The Building Official/Zoning 
Administrator shall enforce the provisions of this Title entering 
actions in the regulatory board, commissions or courts when 
necessary, and such failure to do so shall not legalize any 
violations of the provisions of this Title. The Building 
Official/Zoning Administrator shall not issue any permit unless the 
plans of the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction, 
alterations and use fully conform to all regulations then in 
effect. 
9-2-5. Licensing Requirements. 
All departments, officials, and public employees of the 
City which are vested with the duty or authority to issue permits ^  
or licenses shall confirm to the provisions of this Title and shall ?v\ 
issue no permits or licenses for use, building, or purpose where \J 
the same would be in conflict with the provisions this Title and 
any such permit or license, if issued in conflict with the 
pxovi£^n^J!_this Title shall be null and void. 
9-2-6. Fees. 
Fees shall be charged applicants for building, occupancy, 
and conditional use permits, design review inspection and planned 
unit development and subdivision approvals, Planning Commission, 
and Board of Adjustment hearings, and such other services as are 
required by this Title to be performed by and for in behalf of the 
2 
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9-2-16. Repealer. 
All such Land Use Regulations previously adopted by 
Draper City are hereby superceded and amended to read as set forth 
herein; provided, however that this Title shall be deemed to be a 
continuation of the previous ordinances, including amendments, and 
not a new enactment, insofar as the substance or revisions of 
previous provisions is included in those ordinances whether in the 
same or in different wording. 
9-2-17. Penalty for Violations. 
Whoever shall violate any of the provisions of this Title 
shall be guilty of a Class ffBft Misdemeanor for each and every day 
such violation shall occur or continue and upon conviction of any 
such violation, shall be punishable by a fine of not more than 
$1,000.00, or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or by 
both such fine and imprisonment for each infraction. 
9-2-18. Increased Fees. 
Notwithstanding that any violation of this Title is a 
Class ffBlf Misdemeanor, the City reserves the right to increase the 
permit fee up to twice the normal amount when, (1) an activity that 
complies with all applicable city, county, and state regulations 
has become, but has failed to first attain an appropriate permit, 
or (2) when a person/business to whom an appropriate permit has 
been issued has failed to comply with all the rules and regulations 
which apply to that permit, but has been able to obtain a variance 
from the Board of Adjustments after the non-compliance has been 
discovered. 
a. Scheduled Increased Fees. 
When the City exercises its right to increase its 
permit fee the following schedule shall apply: 
(1) An additional ten percent (10%) shall be added 
to the permit fee when the person/business in 
violation files within five (5) working days 
after notification of the violation from the 
City, an appropriate application to correct 
violation. 
(2) An additional one hundred percent (100%) shall 
be added to the permit fee for those who fail 
to file the appropriate application within five 
(5) working days after the notification from 
the City. 
9 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 6 
Subdivision Application 
£D /lily IC/7£ 
City of Draper 
12441 South 9th East 
P.O. Box 33^1 84020 
ATTN: Planning and Zoning 
Gentlemen: 
Ue hereby submit application for a Minor Subdivision called Shadow Mountain Acres 
located at approximately.647 East 13800 South. 
Enclosed is a filing fee of $250.00 plus $125.00 representing a fee of $25*00 per 
lot. 
At Enclosure 1 is nine copies of a Reel! ml nary Plat which complies with your 
Subdivision Filing Rrocedures 2d. 
At Enclosure 2 are Preliminary Engineering Reports on the sewer and water nade by 
Templeton. Linke and Associates. 
At Enclosure 3 is proof r»f our invested interest. 
We respectfully request that this subdivision be reviewed as soon as possible. If 
there are any questions or problems that we can assist with please let us know. 
Respectfully, 
Layne J. Newman 
232 E. 6715 So. 
Midvale, Utah 8404? 
Telephone: 261-1128 
Melbourne 'T. Yergensen 
2518 Newport Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: 942-1158, 56I-HH 
EXHIBIT 
A 
ALL-STATE LEGAL SUPPLY CO 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 7 
Board of Adjustments file, 4/12/1979 
EXHIBIT 
2QA&D 07 ADJUSTMENTS & . 
Bit April 12 1 1979 IU#tilXg |^ AU-STATE LEGAL SUPPLY CO 
Meeting called to order by Chairman Toe Ifellanthln vith the f allowing pr«ientt 
Doane Sadler; Gary lelsonj Slaer Starling; and Andrea Zlsneroan, Sec. 
Meeting ojLlled to order at 8i2ii p.m. 
Ho. 1t Appeal - Phil Bdaunda 
Charge of $138 for not getting building permit from it City of Draper. 
Also 5<# charge added to fee because he didn't get a building permit. 
Doane Sadler moved that the $0% charge be made aa originally Issued 
vith meoond by Gary Belaon. Toting m in favor. 
Queetion brought up aa to whether he need to get business license. 
Bo. 2i AHTZS PSCK - Yarianoe I 
Building la on a lit foraerly less than one acre. Elmer Sterling moved 
to approval varxgmoe Second by fluane Sadler, Motion carried* 
JTo. 3* MOTAL AfflgRSQS ~ Terianoe 
Applying for ii-plax variance. 
Ton Mellenthln moved to approve the variance on the duplex only. 
Second by Slaer Sterling. Motion carried. 
lo. Us BBffllS JBUHHHAM - Yarianoe 
IXiaae Sadler moved to approve maid variance vith aecond by Gary Kelson. 
Hot ion carr±ed» 
*o. $t LTKE CAKHSR - Yarianoe 
I^ rnn Carter vas preaent to request 100 ft. frontage variance at QkS £• 
11*800 South. Ifaane Sadler moved to approve variance vith second by gbear Sterling. 
Motion carried*___ ~ — - — 
Mo. 6* LLSZ MftMAH. SAM OYAKD & M Y U BAT - Y^Hfn^ 
All of above vere present. A Mr. Stevens, neighbor, also present in 
favor. Ton Mellenthln moved to approve the variance based on the folloving j 
conditionsx \ „ - . , . /*.\ -^ -^ / 
a) 70 foot oul de sac; (b; 16 ft« paved surfaoe back from main roa£,' 
(0) fire hydrant and adequate vaterline. ^ 
Second"by^Dogae "Sadler "and motion passed unanljsoualy. 
^ 1 -?-*•—-RQjyJLl) HASHffgSEN - Yarianoe regarding the l o t s i s e from 1 acre tu .90 acres. 
Klaer Sterling moved to approve variance vith second by Cuane Sadler, Moti« n 
carried unanimously. 
Mae t i n g adjourned at 9*36 p.m. 
0 0 0 2 8 1 
March , I979 
To Whoa it Bay concern: 
M. Saa Ovard and Layne Newman are applying for a variance 
just North of 65O E. I38OO S. 
A right of way 35 feet wide and 311 feet deep connects 138(£. S. 
with a 5.I6 acre peice of land. 
The land is not being used for anything at the present tine. 
There is nothing on the property or right of way exoept old shed 
foundations which will be removed and a concrete irrigation ditch 
which will stay for irrigation. The East Jordan Canal borders the 
Northern property line. 
We plan to build two hones on the property for ourselves to 
live in. 
^ ^ T^ ^^J ^ r / ^ s^#^ o/c^j. # 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 8 
Draper City Ordinances 
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1 AU.-STATCLEOM.SUPfi.YCO. 1 6-3 REGULATORY PROVISIONS 
6-3-1 Enforcement 
A# The Building Official is designated and authorized by the City 
Council as the officer charged with .the enforcement of this Title, but 
from time to time, by resolution or ordinance, the City Council may 
entrust such administration, in whole or in part, to any other officer 
without amendment to this Title. The Building Official shall enforce 
the provisions of this Title, entering actions in the courts^ when 
necessary to33us^failureUb"Jdo~-^ of 
the provisions* The Building Official shall not issue any permit unless 
the plans of the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction, 
alternation and use fully conform to all land use development 
regulations then in effect. 
B« It shall be the duty of the Building Official to inspect or cause to be 
inspected all buildings and improvements in course of construction or 
repair* 
C. The construction, alteration, repair or removal of any building or 
structure or any part thereof, or the change of use of any land or 
building as provided or as regulated in this Title shall not be 
commended, or proceeded with, except after the issuance of a 
written permit for the same by the Building Official. 
^ActA\ c # ^y building or structure erected, constructed, altered, enlarged, 
" t X r converted, moved or maintained contrary to provisions of this Title, 
r Hi* O>L (7 £( anc^ ***? U s e °* ian^J building or premise established, conducted or 
LUJ^v\sJt ^r maintained contrary to provisions of this Title shall be, and the same 
, ..,« hereby is , declared to be unlawful and a public nuisance, and the City 
£ci^£<L^^£- Attorney shal l r upon -request of -the governing body, at once 
v commence -action or proceedings for abatement and removal or 
enjoinment thereof in a manner provided by law, and take other steps 
as will abate and remove such buildings use or structure, and restrain 
or enjoin any person, firm or corporation from erecting, building, 
maintaining or using said building, or structure or property contrary 
to the pruvh*iou* of this Tit le . The remedies provided for herein shall 
be commulative and not exclusive* 
o-3-Z Planning Commission Review 
All applicants for building permits, shall submit to the Planning 
Commission through their usual procedures and staff review process, a plan 
for the use and development of each parcel or structure for the purposes of 
meeting the requirements set forth in this Title. 
6-3-3 licensing 
All departments, officials, and public employees of the City which are 
vested with the duty or authority to issue permits or licenses shall conform 
to the provisions of this Title and shall, issue no permit or license for uses, 
building or purposes where ther'sarne would be in conflict with the 
o A a "> s A 
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provisions of this Title and any such permit or licences, if issued in conflict 
with the provisions of this Title, shall be null and void* 
6-3-4 Fees 
Fees may be charged applicants for building, occupancy, and conditional 
use permits, design review and planned unit development approvals, 
Planning Commission and Board of Adjustment hearings* and such other 
services as axe required by this Title to be performed by public officers or 
agencies* Such fees shall be established by the legislative body and be in 
amounts reasonably needed to defray costs to the public* 
6-3-5 Interpretation 
In interpreting and applying the provisions of this Title, the requirements 
contained herein are declared to be the minimum requirements for the 
purposes set forth* 
6-3-6 Ctmllict 
This Title shall not nullify the more restrictive provisions of covenants, 
agreements, other ordinances or laws, but shall prevail notwithstanding 
such provisions which are less restrictive. 
If any provision of this Title or its application to any - person or 
circumstance is , for any reason, held invalid, the remaining portion and/or 
poritons of this Title or the application of the provision to other persons or 
circumstances shall not be affected* 
6-3^7 Repealer 
The existing Zoning Subdivision and other land use regulatory Ordinance of 
the City are hereby superseded and amended to read as set forth herein; 
provided, however that this Title shall be deemed a continuation of the 
previous ordinances, including amendments, and not a new enactment, 
insofar as the substance of revisions or previous provisions is included in 
those ordinances whether in the same or in different language* 
6-3-g Penalty far Violation 
Whoever shall violate any of the provisions of this Title shall be guilty of a 
Class B miasdeameanor for each and eveiy day such violation shall occur or 
continue and upon conviction of any such violation, shall be punishable by a 
fine of not more than $299 or by imprisonment for not more than six 
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, or by the penalty for 
transfer and sale of property provided in Section 10-9-26 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, 
ft A ft 9 Q S 
6-6 SUBDIVISION 
6-6-1 General Provisions 
A. Purpose 
This chapter shalj provide for minimum standards relating tr- the 
platt ing and recording of land subdivision in the City of Draper, Utah, 
in particular i t is intended, among other things, to: 
1. Promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the 
residents of the City. 
2. Promote the efficient and orderly growth of the City. 
3 . Provide a basis for determining the appropriateness of and 
method for approval of residential development. 
4. Establish design and installation standards for s treets , water 
and sewer facilities, drainage systems and other public utilities. 
B. Evidence of Public Welfare 
Any proposed subdivision and its ult imate use shall be in the best 
in teres ts of the public welfare and the neighborhood and the 
subdivider shall present evidence to this effect when requested to do 
so by the City. 
C. Restrictions of Subdivided Land 
1. No person shall sell or exchange or offer to sell or exchange^ any r 
parcel of land which is a part of a subdivision of a larger t ract J 
of land, or record for building purposes in the office of the 
County Recorder any subdivision plat unless the subdivision has 
been approved by the City according to the provisions of this / 
Chapter. ^ 
2. All lots, plots, or t rac t s of land located within a subdivision 
shall be subject to the provisions of this Chapter, regardless of 
whether or not the t ract is owned by the Subdivider or a 
subsequent purchaser, transferee, or holder of the land. 
6-6-2 Designation of Subdivision 
A. Regular Subdivisions 
The owner/agent of any parcel of land proposed for regular 
subdivision ^h^ll apply to the Planning Commission for Conditional 
Use Perm it~"(Iesi gnat ion as a regular subdivision. Such application 
shall include a legal description of the t ract and a location map 
indicating the relation of the property to existing roads, adjoining 
property owners, and other information as may be required to 
adequately identify and describe the property. At a regular public 
meeting the Planning Commission shall hear the application and make 
6-1 
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a matter of minutes ev idence in support of the application, their 
determinat ion of subdivision designation, and any conditions for 
development that may be peculiar to the subdivision. Uporjapproval 
of the designation and the Conditional Use Permit , the subdivides 
shall follow procedure and submit documents for preliminary and 
final plat processing as defined in this Chapter. 
B. Non-Regular Subdivisions 
The owner/agent of any parcel of land proposed for non-regular 
subdivision shall apply to the Planning Commission for Conditional 
Use Permit designation as a non-regular subdivision of a type herein 
described. Such applications shall include a legal description of the 
tract and a locat ion map indicating the relation of the property to 
exis t ing roads, adjoining property owners, and other information as 
may be required to adequately identify and describe the property. At 
a regular public meet ing the Planning Commission shall h e a r ) t h e 
application and make a matter of minutes evidencevinsupport^of the 
application, their determinat ion of subdivision designation, and any 
conditions for development that may be peculiar to the subdivision. 
Upon approval of designation and the Conditional Use Permit, the 
subdivider shall follow procedures and submit documents for 
processing consistent with type of non-regular subdivision 
requirements l isted here: 
1. Large-Lot Subdivision. Upon designation of large-lot 
subdivision the subdivider shail submit documents for both 
preliminary and final plat processing. All improvements and 
guarantees shall be as required for regular subdivision except , 
after recommendation by the Planning Commission, the City 
Council may allow lots to be sold with only partial improve-
ments , provided that paved s treets and culinary water, 
including fire protect ion capacity , shall be available and 
installed to City standard speci f icat ions . 
2. Minor Subdivision. Upon designation of minor subdivision, the 
subdivider shall submit documents for preliminary plat 
processing in accordance with this Chapter. Approval of the 
preliminary plat by the Planning Commission and the City 
Council shall be authorization for the subdivider to sell lots 
within the subdivision covered by the preliminary plat by m e t e s 
and bounds, and the requirements of a final plat shall be 
waived. 
a. Improvements - When a final plat is not" required, the 
subdivider shall provide all imporvements required for 
standard subdivision, or large-lot subdivision when so 
approved. All such improvements shall be constructed in 
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter and as 
defined by the City Engineer. 
b . Guarantee - In l ieu of each lot being fully improved prior 
to the sa le of lots , the subdivider shall provide improve-
ment guarantee, which amount is to be set by the City 
6-2 ft 0 0 2 8 7 
Engineer and approved by the City Council according to 
the procedures established for regular subdivision. All 
design and improvement standards of regiilar js£iMj_yJLsion 
shall ap"pTy to Minor Subdivision. £p 
3. One-Lot Subdivision. Upon designation of one-lot subdivision, 
the subdivider may request use of the property with the 
requirements for both preliminary and final plat waived, 
provided the use and lot meets all requirements of the City 
Zoning Ordinance. Improvements of one-lot subdivisions shall 
be consistent with regular subdivision or large-lot subdivisions 
where so approved. Guarantee of improvements shall be by 
building occupation restrictions or by bond or escrow at the 
discretion of the City Council. 
4. Planned Development Subdivision. Upon designation of Planned 
Development Subdivision, the subdivider may submit documents 
for processing following the procedures for regular subdivision 
approval which must include the special provisions for Planned 
Development Subdivision as contained in this Chapter. 
6-6-3 Subdivision Processing and Approval Procedure 
A. Preliminary Plat 
1. Preliminary Consultation. Each person or enti ty who proposes 
to subdivide land within the jurisdiction of the City shall 
become familiar with the City subdivision requirements and 
land use related plans for the terr i tory in which the proposed 
subdivision lies by consultation with the Planning Commission 
staff. It shall be the obligation of the subdivider to have a 
knowledge of procedures, policies and to have an understanding 
of the availabilities of utility services before submission of the 
preliminary plat . 
Z. Zoning Requirements. The subdivider shall comply with all 
Zoning Ordinance regulations to accomodate intended lot size 
and type of development. Conditional use and subdivision 
designation approval shall be required of all subdivision 
applications before submission of the preliminary plat . 
3. Preliminary Plat Filing. A preliminary plat shall be prepared in 
conformance with the standards, rules, and regulations 
contained herein, and eight (8) blue and white prints therof Shall 
be submitted to the City for distribution to various departments 
and interested entities for their information and 
recommendations prior to formal action by the Planning 
Commission. 
4. Preliminary Plat Application Fee . At the time of filing the 
preliminary plat , the subdivider shall deposit with the City a 
non-refundable application fee made payable to the City. The 
City Council shall prescribe from time to time the amount of 
such fee, which shall be for the purpose of defraying expenses 
6-3 
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incidental and in connection with the checking and reviewing of 
such preliminary subdivision plats , 
5. Preliminary Plat Requirements . The preliminary plat shall be 
drawn to a s ca l e not smaller than 100 fee t to the ir~rh, and shall 
be on standard 22 x 34 inch or 24 x 36 inch pap^r. The plat 
shall show: £> 
a. The proposed name of the subdivision (acceptable names 
shall be approved by the County Recorder) . 
b. The subdivision locat ion as forming a part of a larger 
tract or parcel . Where the plat submitted includes only a 
portion of a larger tract or only a part of a parcel or 
parcels of the same owner, a sketch plan of a prospective 
major s t ree t system shall be prepared showing logical 
connect ions to and through the larger parcel. The 
preliminary plat shall show all adjoining property owned 
or having an ownership interest by the subdivider. 
c . Sufficient information to accurate ly l oca te the property 
including the nearest sec t ion corner t ie . A copy of the 
County property ownership plat of the property and a 
legal description of the parcel must also be submitted. 
d. The owners of all land adjoining and contiguous to the 
proposed subdivision. 
e. The names and addresses of the subdivider(s), owner(s) of 
land, and the engineer or surveyor of the subdivision. 
f. Contours at two-foot intervals to show the topography of 
the land. 
g. The boundary lines of the tract to be subdivided including 
total acreage proposed for subdivision. 
h* The locat ion, dimensions and other detai ls of all existing 
or p lat ted s treets and other important features such as 
e a s e m e n t s , railroad l ines, water courses (including 
irrigation canals and ditches) , except ional topography, 
bridges and buildings within or immediate ly adjacent to 
the tract to be subdivided. 
n Existing sanitary sewer , storm drains, water supply mains, 
and surface water control structures within the tract and 
immediate ly adjacent thereto . A commitment in writing 
from the appropriate agencies that uti l i ty services will be 
available for the project . 
j . The flood hazard boundary as per Federal Flood Insurance 
Administration, when applicable. 
6-4 
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k. The locat ions , dimensions, and other detai ls of proposed 
public s t ree t , private s tree t s , al leys, uti l ity easements , 
parks, open spaces used and lots , with proper labeling of 
parcels to be dedicated to the public or designated for 
private use . 
1. Buffer zones and proposed mitigation where non-
compat ible uses adjoin the subdivision. 
m. North point, sca le and date . 
n» A copy of proposed protect ive covenants . 
o« A preliminary Storm Drainage Study. 
p. The layout , dimension and numbering of all lots . 
q. Proposed construction of permanent fencing along 
appropriate subdivision boundaries in conformance with 
the guidelines provided in this ordinance and staff 
recommendat ions . 
r. The proposed method of dealing with all irrigation water 
s y s t e m s relating to the properties , including a full 
consideration of all run-off water conditions. 
Preliminary Plat Approval. The preliminary pla t^ shall) be 
reviewed by the Planning Commission, and either approved or 
rejected within 45 days after its presentation to the commssion, 
or if modified, within 45 days of the presentation of the latest 
modification. If approved, the Planning Commission *shall 
express i t s approval in writing or a matter of minutes, with 
whatever conditions are at tached and return one copy of the 
preliminary plat, signed by the Commission Chairman, to the 
subdivider. If the preliminary plat is not approved, the Planning 
Commission shall indicate its disapproval in writing or as a 
matter of minutes and reasons therefore by a siroilarlvs^igned 
copy. Upon the Planning Commission's action, the plat(^halljbe 
referred to the City Council for rev iew, when appro v e a b y the 
City Council , the subdivider is authorized to proceed with the 
preparation of the revised preliminary plat. 
Time Limitat ion. Approval of the preliminary plat shall be 
e f f ec t ive for a maximum period of one (1) year after approval 
unless, upon application of the subdivider, the Planning 
Commission shall grant an extension which shall not exceed one 
(1) year. If the final plat has not been submitted within one (1) 
year, or the approved extension period, the preliminary plan 
must again be submitted to the Planning Commission for 
reconsideration. However , preliminary approval of a large 
tract shall not be voided, provided that the developer shall 
apply for t ime extens ion as part of the original plan of phasing, 
the Planning Commiss ion shall, as part of the preliminary 
period for each, proposed phase, and the final plat for each 
phase is fi led within the maximum period so established. 
6-5 
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a. Bond - The subdivider shall furnish and file with the City 
Recorder a bond with corporate surety in an amount equal 
to 125% of the cost of the improvements as est imated by 
the City Engineer to assure the 'nstallation and 
construction of the improvements required u y this 
Ordinance. Such bond shall be subject to approval of the 
City Council. 
3 . Re lease of Performance Guarantees . The City Council shall, at 
the request of the subdivider or his successors in interest , 
re lease from time to t ime , portions of the bond, for which the 
construction performance has been fully satisfied, provided 
however , there shall be retained with the City for a period of 
twelve (12) months from the date of acknowledgement by the 
City Engineer that all improvements are satisfactorily 
implaced, a sum or securi ty of not less than ten (10) percent of 
the total improvement construct ion cost as a guarantee of good 
material and workmanship. 
D . Recordation and Limitations 
1. City to Record. When finally approved, the City Recorder shall 
be responsible for recording subdivision plats. The subdivider 
shall pay for all recording fees at the t ime of recordation. No 
final plats shall be recorded in the of f ice of the County 
Recorder, and no lots included in such final plat shall be sold or 
exchanged, unless and until the plat is properly approved, signed 
and accepted by the City . 
2. Time Limitation After Approval. Any final plat not offered for 
recording within one (1) year after the date of preliminary plat 
approval, unless the t ime is extended by the Planning 
Commission shall not be recorded, or received for recording, 
and shall have no validity whatsoever . 
3 . Changes in Final Plat Prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any 
person to change the l ines , drawings, lot s izes or shapes, or any 
other provision of a plat or support document after it has 
rece ived final approval by any entity whose approval is 
required. 
E. Amended Plats 
L When changes are to be made in a plat of a subdivision which 
has been approved and recorded, said subdivision shall be 
vacated and an amended plat thereof shall be approved and 
recorded in accordance with the procedures established in this 
Chapter for approval and recordation of the final plat. 
6-6-4 Required Subdivision Improvements 
A. Permanent Improvements 
The subdivider of any land l o c a t e d in or p lat ted as a subdivision shall 
at his o*m expense , install the following improvements in compliance 
Blocks intended fpr business or industrial uses shall be 
designed specificAlly/ for such purposes, with adequate 
space set as\de\jjr o f f -s treet parking and delivery 
fac i l i t ies . 
Lots 
1. Standards, 
a. The lot arrangement and design shall be such that lots will 
provide sat i s factory and desirable s i tes for buildings, and 
be properly related to topography and to existing and 
probable future use requirements. 
b. All lots shown on the subdivision plat must conform to the 
minimum area and width requirements of the Zoning 
Ordinance for the zone in which the subdivision is located 
unless: 
(1) A variance is granted by the Board of Adjustment. 
(2) It is consistent with cluster subdivision approval as 
provided in this Tit le . 
Each lot shall have frontage on a public s treet dedicated 
by the subdivision plat, or an exist ing public s treet , or on 
a street which has become public by right of use and is at 
least forty (40) f ee t wide. Lots on private driveways, 
lanes or s t ree t s not dedicated to the public shall be 
subject to approval of the Planning Commission or Ec-ard 
of Adjustment as provided in this Ti t le . 
d. Buildings constructed on corner lots shall comply with the 
minimum setback for both s tree t s , as provided in the City 
Zoning Ordinance, and corner lot design shall anticipate 
the additional setback requirements. 
e. Side lines of lots shall be at approximately right angles to 
the s treet l ine, or radial to the s treet l ine. 
f. Where the land included in a subdivision includes two or 
more parcels in separate ownership and the lot 
arrangement is such that a property ownership line divides 
one or more lotsy the land in each lot so divided shall be 
transferred by deed to ei ther single or joint ownership 
before approval of the final plat , and such transfer shall 
be ordered by t i t l e report submitted with the final plat . 
Natural Drainage and Irrigation Water 
1. Standards. 
a. Natural Drainage and Other Easements - The Pla 
Commission shall, unless waived for good and suff 
6-18 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 9 
Partial Summary Judgment 
Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (A2033) 
Thomas R. Lee (A5991) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Attorneys for Robert E. Brown, Jr. 
and Diane Brown 
Suite 1300, 185 South State Street 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
B. N. GLANVILLE,-JOSEPH D. 
SANDERS and CHERYL M. SANDERS, ) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 900902397PR 
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF ) 
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD ) (Hon. Anne M. Stirba) 
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY ) 
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER ) 
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L. HOFFMAN,) 
Mayor of the City of Draper, ) 
ROBERT BROWN, KIM STEVENS, and ) 
JOHN DOES I through X, ) 
Defendants. ) 
ROBERT E. BROWN, JR. and 
DIANE BROWN, 
Counterclaim and Crossclaim 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
B.N. GLANVILLE, M.D. GLANVILLE, 
JOSEPH D. SANDERS, CHERYL M. 
SANDERS, KIM STEVENS, REBECCA 
STEVENS, and SUSAN B. DAY, 
Countercla im and Crossclaim 
Defendants . 
HLcDiNcirnvc 
Ovtia-.y Crttfk 
iyM21$ 
The Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 30, 1993 of 
defendant Robert E. Brown, Jr. came on regularly for hearing 
before the Court, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding, at 3:00 
p.m. on June 14, 1993, plaintiffs appearing through their counsel, 
Frederick N. Green, defendant Brown appearing through his counsel, 
Thomas R. Lee, and the Court having reviewed the submissions of 
the parties filed herein, having heard oral argument, and the 
Court having det ermined that there exists no genuine issue as to 
any material fact bearing upon defendant Brown's Motion and that 
defendant Brown is entitled to judgment dismissing with prejudice 
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action of the Amended Com-
plaint as a matter of law for the reasons set forth from the Bench 
and for all of the reasons set forth in defendant Brown's memo-
randa submitted in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant Brown dated 
March 30, 1993 be and the same is hereby granted. 
2. The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action of the 
Amended Complaint herein dated January 21, 1993 of plaintiffs be 
and the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon their 
merits. 
MADE AND ENTERED this ( p ^ day of. £M:LM^%'\ , 1993. 
HonVrable^swff^T Stirba 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Partial Summary Judgment 
was served this day of June, 1993 by mailing on said date 
copies thereof by United States mail, first class postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Frederick N. Green, Esq. 
Green & Berry 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jody K Burnett, Esq. 
Williams & Hunt 
Attorneys for Defendants Draper City, 
Draper City Board of Adjustment, Planning 
Commission, Draper City Council, and 
Charles L. Hoffman 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Kim R. Stevens and Rebecca Stevens, Pro Se 
13755 South Shadow Mountain Lane 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Susan B. Day, Pro Se 
621 East 13800 South 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 10 
Summary of Orders Previously Entered 
C i 
Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (A2033) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Attorneys for Robert E. Brown, Jr. 
and Diane Brown 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
B. N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D. SANDERS 
and CHERYL M. SANDERS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF 
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD 
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY 
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER 
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L. 
HOFFMAN, Mayor of the City of Draper, 
ROBERT BROWN, KIM STEVENS, and 
JOHN DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
ROBERT E. BROWN, JR. and 
DIANE BROWN, 
Counterclaim and Crossclaim 
Plaintiffs, 
SUMMARY OF 
ORDERS PREVIOUSLY ENTERED 
AND 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
REMAINING FOR TRIAL 
Civil No. 900902397PR 
(Hon. Anne M. Stirba) 
vs. 
000653 
B. N. GLANVILLE, M. D. GLANVILLE, 
JOSEPH D. SANDERS, CHERYL M. 
SANDERS, KIM STEVENS, REBECCA 
STEVENS, and SUSAN B. DAY, 
Counterclaim and Crossclaim 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to the Court's direction to counsel at pretrial, the following is a summary of 
the Orders previously entered in this action by the Court (attached are copies of the Orders in 
question) and a statement of the issues remaining for trial. 
The Original Complaint. Attached as Exhibit "A" is a copy of the original 
Complaint filed in this action. It contained four causes of action: 
First Cause of Action sought a writ of mandamus against Draper City re-
quiring Draper City to prosecute violations of zoning and subdivision laws. 
Second Cause of Action sought a declaratory judgment of the construction and 
validity of ordinances and actions of Draper City. 
Third Cause of Action sought recovery of damages against Draper City 
because of its negligence in administration of zoning and subdivision laws. 
Fourth Cause of Action sought damages against defendants Brown and Stevens 
because of their trespass upon the property of plaintiffs. 
Order of Dismissal dated November 26, 1990. Draper City and its various 
committees, council, and mayor (collectively referred to as "Draper City") moved to dismiss 
all claims in the Complaint as against it. Draper City asserted that, for the following 
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0 0 \) o a 4 
reasons, the Complaint failed to state a claim for relief: First, Draper City does not owe 
plaintiffs any duty to enforce variances because enforcement of laws is a duty running to the 
public generally. Second, the statute of limitations expired with respect to any challenge to 
the variances in question. Third, Draper City's alleged misconduct was subject to govern-
mental immunity. Judge Russon granted the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the Ruling, a 
copy of which is attached hereto marked Exhibit "B," on November 7, 1990. That Ruling 
stated that Draper City's Motion was granted for the reasons set forth in its Memorandum 
and that Draper City owed no duty to Sanders/Glanville concerning alleged ordinance 
violations and variances and the statute of limitations applied. Judge Russon entered an 
Order of Dismissal on November 26, 1990, a copy of which is attached hereto marked 
Exhibit "C." The Court's Order effected a dismissal with prejudice of First, Second, and 
Third Causes of Action against Draper City. 
The Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs by Stipulation filed an Amended Complaint, a 
copy of which is attached hereto marked Exhibit "D." The first four causes of action 
contained in the Amended Complaint were substantially identical to their counterparts in the 
original Complaint. After amendment of the Complaint, the following causes of action 
remained (First, Second, and Third Causes of Action having been dismissed by the Court's 
Order of November 26, 1990): 
Fourth Cause of Action sought damages against Brown and Stevens for their 
trespass upon the property of Sanders/Glanville. 
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Fifth Cause of Action sought damages against Brown based upon the claim 
that Brown negligently purchased the property now owned by them, that Brown's 
purchase of the property damaged Sanders/Glanville, and that Brown had been 
unjustly enriched as a result. 
Sixth Cause of Action sought the Court's order rescinding the sales of the 
Brown property because the sales thereof were illegal. 
Seventh Cause of Action sought an order requiring Brown and Stevens to 
comply with subdivision ordinances and to abate the nuisance created by non-
compliance with subdivision ordinances. 
Partial Summary Judgment on Brown's Motion. On March 30, 1993, Browns 
moved the Court for summary judgment dismissing Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of 
Action of the Amended Complaint against defendant Brown. Browns' Memorandum asserted 
that those claims should be dismissed because (a) Draper City had by variance validated the 
subdivision and the time within which that variance could be challenged had expired, (b) 
Sanders/Glanville lacked standing to force compliance with subdivision laws, (c) 
Sanders/Glanville failed to establish any duty running from Browns to Sanders concerning 
Browns' purchase of the property and because Browns' purchase of the property did not 
harm Sanders. 
Thereafter, the Court granted Partial Summary Judgment for the reasons SQt forth in 
Browns' memoranda and dismissed with prejudice Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action 
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of the Amended Complaint. A copy of the Partial Summary Judgment is attached hereto 
marked Exhibit "E." 
Browns' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Sanders/Glanville asserted that a 
right-of-way conveyed to Browns along with the fee simple property they purchased 
described a parcel of ground that was separated from Browns' fee simple property by a few 
feet (which few feet were owned by Sanders/Glanville) and that, accordingly, the Browns 
were trespassing upon the Sanders/Glanville property each time they accessed their property. 
Browns filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated November 30, 1993 seeking the Court's 
determination as a matter of law that the subject right-of-way was contiguous with the Brown 
property and, with that determination, a dismissal with prejudice of all claims of 
Sanders/Glanville for trespass over the alleged strip of land separating the Brown fee simple 
property from their right-of-way. The Court granted Browns' Motion through a bench 
ruling. A transcript is attached hereto as Exhibit "F." In the Summary Judgment entered by 
the Court (attached as Exhibit "G"), the Court ruled, based upon the alternative grounds of 
proper construction of title documents, reformation, and/or easement by necessity, that the 
description of the parcel of land over which Browns had a right-of-way was located so as to 
touch the Brown property, thereby eliminating any "gap" between the right-of-way area and 
the Brown property. As a consequence, the Court dismissed with prejudice those portions of 
Fourth Cause of Action that alleged claims arising from Browns' trespass upon any land 
owned by Sanders/Glanville in any "gap" between the right-of-way, on the one hand, and the 
Brown property, on the other hand. 
-5-
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Issues Remaining for Trial. The foregoing orders have effected a dismissal with 
prejudice of all of the claims contained in the Amended Complaint except that portion of 
Fourth Cause of Action that seeks damages against Browns for their alleged trespass upon the 
Sanders/Glanville property other than any trespass that could arguably be said to have arisen 
through there existing a gap area owned by Sanders/Glanville between (i) the right-of-way 
owned by Browns and (ii) the fee simple property owned by Browns. In addition, all 
defenses of Browns to those claims remain at issue. 
DATED this \V^ day of frrfs(hA^ 1995. 
Woodbury & Kesler 
:, Of Counsel 
JL9 PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN 
&GEE 
Attorneys for Defendants Browns 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 11 
Designation of Additional Exhibit 
Reid W. Lambert - #5744 
Russell s. Walker - #3363 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 3358 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-3358 
Telephone: (801) 364-1100 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLANVILLE, et al. , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF DRAPER, et al., 
Defendants. 
DESIGNATION OF ADDITIONAL 
EXHIBIT 
Civil No. 900902397 PR 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Plaintiff Joseph Sanders hereby designates one additional for 
the Trial in this matter to commence July 13, 1995. Specifically, 
Sanders designates the Assignment of Claim executed by Margaret 
Glanville July 6, 1995, a copy of which is attached hereto. 
DATED this /ft ^  day of July, 1995. 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
Ra&T w7 L a « b e i f b / l V 
Attorney for Sanders 
FILED _ 
p.?T-...-.T r^ntpr 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This certifies that I did deliver a true and correct copy of 
the above DESIGNATION OF WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS to the following by 
first class U.S. Mail this //)& day of July, 1995: 
Bruce Maak 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jody K. Burnett 
257 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kim R. Stevens and Rebecca Stevens 
13755 South Shadow Mountain Lane 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Susan B. Day 
621 East 13800 South o ^ x & a a i . X J O U U O U U L . I I ^-\ 
Draper, Utah 84 020 / / 
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asgXggaESLP? CLAIM 
X
 H a r g a r * t d a n v i l l . « * , - o n a l representa t ive of the 
S s ^ o f Ben . . OlanviUe and the o « of ~ 1 P „ P ^ S e a t e d 
. • ^ i . n o . a s«b3«=t of t h . case known a* 
i n nraper, Utah, vnich xs no 
A4. a i C a s e >*o. 9 0 0 9 0 2 3 9 7 ?R, 
— - - ^ ^ r ^ i c t court for Salt I — Com**. Stat. o. 
o t a h ^ o ~ t h a Honorable AnnaStirba, do hereby assxsn -
• damages ri*hf « * cl2ias WhiCh * "•* " 
-j-ihta of action, damages, r-y 
,-*ed case to Josenh Safari, *y co-plai^f. - d do the abova-dascrlied case » ' » • 
«,• that the estate of Ben K. c-laaville averts no 
further stare that nne 
. • the property, it havin, been held in ioint tenancy «xth 
interest in the proper*, 
m a at the tin* of his death. 
/f1". J,« of July, 1995. DATED this _b__ day or u i, 
Margaret Glanvxll* 
O?RC:AL SHAL 
JAM S. CCXNS3 
NOTARY P'JEUC-OREGON 
\ M V COMMISSION NO. 021733 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES ?=B.2.19S7 
S t a t e of 3&£toa€*sen 
—- - - ^ z: S S L 
Mv comaiss ion - R a s i d i n g ^ : (ju^nm* <™ ^QfP 
expires-. p^tinM! cUlhU— 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 12 
Evidentiary Ruling, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law 
Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (A2033) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Attorneys for Robert E. Brown, Jr. 
and Diane Brown 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Third luminal District 
Deoutv Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
B. N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D. SANDERS 
and CHERYL M. SANDERS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF 
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD 
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY 
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER 
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L. 
HOFFMAN, Mayor of the City of Draper, 
ROBERT BROWN, KIM STEVENS, and 
JOHN DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
ROBERT E. BROWN, JR. and 
DIANE BROWN, 
Counterclaim and Crossclaim 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EVIDENTIARY RULING, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 900902397PR 
(Hon. Anne M. Stirba) 
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B. N. GLANVILLE, M. D. GLANVILLE, 
JOSEPH D. SANDERS, CHERYL M. 
SANDERS, KIM STEVENS, REBECCA 
STEVENS, and SUSAN B. DAY, 
Counterclaim and Crossclaim 
Defendants. 
This action came on regularly for trial on July 13 and 14, 1995 before the Court, the 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding, plaintiff Joseph D. Sanders appearing personally and 
through his counsel, Re id W. Lambert, defendants Brown appearing personally and through 
their counsel, Bruce A. Maak, and defendant Kim Stevens appearing on his own behalf, and 
the Court having heard the evidence, having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, 
having reviewed the file, being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing 
therefor, hereby makes the following: 
EVIDENTIARY RULING 
During the course of trial, plaintiffs offered into evidence a certain "Assignment" 
marked as Exhibit 1. The Court at that time reserved its ruling upon the admissibility of that 
document. The Court now makes the following determinations and rules as follows as to the 
admissibility of Exhibit 1. 
1. According to the representation of counsel, plaintiff B.N. Glanville, who is the 
brother-in-law of plaintiff Joseph D. Sanders, died in May 1995. 
2. Rule 25, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, prescribes a mechanism for the sub-
stitution of a personal representative, or other appropriate party, for a party who dies during 
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the course of an action. Plaintiffs did not pursue an appropriate substitution of parties for 
B.N. Glanville timely, or at all. 
3. Plaintiffs offered no admissible evidence establishing that Margaret Glanville is 
the personal representative of the estate of B.N. Glanville. 
4. Margaret Glanville did not appear at trial and, accordingly, was not available 
for cross-examination by defendants. 
5. The only evidence offered to support the authenticity of the Assignment, 
Exhibit 1, was offered by Joseph D. Sanders, who testified that, although he did not see the 
document executed, he delivered the document to Margaret Glanville for her signature and 
thereafter received the document back from her with a signature appearing to be that of 
Margaret Glanville thereon and that Margaret Glanville told Joseph D. Sanders that she had 
executed the document. Margaret Glanville's statement to Mr. Sanders is inadmissible 
hearsay. The evidence offered to establish the authenticity of Exhibit 1 is thin at best. 
6. The Assignment, itself, constitutes a hearsay statement that is not admissible 
under any exception to the hearsay rule. 
7. The Court finds under Rule 803(24), Utah Rules of Evidence, that the state-
ment is not more probative on the point for which it was offered than any other evidence 
which plaintiff could procure through reasonable efforts and that the general purpose of the 
Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice will not best be served by admission of the 
Assignment into evidence. Further, the proponent of the Assignment (Joseph D. Sanders) 
did not make the Assignment known to defendants sufficiently in advance of the trial to 
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provide defendants with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to 
offer the statement, and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. 
The Assignment was first made known to defendants by serving a copy of it upon them by 
mail on July 10, 1995 - just a few days before trial. 
8. Joseph D. Sanders could timely have complied with Rule 25, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and could, substantially in advance of trial, have apprised defendants of his 
intention to rely upon the Assignment, but he did neither. 
9. If the Assignment had been accepted into evidence, defendants would have 
been unreasonably prejudiced because, among other things, (i) defendants would be denied 
the opportunity to cross-examine declarant in the Assignment, (ii) defendants were precluded 
the opportunity to conduct discovery with respect to the Assignment and the testimony of its 
purported declarant, and (iii) the Assignment is, based upon all testimony concerning it, not 
sufficiently reliable to allow it fairly to be admitted under the circumstances presented here. 
10. Plaintiffs did not timely advise defendants that Exhibit 1 was intended to be 
offered as a trial exhibit. 
RULING 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby rules that the Assignment is inadmissible 
and may not properly be considered by the Court for any purpose. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This action concerns three parcels of real property and a right-of-way de-
scribed as follows: 
800*8? 
The "Brown Parcel" is presently owned by Robert and Diane Brown, is 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning 716.85 feet North 00°23'08" East from the East quarter corner of 
Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence South 76°11'02" West 186.90 feet; thence North 0°23'08" 
East 202.5 feet; thence North 76°11'02" East 186.90 feet; thence South 
0°23'08" West 202.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
The "Glanville Parcel" is located adjacent to and north of the Brown Parcel 
and is more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning 919.35 feet North 0°23'08" East from the East Quarter Corner of 
Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence South 76°ir02" West 221.90 feet, thence North 0°23'08" 
East 163.44 feet, thence North 57°28'51" East 137.16 feet, thence North 
62°46'20" East 112.81 feet, thence South 0°23'08" West 235.80 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
The "Panhandle Parcel" is located adjacent to and west of the Brown Parcel 
and adjacent to and east of the Stevens Parcel described below and is more particularly 
described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 716.85 feet North 0°23'08" East and 186.90 feet South 
76°ir02" West from the East Quarter Corner of Section 6, Township 4 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
76oll ,02 , , West 35 feet; thence North 0°23'08" East 202.5 feet; thence North 
76°ir02" East 35 feet; thence South 0°23'08" West 202.5 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
The "Stevens Parcel" is presently owned by Kim and Rebecca Stevens, is 
located adjacent to and west of the Panhandle Parcel, and is more particularly described as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point at the Southwesterly most point of property conveyed by 
Warranty Deed dated February 23, 1979, in which David H. Day and Susan 
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B. Day, his wife, are grantors and Layne J. Newman and Jessie S. Newman, 
his wife, are grantees, which deed was recorded April 2, 1979, at the office of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder, as Entry No. 3258663 Book 4838, Page 358, 
which point of beginning is South 57028,51" West 137.16 feet from a point 
which is approximately 100 feet West and 725 feet North from the East 
Quarter Corner of Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian and running thence South 57°28 ,5r West 39.65 feet to a point 
on the Southerly side of a concrete irrigation ditch at a corner fence post, said 
39.65 feet call being directly in line with, as though it were an extension of, 
the Southerly side of said concrete irrigation ditch; thence North 32o31'09M 
West 319 feet, more or less, along a fence line and Westerly side of a concrete 
block wall, to the center of the East Jordan Canal; thence Northeasterly along 
the center of said East Jordan Canal 235.9 feet, more or less, to a point which 
is North 00°23'08" East of the point of beginning; thence South 00°23'08" 
West 361.75 feet, more or less, along the West line of the above described 
Newman deed/ to the point of beginning. 
The "Right-of-Way Parcel" is a parcel of land 35 feet in width, which at its 
northerly end lies between the Stevens Parcel and the Brown Parcel and proceeds south to 
13800 South Street in Draper and is more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point which is 282.45 feet North 89°39'27" West from the East 
Quarter Corner of Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, said point being the Southwest corner of the property conveyed 
in that certain Special Warranty Deed to MGF Partnership, a limited Utah 
partnership, recorded July 17, 1979, as Entry No. 3309585, in Book 4903, at 
Page 540 of Official Records, and running thence North 0°23'08" East along 
the West boundary line of said "MGF Partnership" property 186.94 feet to the 
Northwest corner thereof; thence continuing North 0°23,08" East 124.36 feet, 
being parallel to and 17.5 feet, perpendicular distance from the Westerly 
boundary fine of the property conveyed in that certain Special Warranty Deed 
to James Walter Fitzgerald and Betty Marie Fitzgerald, recorded July 20, 
1978, as Entry No. 3140869, in Book 4709 at Page 990, of Official Records; 
thence North 17028y East along the Easterly right of way line of that certain 
35 foot wide right of way as described in that certain Warranty Deed to Ted 
A. Zimmerman and Julie G. Zimmerman, recorded August 14, 1991, as Entry 
No. 5111842, in Book 6346, at Page 911 of Official Records, 344.75 feet, 
more or less, to a point which is South 0°23'08" West from the Southwest 
corner of the property conveyed in that certain Utah Special Warranty Deed to 
Robert E. Brown, Jr. and Diane Brown, recorded January 27, 1989 as Entry 
-6-
0 008 9 9 
No. 4730055, in Book 6100, at Page 478 of Official Records; thence North 
0°23'08" East 24.4 feet, more or less, to the Southwest corner of the aforesaid 
property of "Brown"; thence North 0°23'08" East, along the West boundary 
line of said "Brown" property 160.32 feet; thence West 35.0 feet; thence 
South 0°23'08" West 194.0 feet, more or less, to the point of intersection with 
the Westerly right of way line of the aforesaid 35 foot wide right of way; 
thence South 17°28' West along said Westerly line to a point on the East 
boundary line of a 0.15 foot strip of land as the same described in that certain 
Warranty Deed to Susan B. Day, recorded July 09, 1990, as Entry No. 
4938604, in Book 6235, at Page 484, of the Official Records; thence South 
along said East boundary line of the "Day" property 314 feet, more or less, to 
the quarter section line of the aforesaid Section 6; thence South 89°39'27" 
East along said quarter section line 35 feet, more or less, to the point of 
beginning. 
This Court by Summary Judgment dated February 17, 1994 established the location and 
description of the right-of-way to be as set forth above. 
2. Between November, 1982 and September, 1988, Sanders owned the Glanville 
Parcel, the Panhandle Parcel, and the Brown Parcel subject to and together with a right-of-
way over the Right-of-Way Parcel. The Brown Parcel together with a right-of-way over the 
Right-of-Way Parcel was encumbered by a Deed of Trust in favor of Mountainwest Savings 
and Loan, which was recorded on December 9, 1980 as Entry No. 3512297 in Book 5188 at 
Page 1463 of the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's office (hereinafter referred to 
as the "Mountainwest Trust Deed"). 
3. Sanders failed to make various payments required under the Mountainwest 
Trust Deed and, as a result, the Mountainwest Trust Deed was nonjudicially foreclosed. 
Mountainwest was the purchaser at the trustee's foreclosure sale and, thereafter, received a 
conveyance of the Brown Parcel together with a right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel 
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through a Trustee's Deed recorded on September 1, 1988 as Entry No. 4670769 in Book 
6060 at Page 2702 of the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's office. 
4. Sanders transferred the Glanville Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel subject to a 
right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel to his sister and brother-in-law, M.D. and B.N. 
Glanville, by "Grant Deeds" dated May 19, 1988. Sanders made those transfers shortly 
before and with actual knowledge of the impending entry of a judgment against Sanders and 
in favor of one Ovard and the foreclosure of the Mountainwest Trust Deed. Sanders trans-
ferred those properties to Glanvilles to place them beyond the reach of his creditors. 
5. Glanvilles never transferred the Glanville Parcel or the Panhandle Parcel back 
to Sanders. No writing was ever executed by Glanvilles to evidence any transfer to Sanders 
of any interest relating to those parcels. Sanders had no ownership of or right to possession 
of the Glanville Parcel or the Panhandle Parcel following May 19, 1988. 
6. Sanders and Glanvilles had an agreement that, upon sale of the Glanville 
Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel, Sanders would receive from Glanvilles a portion of the sale 
proceeds. Sanders' right to receive such proceeds was the entire extent of Sanders' 
interest — his interest was not an interest in land, but rather a right to receive a future 
monetary payment. 
7. After the foreclosure sale, Mountainwest sold and conveyed the Brown Parcel 
together with a right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel to Browns by Utah Special 
Warranty Deed which was recorded on January 27, 1989 as Entry No. 4730055 in Book 
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6100 at Page 478 of the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's office. Defendants 
Stevens own the Stevens Parcel together with a right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel. 
8. During the fall of 1989, Browns placed their two horses in a preexisting 
fenced area that included the Glanville Parcel and a portion of the Brown Parcel. 
9. With no prior communication to Browns, on or about March 2, 1990, Sanders 
and Glanville, through their attorney, Frederick N. Green, demanded that Browns remove 
their horses from the Glanville Parcel and that Stevenses cease trespassing. Within a 
reasonable time following receipt of that notice - a few days - Browns installed a new fence 
preventing their horses from moving from the Brown Parcel onto the Glanville Parcel. 
Browns' horses did not thereafter intrude upon the Glanville Parcel. Sanders, not Glanvilles, 
directed that attorney Green write the demand letter to Browns. Glanvilles did not object to 
Browns' horses occupying the Glanville Parcel. Sanders had previously given permission to 
Layne Newman for horses to occupy the Glanville Parcel. Neither Sanders nor Glanvilles 
directly advised Browns that their horses could occupy the Glanville Parcel. However, 
Sanders desired that horses occupy the Glanville Parcel to control plant growth there, and the 
Court finds that Sanders consented to horses occupying the Glanville Parcel until further 
notice. Sanders did not revoke that permission until attorney Green sent his letter of March 
2, 1990. 
10. Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of proving any damage flowing from 
Browns' horses' occupation of the Glanville Parcel. 
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11. Browns own a right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel which entitles them 
to use the Right-of-Way Parcel for all purposes reasonably necessary or incident to furnish-
ing access, ingress and egress to the Brown Parcel. The northerly end of the Right-of-Way 
Parcel is located upon the Panhandle Parcel. The northerly end of the Right-of-Way Parcel 
is adjacent to and west of the Brown Parcel. Most of the north-south length of the Panhandle 
Parcel is burdened with a right-of-way in favor of the owner of the Brown Parcel and the 
owner of the Stevens Parcel. The Panhandle Parcel is only 35 feet in width in the east-west 
direction and is not reasonably usable for any purpose other than furnishing access to parcels 
that are adjacent to it, including the Brown Parcel, the Stevens Parcel, and the Glanville 
Parcel. There are no structures or improvements located upon the Panhandle Parcel. 
12. The driveway serving the house on the Brown Parcel has been in its present 
location since prior to Sanders' ownership and occupancy of the Brown Parcel. A portion of 
that driveway extends into the Panhandle Parcel. During approximately 1991, Browns in-
stalled grass and a sprinkler system in their yard area. They installed the grass entirely 
within the landscaping contours that had previously been established by Sanders during his 
ownership of the Brown Parcel. That grass extended over the boundary line between the 
Brown Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel to the extent of approximately 5-6 feet. There was 
no fence that marked the boundary between the Brown Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel in 
this area. In the area in which Browns installed lawn within the boundaries of the Panhandle 
Parcel, there was previously located only weeds. The area in which Browns installed lawn 
was never used by anyone for any purpose. The traveled area over the Panhandle Parcel that 
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was used to access the Glanville Parcel did not include the area in which Browns installed 
grass. Browns' installation of grass and a few sprinkler heads did not in any way interfere 
with plaintiffs' use or enjoyment of the Panhandle Parcel. The driveway is a use that is 
reasonably necessary to furnishing access, ingress, and egress to and from the Brown Parcel 
and does not interfere with the use of the Panhandle Parcel by its owner. 
13. Because Sanders objected to the location of the grass and sprinklers within the 
boundaries of the Panhandle Parcel, Browns caused both all of the grass and the sprinklers to 
be removed during October, 1994. 
14. A variance was granted by Draper City to Mountainwest with respect to the 
Brown Parcel. That variance allowed the Brown house to be located within 17 feet of the 
"private right-of-way," which referred to the right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel. 
The literal metes and bounds description of the Right-of-Way Parcel located the Right-of-
Way Parcel in such a way that there existed approximately 18 feet between the easterly edge 
of the Right-of-Way Parcel and one corner of the Brown house. This Court by Summary 
Judgment dated February 17, 1994 in this case ordered that the Right-of-Way Parcel, based 
upon the grounds stated therein, was located adjacent to the Brown Parcel, which resulted in 
there being as few as 11.2 feet between the easterly boundary of the private right-of-way and 
one corner of the Brown house. 
15. Draper City has determined that the Brown house location is a valid non-
conforming preexisting use and that the Brown house may be located in its present location 
without requiring that Browns occupy, control or make any claim to any portion of the 
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Panhandle Parcel. In any event, Browns' compliance or noncompliance with that variance 
has no effect on Sanders or Glanvilles. 
16. Glanvilles did not object to the existence of the driveway or to Browns' 
installation of grass and/or sprinklers within the boundaries of the Panhandle Parcel. 
17. Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of showing that they suffered any 
damage as a consequence of the existence of Browns' driveway or Browns' installation of 
grass and a sprinklers within the boundaries of the Panhandle Parcel. 
18. Both Browns and Stevenses periodically and temporarily parked vehicles 
within the Right-of-Way Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel. That use was a reasonable use of 
the right-of-way owned by Browns and Stevenses and did not interfere with Glanvilles' or 
Sanders' use of the Panhandle Parcel. 
19. The trespass claims asserted by Sanders in the action have no basis in law or 
fact. Under the clear evidence in this case, Sanders did not even have standing to pursue any 
claims because he did not even own the subject property. Glanvilles, who owned the prop-
erty, were ambivalent about the claims. The claims, themselves, are devoid of merit. 
20. Sanders brought claims in this action that were completely inconsistent with 
and contradictory to his own statements and actions during his ownership of the Brown 
Parcel. Among other things, both Sanders and Glanville admit that they understood that the 
right-of-way was adjacent to and connected to the Brown Parcel and, during the time that 
Sanders owned only the Brown Parcel (and not the Panhandle Parcel), Sanders used the 
right-of-way as his only access from 13800 South Street into his driveway. In this action, on 
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the other hand, Sanders asserts that the right-of-way did not connect to the Brown Parcel, 
that Browns' driving over the right-of-way into their driveway constitutes a trespass, that the 
Browns' driveway, which existed during Sanders' ownership of the property, constitutes a 
trespass, and that Browns' making the very same use of their property that Sanders made 
during the time that he owned it was wrongful. Sanders brought this action for the improper 
purpose of coercing Browns to pay large amounts of money in settlement. 
21. Sanders testified that he brought this action against Browns and Stevenses 
because he could not sell the Glanville Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel and because sub-
division violation problems precluded his separate ownership and sale of those parcels. 
Sanders, however, made no effort to resolve any subdivision problems that may have existed 
and made no effort to sell the Glanville Parcel or the Panhandle Parcel (except to Glanvilles). 
22. Sanders did not make any reasonable good faith effort to resolve his com-
plaints with Browns or Stevenses. Sanders did not initiate this action to resolve or receive 
fair compensation for any claim that he had against Browns or Stevenses, but rather in bad 
faith to coerce Browns or Stevenses into paying him money to which he was not entitled. 
23. At multiple stages during this proceeding, Browns attempted to settle and 
resolve this case to avoid incurring the substantial expense that they incurred in defending. 
Sanders unreasonably persisted in pursuing his frivolous, baseless claim. 
24. Sanders pursued his claims to hinder and take advantage of Browns and 
Stevenses. Sanders asserted that Browns' purchase of the property from Mountainwest, 
Sanders' foreclosing lender, violated Sanders' rights. He asserted that Mountainwest's sale 
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of the property to Browns (a transaction to which Sanders was not a party) was illegal and 
should be rescinded. He asserted that the Brown Parcel (which Sanders, himself, owned and 
occupied separately) violated zoning ordinances that should be enforced against the Browns. 
He asserted that the Browns' occupation of the same property that Sanders, himself, had 
previously occupied constituted a "private nuisance." Sanders claimed that he initiated this 
action to resolve what he believed to be a "subdivision problem," but he never made any 
effort to resolve that issue. Browns attempted repeatedly to resolve their differences with 
Sanders and even to pay Sanders money to which he was not entitled, but Sanders steadfastly 
refused to make any reasonable effort to resolve his differences with Browns. Instead, 
through taking the positions he took and pursuing this litigation, Sanders attempted to subject 
Browns to economic pressure and to bother and harass them to induce them to pay un-
reasonable amounts of money to Sanders. 
25. This action was without merit and was not brought or asserted in good faith by 
plaintiff Sanders. 
26. Browns incurred in excess of $29,700.00 in defending against the claims of 
Sanders in this action, of which $6,750.00 is attributable to time expended in the trial of this 
case. The Court finds the charges of Browns' counsel to be reasonable under all of the 
circumstances. 
27. Defendants Stevens acted as their own counsel and did not incur any legal fees 
in defense against the claims of Sanders. 
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From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes and enters the follow-
ing: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Browns and Stevenses are not liable to plaintiffs for trespass. 
2. As a matter of fact and law, Glanvilles were the owners of the Glanville 
Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel at all material times. In any event, the Statute of Frauds has 
not been satisfied with respect to any claim of Sanders to ownership of any interest in that 
property. Sanders did not own any interest in the Glanville Parcel or the Panhandle Parcel at 
any time following May 19, 1988. 
3. Since Sanders did not own or have the right to possess the Panhandle Parcel 
and the Glanville Parcel at the times that Browns and Stevenses are claimed to have tres-
passed, he has no standing to assert any trespass claim against Browns or Stevenses. 
4. Sanders, who conveyed the Glanville Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel to 
Glanvilles to place it beyond the reach of his creditors, is estopped to assert that he has any 
ownership of or right to possession of that property. 
5. Glanvilles, the owners of the Glanville Parcel, did not object to Browns' 
horses' brief occupation of the Glanville Parcel. B.N. Glanville had no personal complaint 
with the Browns and admitted that the Browns never did anything about which he was 
complaining. Although Glanville claimed that Sanders told him that the Browns trespassed 
on the Glanville Parcel, Glanville never communicated to the Browns that he did not want 
them trespassing on the Glanville Parcel. 
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6. Browns' horses' occupation of the Glanville Parcel was with permission and 
consent. Prior to the Browns' placing their horses on the property, Sanders had given 
permission to Layne Newman for horses to occupy the Glanville Parcel. Neither Sanders nor 
Glanvilles directly advised Browns that their horses could occupy the Glanville Parcel. 
Nevertheless, Sanders desired that horses occupy the Glanville Parcel to control plant growth 
there, and the Court concludes that Sanders consented to horses occupying the Glanville 
Parcel until such consent was withdrawn. 
7. Browns and Stevenses did not trespass upon the Glanville Parcel. 
8. Plaintiffs have not proved that they suffered any damages as a result of 
Browns' horses' occupation of a portion of the Glanville Parcel. 
9. Browns' and Stevenses' periodic occupation of the Panhandle Parcel was 
allowed by and consistent with their right-of-way over it. 
10. Browns' installation of minimal grass and sprinklers on the Panhandle Parcel 
did not in any respect interfere with plaintiffs' occupation or possession of the Panhandle 
Parcel. Browns are entitled to keep their driveway in its present position. That driveway is 
a reasonable use of Browns' right-of-way and does not improperly interfere with plaintiffs' 
use of the Panhandle Parcel. 
11. Browns and Stevenses did not trespass on the Panhandle Parcel. 
12. Plaintiffs have not proved any damage caused by Browns' or Stevenses' 
activities upon the Panhandle Parcel. 
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13. The location of Browns' house in relation to the location of the "private right-
of-way," which is the Right-of-Way Parcel, is a valid non-conforming preexisting use and 
does not violate the variance issued by Draper City during 1988. 
14. Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert any violation by Browns of any var-
iance affecting the Brown Parcel, and even if Browns had violated the variance by having 
their house located closer than 17 feet from the "private right-of-way," that fact does not 
constitute a trespass. 
15. This action is without merit and was not brought or asserted in good faith 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56. 
16. Plaintiff Sanders is liable to Browns in the amount of the attorney's fees in-
curred by Browns in preparing for and attending trial and any post trial proceedings in this 
action. 
17. Browns reasonably and necessarily incurred reasonable attorney's fees in the 
amount of $6,750.00 in preparing for and attending trial and preparing Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment, for which Sanders is liable. 
18. Sanders owes to Browns and Stevenses their taxable costs. 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba \ 
District Judge 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Evidentiary Ruling, Findings of Fact, and 
Conclusions of Law was served this / / day of December, 1995 by mailing on said date 
copies thereof by United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Russell S. Walker, Esq. 
Reid W. Lambert, Esq. 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Jody K Burnett, Esq. 
Williams & Hunt 
Attorneys for Defendants Draper City, Draper 
City Board of Adjustment, Planning Com-
mission, Draper City Council, and Charles 
L. Hoffman 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Kim R. Stevens and Rebecca Stevens, Pro Se 
13755 South Shadow Mountain Lane 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Susan B. Day, Pro Se 
621 East 13800 South 
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Rosalie Jones, Secretaj?y 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
B. N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D. SANDERS 
and CHERYL M. SANDERS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF 
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD 
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY 
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER 
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L. 
HOFFMAN, Mayor of the City of Draper, 
ROBERT BROWN, KIM STEVENS, and 
JOHN DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
ROBERT E. BROWN, JR. and 
DIANE BROWN, 
Counterclaim and Crossclaim 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900902397PR 
(Hon. Anne M. Stirba) 
00O9U 
B. N. GLANVILLE, M. D. GLANVILLE, 
JOSEPH D. SANDERS, CHERYL M. 
SANDERS, KIM STEVENS, REBECCA 
STEVENS, and SUSAN B. DAY, 
Counterclaim and Crossclaim 
Defendants. 
This action came on regularly for trial on July 13 and 14, 1995 before the Court, the 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding, plaintiff Joseph D. Sanders appearing personally and 
through his counsel, Reid W. Lambert, defendants Brown appearing personally and through 
their counsel, Bruce A. Maak, and defendant Kim Stevens appearing on his own behalf, and 
the Court having heard the evidence, having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, 
having reviewed the file, having entered its Evidentiary Ruling, Findings of Fact, and 
Conclusions of Law, being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, 
hereby makes and enters the following Judgment: 
1. Fourth Cause of Action of the Amended Complaint be and the same is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice and upon its merits. 
2. Defendants Robert E. Brown, Jr. and Diane Brown be and they are hereby 
awarded Judgment against Joseph D. Sanders in the amount of $6,750.00, together with 
interest thereon from and after the date of this Judgment at the rate prescribed by law. 
3. Defendants Stevenses shall have and recover .their costs from Joseph D. r jj 
Sanders in the amount ofr$ Defendants Browns shalrnave and recover tneir costs 
from Joseph D. Sanders in the amount of 
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MADE AND ENTERED this l ^ d a y o f j l Ld4 , 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba \ 
District Judge N.Y 
The address of Joseph D. Sanders is: 
The Social Security number of Joseph D. Sanders is: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Final Judgment was served this J?0 toy of 
October, 1995 by mailing on said date copies thereof by United States mail, first class 
postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Russell S. Walker, Esq. 
Reid W. Lambert, Esq. 
Woodbury & Kesler 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 3358 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Jody K Burnett, Esq. 
Williams & Hunt 
Attorneys for Defendants Draper City, Draper 
City Board of Adjustment, Planning Com-
mission, Draper City Council, and Charles 
L. Hoffman 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Kim R. Stevens and Rebecca Stevens, Pro Se 
13755 South Shadow Mountain Lane 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Susan B. Day, Pro Se 
621 East 13800 South 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Rosalie Jones, Secretary 
APPENDIX 
ITEM # 14 
Court's Ruling on Brown's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, 6/14/93 
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the same statute. The same issues were at stake and it was 
the same case. And Judge Russon squarely ruled that the 
statute of limitation as employed — if you look at the last 
sentence of his ruling, which is at, I believe it's tab 8 of 
the tabs attached to our Memorandum, he says, "Furthermore, 
the statute of limitations applies." He fairly ruled that 
the statute applies. 
The Utah Supreme Court has squarely ruled that 
there are not standing to bring the sorts of claims that are 
being attempted here. And based on these two independent 
reasons, we invite the Court to grant the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. 
Well, this has been briefed very thoroughly and 
very effectively. I am prepared to rule at this time on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment by defendant Brown. 
First of all, with regard to the argument 
pertaining to the statute of limitations, plaintiffs' 
argument is that — or rather defendants' argument is that 
the plaintiffs failed to challenge Draper City's validation 
of the subdivision within the period prescribed by law. 
It does appear to me, first of all, that this 
issue was put before Judge Russon. And I think that, at 
least my understanding of the issue is, that the same issue 
then is being presented now. At least I am persuaded to that 
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1 effect. So in effect, Judge Russon's ruling can be 
2 considered the law of the case. 
3 But I have also looked at it separately. I view 
4 that my rule is that if there is a previous ruling of this 
5 court, that I am entitled to alter that if I feel that I 
6 should. And I have looked at that. But I agree frankly with 
7 Judge Russon's analysis of this. 
8 And I do think that there was a 30-day statute of 
9 limitations as it pertained to the Board of Adjustments 
10 validation, if you will, of the subdivision. And clearly 
11 there was not an appeal taken within that time period. So I 
12 feel that for that reason the Motion for Summary Judgment is 
13 valid. 
14 The defendants' argument then is that that really 
15 takes care of the nuisance and illegality claims as well. 
16 And I understand — clearly there is no 30-day statute of 
17 limitations as it pertains to those two causes of action. 
18 However, they are predicated upon a showing that there was an 
19 illegality. And that showing cannot be made, at least 
20 because that can no longer be challenged as being invalid, 
21 what the Board of Adjustments did. So I understand the 
22 defendants' argument with regard to that. 
23 But turning also to whether the Board of 
24 Adjustments had the authority to do that, I am persuaded that 
25 the Board of Adjustments did have the authority to do what it 
TTTTtTt 
21 
did, for the reasons argued by Mr. Lee in court and also in 
the Memorandum and also in light of the ordinances that were 
presented to the Court here today. 
I feel that the Board of Adjustments did act 
within the scheme of — with regard to the Ellis case, 
that's a very interesting problem, because clearly Mr. Green 
is correct. This statute is very clear in what it says, and 
it's also clear the Ellis case didn't address that 
language. 
Now, it may be that in Ellis the Supreme Court 
simply was not aware of a statute that said — if one existed 
in 1962 — that said what the statute says now. But I think 
that calls for this Court to speculate on what the Supreme 
Court did. As an inferior court, this Court is generally 
bound by what the appellate court says is the common law. 
And I think that it's clearly an appealable issue, 
and it may be that on appeal an appellate court in light of 
that statute might rule differently. But I feel constrained 
at this point to act conservatively from the judicial 
standpoint. And I am going to follow Ellis , which does 
appear to me otherwise to be on all fours with this 
particular case. 
So I am not going to rule differently from that in 
Ellis. And clearly in Ellis the Utah Supreme Court held 
that there is no private right of action to challenge a sale 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 15 
Trial Transcript — Cross Examination 
of Joseph Sanders 
1 A Foreclosure for a time until we could straighten 
2 things out. 
3 Q And that property has been vested in the name of 
4 your brother-in-law and sister for about seven years; is that 
5 right? 
6 A Yes, sir. But I stated many times it was done 
7 solely for the purpose of trying to buy time so we could 
8 resolve these issues. I have been in court since 1984 trying 
9 to resolve this simple issue. Everybody that has come in 
10 contact with this property, including the Browns, Ovards, 
11 Mrs. France, has been damaged by it. It is time this is put 
12 together. 
13 I am not running from the problem. I am trying to 
14 solve the problem. I transferred it to my brother-in-law to 
15 buy time so I could solve the problem. I knew at the time it 
16 was illegal. I was taking that chance. 
17 Q There was nothing that prevented your 
18 brother-in-law and sister from conveying the property back to 
19 you some time during the past seven years, is there? 
20 A That's right. We talked about that at times. 
21 There is no real need to do it. It's common knowledge why 
22 they have it. It's there. 
23 Q And you agree with me, don't you, that since the 
24 title is vested in their name, they have a right to sell the 
25 property? 
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1 A Yes, sir. 
2 Q And you agree with me that you don't have any 
3 interest in the property? 
4 A I don't have a legal interest, but I certainly 
5 have a moral interest. And I have a right in this claim. 
6 Q I'd like to show you now, Mr. Sanders, what has 
7 been marked as Exhibit 6, Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant 
8 Robert E. Brown, Jr.'s Interrogatories. And first will you 
9 tell me, everybody, you signed that document under oath on 
10 the last page? 
11 A Yes, sir, I did. 
12 Q I'd like to direct your attention to Interrogatory 
13 No. 1 where 2 states, 
14 "State the name and address of each person who 
15 owns any fee simple interest in the Glanville 
16 property." 
17 Do you see that? 
18 A Yes, sir. 
19 Q And the answer is, "B.N. Glanville and his wife 
20 M.D. Glanville of Malhure County, Oregon, are the 
21 sole owners of the Glanville property." 
22 Is that correct? Do you see that? 
23 A Yes, sir. 
24 Q That question is "fee simple owner." And they are 
25 fee simple owners, does it say, Mr. Sanders? 
7* 
1 A The question does. 
2 Q And with respect to Interrogatory No. 2, it asks 
3 that you, 
4 "Identify each holder of an encumbrance, lien, 
5 mortgage, deed of trust, right-of-way, or other 
6 interest in the Glanville Property." 
7 And do you see in your answer there that you don't 
8 identify any interest of your own? 
9 A Well, I have no encumbrances, lien, mortgage, deed 
10 of trust, right-of-way. Other interest I guess. I signed 
11 that. 
12 Q Mr. Sanders, do you or don't you have an interest 
13 in the property? 
14 A I have an equitable interest in the property and 
15 it will be deeded to me when I ask it to be deeded to me. 
16 Q And you will agree that the interrogatory asked 
17 you to identify anybody who had any interest in the property; 
18 is that right? 
19 A I maybe misinterpreted the question. 
20 Q Is that not what it says? 
21 A It starts out "encumbrance, lien, mortgage, deed 
22 of trust, right-of-way. I was looking for a legal document. 
23 Q And you prepared these answers in consultation 
24 with your attorney, Mr. Green; is that right? 
25 A Yes, sir. 
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1 Q And no place in these interrogatory answers did 
2 you state that you have a beneficial interest or equitable 
3 interest or any other interests in the Glanville property. 
4 Isn't that true? 
5 A I would have to look at the rest of the 
6 interrogatories. 
7 Q If you feel you did, take a minute. 
8 A If you say it's not there, I'll concede that. 
9 Q As of the date you transferred the property to 
10 Glanville, Mr. Sanders, the Browns did not own and had not 
11 purchased the Brown property, had they? 
12 A That's true. 
13 Q And Mountain West had had a foreclosure sale, had 
14 they not? 
15 A No, sir. 
16 Q So before the Browns ever appeared on the scene, 
17 you conveyed the property to your brother-in-law and sister? 
18 A Yes, sir. 
19 Q If I understand you correctly, you are complaining 
20 of the following: trespass problems — first, driveway; 
21 second, landscaping; third, horses; and fourth, car parking? 
22 A The use of the yard. 
23 Q Okay. Anything else? 
24 A That covers it. 
25 Q Browns' horses were not on the property at any 
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1 time before you conveyed the property to Glanville, were 
2 they? 
3 A No, sir. 
4 Q During your ownership of the Glanville property 
5 before you conveyed it, you gave Layne Newman permission to 
6 run horses on the property. Is that right? 
7 A Yes, sir. 
8 Q And you didn't ever tell him that he could only 
9 run horses that he, himself, owned there, did you? 
10 A He asked me if he could run his horses. And I 
11 replied, Yes, you can run your horses. There were no other 
12 horses discussed. 
13 Q Are you testifying that you can recall seven or 
14 eight years ago saying, Newman, you can only run your horses? 
15 A I didn't say that. I didn't say "only." He said, 
16 May I run my horses on your property, or something to that 
17 effect. And I said, Yes, you can run the horses on the 
18 property, or something similar to that. 
19 Q Did he tell you how many horses he would run? 
20 A I knew how many he would run. I was his neighbor. 
21 Q Did he tell you, is the question. 
22 A No, sir. 
23 Q So as far as you are concerned, he could run 
24 whatever he had there? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 A Yes, sir. 
2 Q And you were not a party to that transaction at 
3 all, were you? 
4 A No, sir. 
5 Q You had nothing to do with that transaction. 
6 A I had nothing to do with the transaction, no, sir. 
7 Q Aside from at your deposition, you have never met 
8 nor spoken with Bob and Diane Brown? 
9 A No, sir. 
10 Q And you filed this lawsuit against them because of 
11 horses, the grass, the driveway and the variance. Is that 
12 right? 
13 A It's the use of the yard is the principle reason, 
14 yes, sir. 
15 Q It is a fact, is it not, Mr. Sanders, that you 
16 have filed this lawsuit against the Browns because you want 
17 to put intense pressure on them to pay you settlement money? 
18 A I have two motives in my lawsuit. And the lawsuit 
19 is all-inclusive; it involves the entire subdivision: One, I 
20 would like to recover some of the very large money that I 
21 have spent; and two, I would like to get a case built so that 
22 the City of Draper will process their subdivisions properly 
23 so we don't have to do this time and time again as more and 
24 more people get involved this trap. 
25 Q I want to ask you the question again, Mr. Sanders. 
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1 The question is, is it not a fact that you filed this lawsuit 
2 against the Browns to put intense pressure on them to pay 
3 settlement money to you. 
4 A The reason for this lawsuit — if you are talking 
5 about this particular one right here? 
6 Q Yes, sir. 
7 A The reason we are doing it is, no one will certify 
8 without going to appeal. No one would settle without giving 
9 up appeal rights. If they would let us appeal, we would have 
10 settled today. 
11 Q Apart from this hearing, we are talking about the 
12 whole lawsuit, Mr. Sanders, and this is the third time now, 
13 is it not a fact that you have filed and pursued this lawsuit 
14 against the Browns to subject them to intense pressure so 
15 that they would pay you settlement money. Isn't that true? 
16 A That is part of the answer, yes. 
17 MR. MAAK: No further questions. 
18 THE COURT: Redirect? 
19 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
20 BY MR. LAMBERT: 
21 Q Let's start where we left off, Mr. Sanders. 
22 Wasn't the original reason for filing a lawsuit because there 
23 was a gap between the right-of-way and the Brown property? 
24 A Yes, sir. 
25 Q And every time they drove across it it was a 
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1 not Mr. Sanders had ever understood that that agreement 
2 included the entire strip? 
3 A Mr. Green admitted to me that his client reneged. 
4 I don't know what he told his client. 
5 Q Of the time you testified to, it appears that 45 
6 hours of that time was incurred from the time after the 
7 second summary judgment motion up until projecting through 
8 the end of today, I assume. Is that right? 
9 A No. Forty-five hours was consumed in the second 
10 summary judgment motion. And in addition, 45 hours has been 
11 and will be consumed from the entry of that second summary 
12 judgment'through this morning. 
13 Q Okay. I apologize for asking you a question that 
14 wasn't clear. I meant from the time of the summary judgment 
15 until today. 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q That is 45 hours. That 45 hours was spent on the 
18 discrete trespass claims we have been addressing here today; 
19 is that correct? 
20 A That is correct. 
21 Q Back in March, just before we were set to go to 
22 trial the segond time, you received a settlement offer to 
23 settle the discrete claims in this proceeding that we have 
24 gone through here for $2500; is that right? 
25 A An offer to settle these claims and still pursue 
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1 an appeal? 
2 Q That's right. 
3 A Yes, 
4 Q And you didn't respond to that offer until our 
5 phone conversation until on about Tuesday of this week; is 
6 that right? 
7 A I don't think that is right. When you and I met 
8 and discussed exhibits, I told you that if there was going to 
9 be an appeal we were not interested in settling. 
10 Q That meeting took place before I sent you the 
11 letter on March 15th, didn't it? 
12 A I don't believe that's the case. 
13 Q Okay. In any event, just prior to the 
14 commencement of this trial yesterday, it was indicated to you 
15 that to compromise just these discrete trespass claims 
16 Mr. Sanders would come down to a figure of $1,000. Is that 
17 right? 
18 A You told me that yesterday morning. 
19 Q Right. 
20 A You also told me he would continue to pursue an 
21 appeal of all the other issues in this case. And I told you, 
22 as I had always told you, we wanted to settle this case and 
23 stop spending attorney's fees and settle this. The Browns 
24 were interested in terminating litigation and not paying 
25 piecemeal. 
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1 Q That perhaps answers the next question 1 was going 
2 to ask. And the basis for rejecting both of those offers was 
3 that any settlement that you would be willing Lo enter on 
4 behalf of the Browns would require Sandy to give up his 
5 appeal rights Is that right? 
6 A That is not the basis at all. The basis is, 
7 anybody who has litigated with Mr. Sanders in this case would 
8 be a fool to pay a nickel unless they had absolute assurance 
9 that he could not do anything more in the case. 
10 Q So is it accurate for me to say you were unwilling 
11 to settle the issues we were discussing yesterday and today 
12 unless Sanders would also forego his right t o appeal the 
13 issues that had been decided previously on summary judgment? 
14 A With the exception of the offer <»f Judgment that 
15 we filed, we offered to allow judgment to be taken for the 
16 trespass claims for $750, Mi, Sanders never responded to 
17 that. 
18 MR. liAMBERT: I think that's all I have, your 
19 Honor. 
20 THfc "OURT; Anything else? 
2 1 MR. MAAK: I have nothing further, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Stevens? 
23 MR. STEVENS: No. 
74 THE COURT: Very well. You may call your next 
25 witness. 
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1 that you abandon a claim or abandon a position on an issue or 
2 omit a position on an issue and you agreed to go along with 
3 that? 
4 A Yes, they have suggested some things. Both you 
5 and Rick suggested some things that wouldn't be appropriate 
6 and I have agreed to drop them. 
7 Q And as far as the investigation into the legal 
8 basis for your claims, have you ever had a lawyer tell you 
9 that the claims you were asserting were in bad faith? 
10 A No, sir. 
11 MR. LAMBERT: That's all I have. 
12 CROSS EXAMINATION 
13 BY MR. MAAK: 
14 Q You say, Mr. Sanders, that the reason you brought 
15 this lawsuit is to rectify an illegal subdivision problem. 
18 Is that right? 
17 A That•s correct. 
18 Q Have you ever proposed to the Browns that they 
19 sign any document ' assist you in that regard? 
2 0 A I have not precisely done that, no, sir. 
Q But that's why y :>ii brought the lawsuit, right? 
22 You wanted to fix the subdivision problem, right? 
J A That's why — we brought the lawsuit because I 
24 refused to acknowledge the notice of claim and suggest 
25 anything. 
0 0 1 2 4 4 224 
1 Q Please tell me, Mr. Sanders, what the Browns can 
2 do to fix what you perceive to be a subdivision problem, what 
3 can they do? 
4 A They can acquire the rest of their side yard that 
5 is required by them. And they can see to it that we can 
6 record the property. 
7 Q So they could buy your property, right? That's 
8 the first thing they could do? 
9 A That would be part of it. 
10 Q And the second thing is to record a document; is 
11 that right? 
12 A That's correct. Someone has to record the 
13 document. 
14 Q And you have never asked them to record any 
15 document ever, have you, Mr. Sanders? 
16 A No, sir. 
17 Q And, in fact, in this lawsuit you don't ask for 
18 the Browns to sign anything, do you? Do you? 
19 A I guess not. 
20 Q What you ask for is money. Isn't that right, 
21 Mr. Sanders? 
22 A I don't think — my testimony is not that. 
23 Q Your Complaint in this case asks for only one 
24 thing from the Browns, and that is money, is it not, 
25 Mr. Sanders? 
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1 A In this precise case today? 
Q In this lawsuit. 
3 A In this case today? 
4 Q In this entire lawsuit you ask for only one thing 
5 from the Browns and that is money. Right? 
h A 1 don't think that's true, but I would have to 
7 review the information. 
Q What else do you ask for besides money? 
') A The one lawsuit was specifically to enforce the 
ID subdivision ordinance. 
11 Q I am asking you what in this lawsuit you ask the 
12 Browns for other than money. 
13 A The entire — what do you mean by "lawsuit"? This 
14 finite hearing today? 
15 Q I mean everything in this case that has been 
16 decided against you and is being considered today. What do 
17 you ask of the Browns besides money? 
18 A I ask to correct the -- as I understand it, the 
two summary judgments with the Browns: One, that reformed 
the right-of-way, if that's a proper term; and the other one 
was that I didn't have the ability to force the Browns to 
22 help us get the subdivision approved. 
2 ! Q I am going to show you what•s marked as Exhibit 
24 16, Mr. Sanders. Can you identify that for us, please? 
25 A Well, it says Amended Complaint for Civil Case 
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1 9009- — whatever. 
2 Q Who is the plaintiff there? 
3 A B.N. Glanville. 
4 Q Who are the defendants? 
5 A Draper City, the Board of Adjustment, the Planning 
6 Committee, The City Council, Mayor Charles L. Hoffman, Robert 
7 Brown, Kim Stevens John Does I through X. 
8 MR. MAAK: May I approach the witness briefly, your 
9 Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Yes. 
11 Q In your Complaint in the prayer there is two 
12 paragraphs. The first asks for relief as to the City of 
13 Draper, et al. Do you see that? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And the second asks for relief as to defendants 
16 Brown and Stevens. Do you see that? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q Will you read the entirety of the relief you ask 
19 for against Browns and Stevens, please. 
20 A My counsel wrote this for me. 
21 Q I'll just read it for you. 
22 A Well, I'll read it. 
23 "For a judgment finding that the actions of the 
24 Defendants Browns — " 
25 THE COURT: Wait, wait. You are going to have to 
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1 slow down. People tend to read faster than they speak and 
2 you speak fast anyways. And for the reporter's sake and so I 
3 hear clearly, please slow down. 
4 A "For a judgment finding tii: it actions of the 
5 Defendants Brown and Stevens and those acting 
6 with him are trespass on the properties of 
7 Plaintiffs. 
8 "For the immediate issuance and entry of an 
9 injunction restraining Defendants Brown and 
10 Stevens and those acting with them from the 
11 actions described in the Complaint• 
12 "For judgment in connection with the trespass of 
13 Brown and Stevens and those acting with them in 
14 an amount not less than $20,000, in punitive 
15 damages and $10,000 in general damages." 
16 Q Now, Mr. Sanders, you agree with me, don't you, 
17 that you haven't asked the Browns and Stevens to do anything 
18 to help you with your subdivision problem, have you? 
19 A II appears not. 
20 Q Okay. Did you read that ever before it was filed 
21 or si lie :e it has been filed? 
22 A I am not an attorney. I hired the best counsel I 
23 know how and I haven't always had good judgment. 
24 Q Did you read it? 
25 A I read it, yes. 
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1 Q Is it important to you that you resolve this 
2 subdivision problem? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q In reading it now, you can tell, can't you, 
5 Mr. Sanders, that you are not asking to resolve any 
6 subdivision problem there, are you? 
7 A Well, I have talked to my lawyer. And I say, This 
8 is what I want, and he writes the words. And what I see here 
9 it says, "For..entry of an injunction restraining defendants 
10 Brown and Stevens and those acting withr them from the 
11 actions described in the Complaint." If they would get the 
12 subdivision they could stop trespassing. 
13 THE COURT: Counsel, your point has been made. 
14 MR. MAAK: Thank you, your Honor. 
15 Q Did you ever ask Rick Green to sign a RICO 
16 complaint? 
17 A Yes, sir, I did. 
18 Q Did he refuse? 
19 A He did not refuse to sign it. He felt he was not 
20 qualified and brought in other attorneys to do it. 
21 Q Is it your testimony today, sir, under oath, that 
22 Rick Green did not refuse to sign your RICO Complaint? 
23 A He didn't prepare it. 
24 Q Who prepared it? 
25 A I guess he started to prepare it, but he brought 
229 
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1 in the firm of — 
2 Q Who prepared it? 
3 A I don't recall all the details. But Rick prepared 
4 it. We 1 lad < \ ] arge meeting with Russ Walker, I think — and 
5 I don't know whether Reid was there or not, but there was 
6 another attorney in this thing. And we talked at length and 
7 they reviewed it and decided to go forward with it. 
8 y Rick prepared it. Correct? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q And Rick wouldn't sign it. Correct? 
11 A He didn't sign it. 
12 O He declined to sign it? 
13 A Yes. The reason he gave me, that he poorly served 
14 me and that he wasn't qualified to do it. 
15 Q And you signed it, didn't you, Mr. Sanders? 
16 A Yes, sir. 
17 Q And you f:i 1 ed i t? 
18 A Yes, sir. 
19 MR. MAAK: No further questions. 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Stevens, do you have any other 
21 questions? 
22 MR. STEVENS: Yes, please. 
23 CROSS EXAMINATION 
24 BY MR. STEVENS: 
25 Q Mr. Sanders, do you feel that you have been 
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1 wronged in this case? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q Do you feel that you have been wronged by the 
4 Browns? 
5 A The Browns just stumbled into the middle of the 
6 case. But the Browns have not done anything except they got 
7 a piece of property that had problems associated with it. 
8 And I am attacking the property, not the Browns. 
9 Q Have you been wronged by the Newmans while you 
10 lived in your home? 
11 A The fact that Newman did not — Newman and Ovard 
12 did not record the subdivision they got permission to do has 
13 hurt me greatly. Had they recorded their subdivision, none 
14 of these problems, none of these problems would exist today. 
15 Q Have you been wronged by the Days? 
16 A It was the Days1 property that was subdivided. It 
17 was the Days that would not pay off Mrs. France so we could 
18 have it recorded. I would have probably fixed the problems 
19 myself had they been — 
20 Q Have you been wronged by the Stevens? 
21 A You unfortunately bought a part of the problem 
22 when you bought from the Days. 
23 Q Have you been wronged by the Ovards? 
24 A Yes, sir, very greatly. 
25 Q You have been wronged by everybody that surrounds 
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1 FRIDAY, JULY 21, 1995; 2:15 P.M. 
2 J U D G E ' S B E N C H R U L I N G 
3 
4 THE COURT: Back on the record. This is the matter 
5 of Glanville versus The City of Draper, Case No. 900902397. 
6 The record should reflect Mr. Stevens is here. And counsel, 
7 would you state your appearances. 
8 MR. MAAK: Your Honor, I am Bruce Maak and I 
9 represent Diane and Robert Brown. 
10 MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I am David Williams and 
11 I am he;re on behalf of the plaintiff Mr. Sanders. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Williams. 
13 First of all, I apologize for being a few minutes 
14 late on the bench. I was double-checking some of the 
15 exhibits to make sure that I was correct in my understanding 
16 of some of the evidence. The record should also reflect that 
17 since the conclusion of the trial last Friday I have had an 
18 opportunity to read all of the evidence that was submitted to 
19 the Court and the cases that were submitted. And I have 
20 considered all of that. 
21 I have considered the proposed Findings of Fact 
22 and Conclusions of Law. I have considered the briefs. And I 
23 had a transcript made of the closing argument and have 
24 reviewed that* And in light of all of that, I feel very 
25 well-informed and I am prepared to rule today. 
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1 flow, the record should also reflect that this 
2 morning I attempted to initiate a telephone conference call 
3 with all of the parties. Mr. Maak was available; Mr. Lambert 
4 was available. 
5 Mr. Stevens, there should be a message on your 
6 answering phone to the effect that we tried to get in touch 
7 with you and you had your answering machine on and we had no 
8 other way to contact you. In light of the question that I 
9 wanted to ask Mr. Lambert and Mr. Maak, it really pertained 
10 to a legal issue. And because you really throughout the 
11 trial deferred to Mr. Maak for the issues regarding the legal 
12 issues, I felt that it would be all right to go ahead without 
13 you. 
14 And the legal issue that I was raising was 
15 pertaining to Exhibit 1, the admissibility of which I had 
16 reserved ruling on until this time. And I just indicated 
17 that I had not made my decision yet as to whether I would 
18 rule on Exhibit 1 or whether I might this afternoon request 
19 some additional briefing on that issue. And I simply wanted 
20 to alert counsel that that was a possibility and to notify 
21 their respective clients to that effect. And I certainly 
22 made no decision or gave an indication of how the Court was 
23 going to rule ultimately in this case. 
24 Mr. Stevens, do you feel uncomfortable in any way 
25 that you were not involved in that particular conversation? 
3 
~. c\ O 
1 MR. STEVENS: No. I am fine. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Do you have any questions 
3 about that conversation? 
4 MR. STEVENS: No, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: In light of that I am prepared to rule 
6 at this time on the issues before the Court. And this is a 
7 bench ruling. I no doubt will overlook some matters, and 
8 certainly many findings. The prevailing party is entitled to 
9 present in the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
10 Law any findings consistent with the Court's ruling. I know 
11 my ruling will not be all encompassing. If there are any 
12 objections to any of the findings that are proposed, I will 
13 rule on the objections as to what I feel I can find or don't 
14 find based on the evidence. 
15 Now, the first issue that needs to be addressed is 
16 the admissibility of the Assignment of Claim. I have 
17 considered that in several different respects, and I just 
18 want some verification, counsel. There is before the Court 
19 various deeds, including: Ovards, Nipkos, Newmans, Sanders, 
20 and then Sanders to Glanville. And the deed to Sanders, the 
21 two deeds from Sanders to Glanville are to Mr. and Mrs. 
22 Glanville. Is that consistent with your understanding? 
23 MR. MAAK: That is correct, as joint tenants. 
24 THE COURT: And you agree with that also? 
25 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, I do, your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: And the status of the record also is 
2 that what Mr. Sanders' interests are — well, Mr. Sanders has 
3 no standing in this lawsuit except that which he has 
4 specifically received from the Glanvilles. Now, 
5 Mr. Glanville appears to have been deceased — or he is now 
6 deceased. And correct me, I couldn't find in my notes the 
7 date of that death. Does either one of you have that? 
8 MR. MAAK: It was some time — Mr. Lambert said it 
9 was May of 1995. That's the only information I have. 
10 THE COURT: Do you have reason to dispute that? 
11 MR. WILLIAMS: I don't, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: I remembered May. I wasn't clear for 
13 sure on that. 
14 Now, Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
15 sets forth a procedure that is to be followed when a party 
16 dies. And that is, within 90 days following the death, that 
17 there be a Suggestion of Death filed with the court and there 
18 was in this case a Suggestion of Death filed. After that 
19 what is to happen is that there be a motion for substitution 
20 of the parties. And the personal representative of the 
21 estate of the deceased may move to be substituted as a party 
22 plaintiff. And that is the procedure called for under Rule 
23 25. 
24 That did not happen in this case. What happened 
25 is that, I believe it was the Friday before the trial which 
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1 began on Tuesday following that Friday, there was filed with 
2 the Court an Assignment of Claim which is in the record as 
3 proposed Exhibit No. 1. In that Assignment of Claim, which 
4 is notarized, Mrs. Glanville purports to represent to the 
5 Court that she is the personal representative of the estate 
6 of her husband and the owner of the real property located in 
7 Draper which is the subject matter of this litigation. And 
8 that she does, 
9 "Hereby assign any and all rights of action, 
10 damages, rights and claims which she may have in 
11 the above described case to Joseph Sanders, my 
12 coplaintiff" — he is actually not her 
13 coplaintiff; he is coplaintiff with her deceased 
14 husband — "and do further state that the estate 
15 of Ben N. Glanville asserts no interest in the 
16 property, it having been held in joint tenancy 
17 with her at the time of his death." 
18 Now, that purports to bear her signature dated 
19 July 6, 1995 and shows that it was notarized. I do not 
20 recall testimony in the trial — help me with this, if you 
21 will — as to whether Mr. Sanders authenticated her 
22 signature. 
23 MR. MAAK: Mr. Sanders gave evidence that he was 
24 familiar with her signature and that it appeared to be her 
25 signature. He said he did not see her sign the document but 
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1 testified that she told him she had signed the document. He 
2 said he took the document to her, left and came back a day or 
3 so later, or hours later, and she handed it to him executed 
4 and notarized. That's the sum and substance of what I can 
5 recall. 
6 THE COURT: Is that consistent with your 
7 recollection, Mr. Stevens? 
8 MR. STEVENS: That is consistent. 
9 THE COURT: That's consistent with the recollection 
10 I have as to what his testimony was. 
11 Now, obviously Exhibit 1, the Assignment of Claim, 
12 is not a self-authenticating document. It needs to be 
13 authenticated in some fashion. I think given the testimony 
14 of Mr. Sanders at trial, that he recognizes his sister's 
15 signature and that the signature on the document is her 
16 signature, I think that does authenticate the document, 
17 although given all the circumstances, it is very thin 
18 authentication for a document of this type. Now, the notary 
19 doesn't authenticate the document. But I don't believe that 
20 authenticity is a bar to the Court considering this Exhibit. 
21 Now, there was no evidence presented to the Court, 
22 however, that Mrs. Glanville is, in fact, the personal 
23 representative of the estate of Ben N. Glanville. While this 
24 appears to be an assignment of claim, it also contains her 
25 representation that she is the personal representative of the 
«0 i32*
 7 
1 estate of Ben Glanville. She did not testify at the trial. 
2 She was not produced at trial nor were there any documents 
3 certifying that she is, in fact, the personal representative 
4 of the estate of Ben Glanville presented to the Court. And 
5 accordingly, there is a hole here. 
6 There has to be a sufficient chain showing what 
7 all of this purports to show. And an affidavit, if you 
8 will — and this doesn't purport to be an affidavit; it is 
9 merely an assignment of claim -- this doesn't contain any 
10 probative evidence that she is, in fact, the personal 
11 representative of the estate of Ben Glanville. 
12 For that matter, if she had appeared at trial as a 
13 witness and been subject to cross examination, that could 
14 have been determined in that fashion. But she didn't appear. 
15 And there was nothing, no court order for example appointing 
16 her as personal representative, no indication if there are 
17 any competing claims for this property. So there is a hole 
18 in the proof; there is a failure of proof on that point. 
19 I do not believe that the Assignment of Claim is 
20 sufficiently probative to establish, in fact, there has been 
21 an assignment of claim. That she is, in fact, legally 
22 entitled to assign the claim, given the comments I have just 
23 made. It is her burden to establish a bona fide legal claim 
24 to this property, and that as personal representative she is 
25 entitled to make this claim. 
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1 Now, this problem of the transfer, if you will, of 
2 a claim of Mr. Glanville's and Mrs. Glanville's claims to 
3 this property to Mr. Sanders is something that could have and 
4 should have been dealt with well before it was. This was the 
5 product of Mr. Sanders' own conduct and not that of the 
6 Browns and Stevens. This is something that was known 
7 certainly at the time of Mr. Glanville's death. I don't know 
8 about the circumstances preceding his death or how sudden it 
9 was, and I have no judgment about that. But certainly since 
10 May, the time of his death, this is a subject that could have 
11 been dealt with before it was right before trial. 
12 Now, in my view there is prejudice to the 
13 defendants, therefore, for this late filing. And there is 
14 prejudice because there was no opportunity for the defendants 
15 to do discovery regarding whether Mrs. Glanville is, in fact, 
16 the personal representative of the estate of Mr. Glanville 
17 and that there are no competing claims for this position. 
18 Accordingly, there is a failure of proof in this Assignment 
19 of Claim. 
20 It is only through this Assignment of Claim that 
21 Mr. Sanders has any standing whatsoever. And in light of the 
22 finding that there is a failure of proof, the Court finds 
23 that Mr. Sanders has no standing in this action. 
24 Mrs. Glanville has never been made a party to this action. 
25 And accordingly, the claims that were litigated at trial are 
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1 therefore dismissed and judgment will be rendered in favor of 
2 the defendants. 
3 Now, with regard to the defendants' bad faith 
4 claim, Mr. Sanders testified that he undertook this lawsuit 
5 to clear title and easement issues so that he could sell this 
6 property. Mr. Sanders nor Mr. Glanville has ever put this 
7 property on the market for sale. He made no effort, neither 
8 one of them made any effort regarding attempts to cure this 
9 problem short of five years of litigation. 
10 Mr. Glanville in his deposition knew essentially 
11 nothing about this property except in the vaguest of terms. 
12 And obviously he was not pursuing this except at the request 
13 of his brother-in-law, Mr. Sanders. And Mr. Sanders, 
14 according to Mr. Glanville1s testimony, was acting as his 
15 agent in this lawsuit. 
16 Putting aside any question about whether 
17 Mr. Sanders could, in fact, do so, I think that it's fair to 
18 say that Mr. Sanders and Mr. Glanville did intend that 
19 Mr. Sanders deal with the attorneys, make litigation 
20 decisions, and in that way act as Mr. Glanville's agent. So 
21 I believe there was enough there for Mr. Sanders to act as 
22 Mr. Glanville's agent. 
23 I was very disturbed about the testimony at trial 
24 that there were almost no efforts short of Mr. Green's letter 
25 to advise the defendants of any of these problems, and 
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1 particularly the problems with — well, I'll let that 
2 statement stand. There were no efforts by Mr. Sanders to 
3 attempt to resolve the problems that he perceived existed 
4 without having filed a lawsuit. 
5 Now, it is certainly Mr. Sanders1 right to have 
6 filed the lawsuit. He has a legal right to do so, and the 
7 Court well recognizes that right. That is not the problem 
8 here. The problem is that Mr. Sanders, based on the Court's 
9 impression of him while he was testifying and the conduct 
10 that was referenced in evidence and in oral argument, the 
11 Court is persuaded that the weight of the evidence clearly is 
12 that Mr. Sanders is someone who likes to litigate. That even 
13 the remaining issues that were not resolved by way of partial 
14 summary judgment previously could not be resolved without a 
15 trial, notwithstanding the fact that the defendants did, in 
16 fact, attempt to resolve this case prior to trial. 
17 It is the Court's finding, based on all of the 
18 circumstances involved in this case, that Mr. Sanders had no 
19 apparent desire to settle this case or resolve it short of a 
20 trial. In his own testimony he wanted a trial and he has 
21 always wanted a full-fledged trial. I don't believe those 
22 are his precise words but his testimony was similar to that 
23 by his own admission. 
24 While this is his right, and the Court recognizes 
25 his right to litigate, under all of the evidence before the 
ft f, 1 f, :i ft 
1 Court regarding his actions, vis-a-vis some of the trespass 
2 claims, the Court finds that his efforts were unreasonable 
3 and in my judgment in bad faith. Specifically because of 
4 this, also because he had the ability to deal with the 
5 Assignment of Claim issue and because there was a failure for 
6 properly proceeding under Rule 25, also a failure independent 
7 of that of securing the evidence and presenting the evidence 
8 necessary to support that claim, the Court finds that the 
9 defendants, Browns and Stevens — well, excuse me, Browns — 
10 prevailed on the issues litigated in trial regarding the 
11 trespass claims involving the horses, the grass and the 
12 sprinklers. Actually the Court finds that Browns and Stevens 
13 prevailed on all the issues litigated at trial. Specifically 
14 with regard to whether these issues were without merit, 
15 without any merit as the statute requires, the Court finds 
16 that the claims involving the horses, grass and sprinklers 
17 were without merit and that they were not asserted in good 
18 faith. 
19 With regard to the issues regarding the trailer 
20 and regarding the portion of the cement driveway that is 
21 occupying the premises — for the driveway, obviously that's 
22 continuing; for the trailer, that's periodic and has 
23 continued beyond the litigation, it appears to be something 
24 that has continued in the past — with regard to those two 
25 claims the Court finds that, while they prevailed on those 
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1 claims for the reasons I previously expressed, that the 
2 claims of Mr. Sanders — strike that, I correct myself on 
3 this. The claims involving the horses — excuse me, I am 
4 rethinking this. 
5 The claims regarding the driveway and the trailer, 
6 when brought by Glanville and Sanders were not without merit 
7 as a matter of fact and law. However, Mr. Sanders had no 
8 claims to assert those issues. And accordingly, as to 
9 Mr. Sanders, those issues are without merit. There is no 
10 other party in the lawsuit as plaintiff at this time. 
11 Therefore, as to all the claims that were 
12 litigated at trial, the Court finds that as to Mr. Sanders, 
13 those claims were pursued in violation of — well, in such a 
14 manner as I previously described so that attorney's fees, 
15 reasonable attorney's fees are going to be awarded as to the 
16 claims that were litigated at trial only. All the other 
17 claims that were involved with regard to the partial summary 
18 judgments are not included under the findings regarding 
19 78-27-56. 
20 Now, Mr. Stevens did not incur attorney's fees so 
21 he is not awarded any attorney's fees. The Browns are 
22 awarded reasonable attorney's fees consistent with the 
23 Court's ruling here. 
24 Are there any questions? 
25 MR. MAAK: I have no questions, your Honor. 
001332 is 
1 THE COURT: Very well. 
2 Do you have any questions? 
3 MR. WILLIAMS: I don't, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Then Exhibit 1, implicit in this 
5 ruling, is not received in evidence for the reasons I have 
6 stated. And I want Mr. Maak to prepare proposed Findings of 
7 Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order of dismissal 
8 consistent with this ruling, including the ruling on the 
9 Assignment of Claim, Exhibit 1. 
10 Very well. Hearing no questions then, court is in 
11 recess. And I thank all counsel. Very well. 
12 MR. MAAK: Thank you, your Honor. 
13 (This concludes this Judge's Bench Ruling). 
14 * * * 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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1 C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 STATE OF UTAH ) 
3 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
4 I, SUZANNE WARNICK, RMR, CSR, do certify that I am 
5 a nationally certified Registered Merit Reporter, a state 
6 Certified Shorthand Reporter, and a Notary Public in and for 
7 the State of Utah. 
8 That at the time and place of the proceedings in 
9 the foregoing matter, I appeared as the court reporter in the 
10 Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable Judge Anne M. 
11 Stirba, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the 
12 proceedings had therein. 
13 That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of the 
14 Judge's Bench Ruling were transcribed by computer into the 
15 foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, true and 
16 correct transcript of the same. 
17 WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
18 this, the 12th day of October 1995. 
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zannq Warnick, RMR, CSR 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 20 
Deposition of Joseph Sanders 
Q In the four-and-a-half or five years since you 
transferred the property to Glanville you haven't done 
anything to transfer it back to yourself; is that right? 
A We've talked about it and we figured why clutter 
the thing, just leave it where it's at. It's been no 
secret. We've said all that have asked what the arrangement 
is. 
Q If I had said to Mr. Glanville this morning during 
his deposition, Mr. Glanville, I would like to buy from you 
the panhandle property and the Glanville property, I'd like 
to pay you X dollars for it, would there be anything to 
prevent him from taking my money and giving me a deed? 
A None whatsoever. 
Q Okay. So I take it you would agree that he has 
the right, in your opinion, free and clear of any interest on 
your part, to sell and transfer that property whenever he 
wants; is that right? 
A He has the legal right, yes, sir. Morally I don't 
think he does. 
Q Okay. Do you own any interest in the Glanville 
property or the panhandle property today? 
A Not according to the law. 
Q Okay. Well ~ 
A My name is not on any instrument or document. 
I've been paying taxes on it, but that's all. 
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Q If you go to Mr. Glanville and say, hey, Ben, why 
don't you sign these and deed these back to me, would he do 
that ~ 
Probably. 
— for free? 
Yes, sir. 
Do you feel that's his obligation? 
We have a business arrangement. I think it's his 
obligation, yes, sir. 
Q So he holds the legal title, but basically you 
have all of the other incidents of ownership? 
A I 'think that's true, yes, sir. 
Q Did Mr. Glanville ever hand you cash in the amount 
of $10 for that property? 
A Not specifically, no, sir. 
Q Not at all, did he? 
A We have — we're in a business together, we've 
transferred money back and forth. But not specifically, no, 
sir. 
Q He never said, here is $10 to buy that property? 
A No, sir. 
Q What was the purpose for which you transferred the 
Glanville property and the panhandle property into 
Mr. Glanville's name? 
A Haven't I answered that several times? 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 21 
Draper City Board of Adjustment File 
1988 Variance Application 
APPLICATION FOR VARIANCE 
Fee Title Owner W ^ \ABS<^W'/i6S Appl. Date 6 ~6 ' ?% 
mail, addr: ^y-^3" tt-3T~ 3 3 n & 3. 
~S L.3 ,d/r-~ ^4im Property Addr. /37S'S~ J^^i^u) nnr. l^^ 
telephone: / ^ g , - W 3 / 
Applicant/Agent /TPbQrtAj 54mn (QvA^tQ Requesting Variance to the 
mail, addr: ^5/&-B, /^?7a* s. requirements of the Building 
.Sfczw&• y-yg?^^. and/or Land Use Regulations, , 
telephone: QU-Z-'HZbS specifically sections: 
Applicant requests a Variance on structures and/or property indicated above 
of l_ acres, and which legal description i s : 
See - d^/^y a A -r?7T^e: / />^«^^e£ : ^r?^. ik£Cfro <&&.*-<• 
1. What is the present use of the property? 
i 
2. State the facts upon which you base your reguest to show that granting 
said request will not be contrary to the public interest. What special 
circumstances affect your property that do hot affect other properties 
in the same zoning district? Do those circumstances deprive your 
property of privileges possessed by other properties in the area? What 
hardships or special difficulties would be imposed upon you by a 
literal enforcement of the City's Regulations? 
7 ? ^ 0&£tAlAL- S/hZiArtiie. 0g-r&//V€^£> TO 3#/<-& 
/+ I/AX.>A/SC£. TO / - ^ i / e - w s HOUSB o*t 77f£< &&•'**•*•-
MAS osJt-y. 
jr tsee& TMB VAMIASJ(±£ T* tg-zarj fh^A^Q.,^c 
f=£*£€-(lL&SC*-/Z£: 3*L£. f7?0U"T#>4 UJ&ZT- S^^CS / •£. 
PAGE TOO 
Application for Variance 
Owner / > 7 r . ftjlgsy £&S/fiJ<$S 
Property /^7£TS •^tWWO' ^>r L&**& 
Date ^ - g g 
State of Utah } 
Applicants Affidavit 
County of Salt lake } 
j being duly sworn, depose and say that I 
am the cwner/agent of the subject property of th i s application. The 
statements, informations, exhibits , and any and a l l plans herein or 
attached or submitted present the intentions of the applicant and are in a l l 
respects true and correct to the best of my knowledge and bel ie f . 
121785 
It' 5 
9 L f 
> J « 
"MAYOR 
CHARLES L HOFFMAN 
COUNCIL MEMBERS 
TODD ANDERSEN 
WAYNE H. BALLARD 
CLAIR L. HUFF 
B JEFF RASMUSSEN 
B LAMONT SMITH 
12441 SOUTH 900 EAST. PO BOX 1020 
DRAPER. UTAH 84020 (801) 571-4121 
CITY ADMINISTRATOR 
ANDREW HATTON-WARD 
CITY RECORDER 
BARBARA L. SADLER 
CITY TREASURER 
KAREN L. WILKINS 
DOCUMENT CERTIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
This /£ ~ day of 
scorder 
19 ££, 
I Barbara Sadler, Re of the City Of Draper, by my signature 
below, certify hereby that the documents described below and attached 
hereto are true and accurate copies of the original documents in the 
official City files. 
^7 (J./Y^i 
3. 
4. 
;%t4*4e,/n%. 
/c^/rtArJj. Ms-/HfSS, 
Barbara Sadler, City Recorder 
City Of Draper, State Of Utah 
MINUTES OF THE REGULAR MEETING OF THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS HELD 
JULY 20, 1988. BEGINNING AT 7:05 P.M. IN THE COUNCIL CHAMBERS OF 
THE DRAPER CITY HALL. 
MEMBERS PRESENT: Chairman Duane Sadler, George Westbrook and 
Floyd Nielsen. 
OTHERS PRESENT: Attorney Hollis Hunt, Rick Smith, Pat Cutler, 
Wayne King, Cindy King, Ben Cutler, Grant 
Beagley, Barbara Sadler, Jean Hendricksen, 
Mike Dowland, Norm Franz, Mr. & Mrs. Ovard, 
Joseph Sanders, Mr. Stevens, Attorney Tom 
Crowther and Kathy Anderson. 
A22roval_of_m_nutes_f gr_July._6.i_ 1988 . 
Hollis Hunt indicated an error on page 3, paragraph 6 where 
it reads: "Attorney Hollis Hunt then explained that the Board of 
Adjustments is an appellate for the Planning and Zoning 
Administrator of the City. . . " This should read: "Attorney 
Hollis Hunt then explained that the Board of Adjustments is an 
appellate Board for the Planning and Zoning Commission of the 
City. . . " 
George Westbrook made a motion to approve the minutes of 
July 6, 1988, with the correction on Page 3 and a stipulation 
that a copy be sent to Mr. Scott Jolley for his signature and 
returned to the City. Duane Sadler seconded the motion. Floyd 
Nielsen abstained due to his absence, George Westbrook and Duane 
Sadler voted yes. Voting was unanimous in the affirmative. 
Y§ri§nce___Ben_and_Patricia_Cutler_are_reguesting §_Y§_iance_for 
a_lot split_gn I^Q4_acres in_an_RR-43_zone_district__gcated_at 
240_East_l3800_South. 
Grant Beagley explained that the proposal is to take the 
West end of an existing lot and create another lot with a 100 
foot frontage which would contain .38 of an acre (a little larger 
than 1/3 acre) leaving approximately 2/3 of an acre where the 
existing house exists in an RR-43 (one acre) zone. The action 
required is a motion to grant or deny a Variance to allow a lot 
split on 1.04 acres in an RR-43 zone; and a motion to approve or 
deny a site plan and authorization to issue a building permit on 
subject property according to an approved site plan with or 
without conditions. Grant explained that the Planning Department 
took an adjacent area of 300 feet and checked the existing lot 
sizes. The breakdown for those lots, consisting of 24 parcels, 
are: 12 parcels of the 24 are 1/3 acre or less, 7 parcels are 
larger than 1/3 but less than 1 acre and 5 lots are over 1 acre. 
Should the Board approve the Variance, the issuance of a building 
permit is subject to all stipulations of the Land Use 
Regulations, Fire Marshall, all applicable fees, subject to 
frontage improvements including curb, gutter, sidewalk and paved 
streets including fire hydrant. Granting of this Conditional Use 
and stipulations hereof does not constitute building permit 
approval. 
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Rick Smith with Engineering Planning Group and the 
consulting engineer for the Cutlers explained the reason for the 
hardship on subject property is due to the existing home which is 
the old Riley A Erma Fitzgerald home, that has an old rock mound 
which has prevented any irrigation or farming and the soil is not 
conducive to this. They would like to build a home, plant grass 
and improve the looks of the property. 
Floyd Nielsen made a motion to deny a variance based on the 
fact that this falls within proper zoning to have a one acre lot. 
Floyd suggested that the owners look at adjacent properties 
available that could be considered as a group in a larger mass of 
property that would be able to be rezoned and put into smaller 
lots compatible to this request for one lot. George Westbrook 
seconded the motion. Floyd Nielsen voted yes; George Westbrook 
voted yes and Duane Sadler voted yes. Voting was unanimous in 
the affirmative. 
Variance - Martin Sam Qvard k Mountain West Savings are 
requesting a variance to allow a lot^split_in_an_RR-43_zone 
l2S§±ed_at_1375 5_South_Shadow_Mountain Lane^. bj._A variance.to 
allow a side yard setback of 6_feet_on_the_west_side_of_the 
street^ cl_A_variance_tg_allgw_a_side_yard_se tback_gf _JL3_f eet_gn 
ib^-^ast^side^of^the^street^ dj._A_yar iance_tg_allgw_the_Igt_area 
gf_the_lgt_gwned_by_Mguntain_W^ ^84_acres in_an 
SBz43_zgne^ §l_A_variance_tg_waive_the_street_i . 
Grant Beagley explained that some years ago about the time 
that Draper became a City, a 3-lot Variance was created which 
resembled a subdivision but was not called a subdivision. There 
were conditions placed on that private lane with some 
improvements. The request is to take one of those original 3-lot 
variances and divide it. Grant read the 5 requests and 4 
recommendations from the Planning Department's _ Review and 
Recommendation dated 7-14-88 (copy attached). 
Attorney Tom Crowther, legal counsel for the Ovard's, 
explained briefly the background of the 3 lots and the legal 
discrepancies the Ovard's have encountered which in turn have 
inflicted hardships on the property. Mr. Crowther explained that 
when the home was built it did not totally meet the setback 
requirements• but it was approved and a building permit issued 
and this needs an adjustment. An adjustment may or may not be 
needed on the size of the acre as there is a dispute. Mr. Ovard 
has a certificate of survey that indicates this is one acre and 
the City's plat indicates it to be .8482 acres. If this is one 
acre, there would not need to be a Variance on the size. With 
respect to other requirements such as expanding the cul-de-sac to 
100 feet, requiring fire hydrants and the water being close 
enough to the back lot, we believe these are hardships for 
several reasons: (1) They were not required for the building of 
the home which is what Mr. Ovard is acquiring now. What is there 
now, as soon as the improvements are completed for which he has 
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paid the money, will be adequate to meet the conditions of that 
Variance, but it is out of the Ovard's hands to accomplish these 
things and unfair to require Mr. Ovard the expense of widening 
the cul-de-sac and putting in the water mains and fire hydrants 
to benefit the back lot which he does not own and is owned by Mr. 
Sanders. Mr. Sanders may eventually wish to build on that lot 
and should bear the expense and burden of doing that. (2) With 
respect to widening the cul-de-sac which would only be necessary 
because of the back lot, the hardship is that there is not enough 
room to expand the cul-de-sac to 100 feet and Mr. Ovard has not 
physical or monetary means of doing so because other people own 
those properties and the Ovard's cannot force them to do this. 
The Ovard*s asked the Board to leave in place the conditions that 
were required when the house was built on the front lot. The 
Ovard's would like for the improvements to be required whenever 
the back lot is developed. 
Attorney Hollis Hunt explained in detail some the 
requirements and the reasoning for them. One of the main 
problems discussed was the 100 foot cul-de-sac needed for the 
Fire Department to turn a fire truck around. Hollis explained 
that if the 3 property owners have deeded or given a recorded 
easement for the existing 70 ft. cul-de-sac, the additional 30 
foot radius would be a hardship. If in fact the record owner, and 
whoever the owner where the diameter of the turn-around is, have 
not yet given for record the 70 ft. easement, then they could be 
required to give the 100 ft. The problem however is that 70 feet 
is not adequate for the public safety vehicle to turn around. 
Attorney Hollis Hunt briefly discussed another issue that 
would make a great difference especially to the Ovard's and in 
reality to the other property owners, Steven's and Newman's, and 
that is they have large lots in excess of an acre and if this 
area follows true to plan they may want to divide their lots in 
the future and they will be prohibited from doing so because they 
do not have an adequate turn around. 
Mr. Stevens, one of the property owners, explained where his 
property was situated and stated several reasons why he was 
opposed to additional footage on his property indicating it would 
be ugly due to all the expenses. There was much discussion 
regarding Mr. Stevens' property, legal difficulties between the 
other two parties and a signed easement mainly for the cul-de-
sac. Grant Beagley explained the recommendation in detail and 
that Mr. Stevens would be the benefactor of the recommendation. 
There was much discussion regarding this subject. Attorney 
Hollis Hunt clearly stated that unless the 100 foot turn around 
is in there, none of the property owners will ever be able to 
obtain a building permit, subdivide or modify existing lots or 
anything thatwTTI require regulatory approvaldue to the fact 
that we, the City, cannot service you with public safety. 
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Mr. Joseph Sanders submitted a recent survey map of the lots 
and explained briefly the court problems with the Ovard's over 
this. 
After much discussion, Floyd Nielsen made a motion to 
approve the lot division subject to the following: (1) Granting 
of this variance and the stipulations hereof do not constitute 
Building permit approval; (2) A certified survey shall be 
provided and indicate whether the lot is .84 of an acre or in 
fact 1 acre and the property staked by a registered surveyor to 
verify property boundaries, setbacks and access right of ways; 
(3) Professionally drawn site plans and building plans, and 
required documentation shall be submitted to the City according 
to the usual procedures for review and approval of building 
permits; (4) All street improvements are required including 100 
foot diameter turn around unless there is a recorded document 
which indicates and has been technically recorded with the City 
and is legal and binding for something less than that dated in 
the year 1979 and if not it would be thei^OO feet required as 
indicated, pavement, water main extension, fire hydrants, 
drainage system and irrigation system, and must be satisfactorily 
designed and installed to City standards to the satisfaction of 
the City engineer except as modified by the Board of Adjustments, 
prior to issuance of any building permits or execute a completion 
agreement in an amount estimated by the City for the guaranteed 
installation of said improvements; (5) Issuance of a building 
permit is subject to all Stipulations of the Board of Adjustment; 
Fire Marshall approval;- City Engineer approval of offsite 
improvements and utilities; all building codes currently in 
effect, and payment of all applicable fees including; building 
permit, plan check, tradesman permits and impact. George 
Westbrook seconded the motion. George Westbrook voted yes; Floyd 
Nielsen voted yes and Duane Sadler voted yes. Voting was 
unanimous in the affirmative. 
George Westbrook reviewed the applicant request for a 
Variance to allow a side yard setback from a private right of way 
to be 6 feet on the west side of the right of way; Title 6, 
section 6.5.2.D.3.(d), which requires minimum front or side yard 
setback from right of way to be 30 feet; and to approve a 
Variance to allow a side yard setback from a private right of way 
to be 13 feet on the east side of the right of way. Title 6, 
section 6.5.2,D.3.(d), which requires minimum front or side yard 
setback from right of ways to be 30 feet. George Westbrook made 
the motion based on staff recommendations to allow a side yard 
setback from the private right of way to be 17 feet on both the 
west and east sides of the right of way which said right of way 
shall be recorded and shall be 20 feet wide across parcel no. 34-
06-277-019 (owned by Joseph D. Sanders), and no less than 30 feet 
wide from 13800 South across parcels no. 34-06-2^7-022 k 021 
(owned by Layne Newman) to the south end of parcel no. 34-06-277-
018. This motion requires a 54 ft. right of way, and the 
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installation of the 20 ft. asphalt roadway (Sander's lot) shall 
be installed by the property owner of Parcel #34-06-277-018 
(Sander's lot) at the time a Building Permit is issued on this 
Parcel. Floyd Nielsen seconded the motion. Floyd Nielsen voted 
yes; George Westbrook voted yes; Duane Sadler voted yes. Voting 
was unanimous in the affirmative. 
Floyd Nielsen made a motion to grant a Variance to allow the 
lot area of the lot owned by Mountain West Savings et.al., parcel 
ID no. 34-6--277-020 to be .84 acres. Title 6, section 6.5.8.C.1, 
requires minimum lot area to be 1.00 acre based on staff 
recommendations to allow the lot area of the lot owned by 
Mountain West Savings et.al., parcel ID no. 34-6-277--020 to be 
.84 acres, as per a certified survey. George Westbrook seconded 
the motion. George Westbrook voted yes; Floyd Nielsen voted yes, 
Duane Sadler voted yes. Voting was unanimous in the affirmative. 
George Westbrook reviewed the request to allow the Variance 
to waive street improvements. Title 6, section 6.5.2.D.3 (b), 
which requires "improvements equivalent to...public streets'* 
installed to City standards on private right of ways. George 
Westbrook made the motion based on staff recommendations to grant 
a variance to waive curb-gutter and sidewalk only. All other 
street improvements as enumerated under stipulation no. 4 are 
required beginning from the North part of the cul-de-sac back to 
the beginning or southern boundary of Parcel #34-06-277-018. 
Floyd Nielsen seconded the motion. George Westbrook voted yes; 
Floyd Nielsen voted yes; Duane Sadler voted yes. Voting was 
unanimous in the affirmative. 
Floyd Nielsen made a motion to adjourn at 8:30 p.m. George 
Westbrook seconded the motion. 
CITY OF DRAPER 
PLAITSIJTG DEPARTMENT 
TO: BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS 
Hearing Date: 7-20-88 
REVIEW And RECOMMENDATION 
By Tom Spencer 
7-14-88 
APPLICATION: BOA-88-90 
MARTIN SAM OVARD and MOUNTAIN VEST SAVINGS, owners; 
13755 So. Shadow Mountain Lane, Draper 
REQUEST: 
Appeal to the BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT for the following VARIANCE(s). 
1. Permit to divide a lot (parcel ID nos. 34-6-277-018, 019 & 020). 
Title 6, section 6.2.4.C., authorizes that the Board may "permit 
a redivision pf a lot,• . ." 
2. Variance to allow a side yard setback from a private right of way 
to be 6 feet on the west side of the right of way. Title 6, 
section 6. 5. 2. D. 3. <d) , requires minimum front or side yard 
setback from right of ways to be 30 feet. 
3. Variance to allow a side yard setback from a private right of way 
to be 13 feet on the east side of the right of way. Title 6, 
section 6.5.2.D.3. Cd), requires minimum front or side yard 
setback from right of ways to be 30 feet. 
4. Variance to allow the lot area of the lot owned by Mountain Vest 
Savings et.al., parcel ID no. 34-6-277-020 to be .84 acres. 
Title 6, section 6.5.8.C.1, requires minimum lot area to be 1.00 
acre. 
5. And, variance to waive street improvements. Title 6, section 
6.5.2.D.3.(b), requires "improvements equivalent to...public 
streets" installed to City standards on private right of ways. 
RECOMMEND AT I PIT: 
The Board may find favorably for applicant only if in the Board's 
opinion the conditions for such appeal under Section 6.2.3.C. are 
satisfied. 
Should the Board find favorably for the applicant, I recommend 
the following motions and stipulations as minimum conditions of the 
variance(s)• 
1. Motion to permit the redivision of the subject lot and authorize 
the issuance of building permits, conditional upon the prior 
satisfaction of the following stipulations; 
1) Granting of this variance and the stipulations hereof do not 
constitute Building permit approval. 
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2) A certified survey shall be provided and the property staked 
by a registered surveyor to verify property boundaries, 
setbacks and access right of ways. 
3) Profesionally drawn site plans and building plans, and 
required documentation shall be submitted to the City 
according to the usual proceedures for review and approval of 
building permits. 
4) All street improvements are required including 100 foot 
diameter, turn around, pavement, water main extension, 
firehydrants, drainage system and irrigation system, and must 
be satisfactorily designed and installed to City standards to 
the satisfaction of the City engineer except as modified by 
the Board Of Adjustments,t prior to issuance of any building 
permits or execute a completion aggreement in an amount 
estimated by the City for the guaranteed installation of said 
improvements. 
5) Issuance of a building permit is subject to all Stipulations 
of the Board Of Adjustment; Fire Marshall approval; City 
Engineer approval of offsite improvements and utilities; all 
building codes currently in effect, and payment of all 
applicable fees including; building permit, plan check, 
tradesman permits, and impact. , 
2. Motion to allow a side yard setback from a private right of way 
to be 17 feet on bath the west and east sides of the. right of way 
which said right of way shall be recorded and shall be 20 feet wide 
across parcel no. 34-06-277-019 (owned by Joseph D. Sanders), and no 
less than 30 feet wide from 13800 South across parcels no. 34-06-277-
022 & -021 (owned by Lavne Newman) to the south end of parcel no. 34-
06-277-019. 
3. Motion to allow the lot area of the lot owned by Mountain Vest 
Savings et.al., parcel ID no. 34-6-277-020 to be .84 acres. 
4. Motion to grant a variance to waive curb-gutter and sidewalk 
only. All other street improvements as enumerated under stipulation 
no. 4) are required. 
FACTUAL SUMMARY 
1. The following comments refer to application and plan stamp dated 
June 6, 1988, 
2. The property is 1.86 acres located in a RR-43 zone. 
3. The applicants desire the above referenced variance(s) to allow 
the resale of a parcel of land (Mountian Vest's) smaller than was 
originally approved by the Board Of Adjustments April 12, 1979. The 
lot approved and upon which the Board authorized a building permit in 
1979 was 2 acres in area. Mountain Vest apparently accepted a Trust 
deed on property less than the approved lot area. 
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4. Currently the property is accessed an an exclusive private right 
of way that varies in width from 16 feet to 35 feet. The redivision 
will require an extension of a right of way along the west side of 
the property to access the north half. 
5. The north half will (under current circumstances) be unusable 
unless the Board also resolves the issues of access right of way and 
setbacks of the existing structures from the right of way to that 
lot. There is no reason to permit the lot redivision unless the 
issues of access to the north half are resolved. The current owner 
of the north half (Joseph Sanders) does have other alternatives that 
might be pursued, but, the probability of working out an alternate 
access is less. 
PRIOR ACTIOff 
April 12. 1979; The Board Of Adjustments approved the formation of 
three building lots reconfigured from 6 parcels. The subject lot 
under current consideration was approved as 2 acres in area. The 
Board also authorized three building permits (one on each lot) with 
certain stipulations regarding street improvements on the private 
right of way. The right of way has not been fully established nor 
have the required improvements been completed. 
June 10, 1988; Mr. Ovard (the current co-applicant with Mountain 
Vest Savings) has executed a completion guarantee to the City for his 
potential share of the previously required improvements should he 
aquire the property. 
REVIEVt 
1. The site plan submitted is very incomplete, requested information 
on the application form has not been provided, i.e. fences, ditches, 
accurate parcel areas, parcel no. 34-06-277-019, canal easement, 
etc., and with some information shown being inaccurate such as parcel 
areas. 
2. The original 2 acre lot was an authorized and approved lot. No 
space needed to meet the ... building requirements may be sold or 
leased away from such lot or building C6.5.2.B.4]. 
3. The design, right of way dedication, installation and guarantee 
for completion of full street improvements are required C6.5.2.D. or 
6.5.2.E. as either may be applied]. 
Page 4 
MTBT. VEST/0VARD; BOA-88-90 
Review, 7-14-88, 
4. Minimum setbacks from any street right of way (public or private) 
in a RR-43 zone is 30 feet C6. 5. 2. D. 3. <d> and 6.5.8.D. 1 & 3]. 
5. Minimum diameter of a turn around shall be 100 feet 
C6.5.2.D.3. <b> & <c>. 
6. A drainage^ plan and installation of drainage facilities is 
required by the City engineer conforming to standards of the Drainage 
Guide of Draper City and/or as modified and required by the City 
engineer. | 
7. The north half, if approved as a lot will more than likely need-
to extend the water main and install a firehydrant to be within 250 
feet of any structure on that parcel. 
8. Except for conditions upon which this appeal is requested and the 
stipulations imposed, the proposed redivisian and uses shall 
otherwise be required to conform to all other minimun development 
standards of Draper City C6.3., 6.4.2.A.39,, and 6.5.]. 
cc: Martin Sam Ovard, 2316 E. 10375 So., Sandy, 84092 
Douglas Malan, Mountain Vest Savings, 
Suite 500, 40 E, South Temple, SLC. , 84111 
Joseph D. Sanders, 13550 Aldrin, Poway, CA., 92064 
Layne J. Newman, 13735 So. Shadow Mountain Lane, Draper, 84020 
City Council 
Planning Commission 
Mayor Charles Hoffman 
City Attorney, Hoilis Hunt 
City Administrator, A. Hatton-Vard 
City Engineer, Palmer-Vilding 
G« Beagley 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 22 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-1002 
MUNICIPAL LAND USE 10-9-1002 
with respect to property boundary lines, and other permissible forms of land 
use controls. 
(2) The legislative body may refuse to approve or renew any plat or 
subdivision plan, or dedication of any street or other ground, if the deed 
restxictions, covenants, or similar binding agreements running with the land 
for the lots or parcels covered by the plat or subdivision prohibit or have the 
effect of prohibiting reasonably sited and designed solar collectors, clothes-
lines, or other energy devices based on renewable resources from being 
installed on buildings erected on lots or parcels covered by the plat or 
subdivision. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-901, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 235, § 52. 
PART 10 
APPEALS AND ENFORCEMENT 
10-9-1001. Appeals. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use 
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative 
remedies. 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the 
district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered. 
(3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. 
History: C. 1953,10-9-1001, enacted by L. ment, effective Apnl 27,1992, made grammati-
1991, ch. 235, § 53; 1992, ch. 30, § 13. cal changes in Subsection (1). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and C.J.S. — 101A C J S Zoning and Land Plan-
Planning § 1019 et seq. ning § 265 et seq. 
10-9-1002, Enforcement. 
(1) (a) A municipality or any owner of real estate within the municipality in 
which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority 
of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other 
remedies provided by law, institute: 
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate 
actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful 
building, use, or act. 
(b) A municipality need only establish the violation to obtain the 
injunction. 
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(2) (a) The municipality may enforce the ordinance by withholding building 
permits. 
(b) It is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter, or change the 
use of any building or other structure within a municipality without 
approval of a building permit. 
(c) The municipality may not issue a building permit unless the plans of 
and for the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, or 
use fully conform to all regulations then in effect. 
History: C. 1953,10-9-1002, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 235, § 54. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Laches as defense in suit by gov-
ernmental entity to enjoin zoning violation, 73 
A.L.R.4th 870. 
10-9-1003. Penalties-
CD The municipal legislative body may, by ordinance, establish civil penal-
ties for violations of any of the provisions of this chapter or of any ordinances 
adopted under the authority of this chapter. 
(2) Violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or of any ordinances 
adopted under the authority of this chapter are punishable as a class C 
misdemeanor upon conviction either: 
(a) as a class C misdemeanor; or 
(b) by imposing the appropriate civil penalty adopted under the author-
ity of this section. 
History: C. 1953,10-9-1003, enacted by L. ther* to precede new Subsections (2Xa) and 
1991, ch. 235, § 55; 1992, ch. 23, § 24. (2Kb). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
ment, effective July 1, 1992, added Subsection meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
(1), designated Subsection (2), and added aei-
CHAPTER 10 
CITIES OF FIRST AND SECOND CLASS 
[REPEALED] 
10-10-1 to 10-10-75. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 169, § 66 repeals service commission, were repealed by $ 10-1-
§ 10-10-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating 114, enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 48, § 1. For 
to division of city into wards, effective April 25, present provisions, see § 10-3-1001 et seq. 
1988. Sections 10-10-23 to 10-10-75 (L. 1961, ch. 
Sections 10-10-2 to 10-10-8 (Utah Code An- 24 § 1- 1967 ch 24 § 1- 1971 ch 14, § 1; 
notated 1953; L. 1957, ch. 20 § 1) relating to
 x^12 ( l s t s s { c h ' x> §'§ x ^ 1 2 ; 1 9 7 3 (i8t's.S.), 
h f f s ^ 4 6 " 1 ' W 6 r e r e P € y ch- !• 5 1). * e Uniform Municipal Fiscal Pro-
cn.24, J 2. , . , . , . , „ , . . . cedures Act, were repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 
Sections 10-10-9 to 10-10-22 (Utah Code An- ,.. , .
 P ' _ „ „ f _ ! , „ . , ' . „ M iru?-l01 
notated 1953; L. 1953, ch. 20, § 1; 1955, ch. 16, f1'* « i £ P P™™"*. " • «« 1 0 -«- 1 0 1 
§ 1; 1955, ch. 17, § 1), relating to the cml w i u - ° - l o a -
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APPENDIX 
ITEM # 23 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 
78-27-54 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah's Inherent 
Risks of Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol 
Hill, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 355. 
78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards listing 
inherent risks and limitations on liability. 
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent locations 
within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing 
and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in this act' 
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4. 
Meaning of "this act ." — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to § 78-27-51. 
78-27-55. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch. 
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in 
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of 
skiing and the statute of limitations on such 
action, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 43, § i 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or de-
fense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except 
under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees 
under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted the 
Subsection designation (1); deleted "where not 
otherwise provided by statute or agreement" 
following "civil actions" in Subsection (1); sub-
stituted "shall" for "may" following "the court" 
in Subsection (1); added "except under Subsec-
tion (2)" at the end of Subsection (1) and added 
Subsection (2). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer. 
Discretion of court. 
Essential elements. 
Findings. 
Frivolous appeal. 
Hearing. 
State of mind. 
"Without merit" and "good faith." 
Cited. 
Breach of covenant of good faith by in-
surer. 
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing by an insurer does not 
show the bad faith necessary for an award un-
der this section. Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
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James LEAKE, Jerry Couch, John Volpl, 
Daniel Garcia, James Green, and Com-
merce City, Colorado, Petitioners, 
v. 
H. Marie CAIN, nka H. Marie Burrows, 
individually and as natural mother and 
next friend of the deceased, Jeffrey 
Mark Cain, and Delores Chase and 
Jack Chase, individually and as natural 
parents and next friends of the de-
ceased Jay Chase, Respondents. 
No. 85SC66. 
Supreme Court of Colorado, 
En Banc. 
June 9, 1986. 
Wrongful death action was brought 
following death of pedestrians struck by an 
automobile driven by intoxicated person 
whom police officers had released in the 
custody of a younger brother. The trial 
court granted officers' motions for summa-
ry judgment. The Court of Appeals, 695 
P.2d 798, reversed and remanded. The Su-
preme Court, Erickson, J., held that: (1) 
public-duty rule no longer applies in Colora-
do; (2) duty of public entity is determined 
in the same manner as if it were a private 
party for purposes of determining negli-
gence liability; (3) police officers owed no 
duty to decedents after having detained 
intoxicated person at party and calmed him 
down and then released him to custody of 
his younger brother, who assured officers 
that he would drive intoxicated person 
home; (4) officers' failure to commit intoxi-
cated person under the emergency commit-
ment statute did not give rise to cause of 
action; and (5) officers exercised discretion-
ary function in determining whether to re-
lease intoxicated person, and thus enjoyed 
qualified immunity. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Rovira, J., filed a specifically concur-
ring opinion. 
1. Municipal Corporations «»723 
I Public-duty rule cannot be used to 
'avoid liability where special relationship ex-
ists between public entity and plaintiff. 
2. Municipal Corporations «=*723 
Public-duty rule is not applicable 
/where tortious conduct of public entity vio-
lates statute or ordinance enacted for bene-
fit of class of persons to which plaintiff 
belongs. 
3. Municipal Corporations «=>723 
Public-duty rule no longer applies in 
Colorado and, for purposes of determining 
liability in negligence action, duty of public 
entity is determined in same manner as if it 
were a private party; overruling Miller v. 
Ouray Electric Light & Power Co., 18 
Colo.App. 131, 70 P. 447; People v. Hoag, 
54 Colo. 542, 131 P. 400; and Richardson 
v. Belknap, 73 Colo. 52, 213 P. 335; disap-
proving Gold Run, Ltd. v. Board of Coun-
ty Commissioners, 38 Colo.App. 44, 554 
P.2d 317; disagreeing with Shore v. Town 
of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 
1379; Fryman v. JMK/Skewer, Inc., 137 
UI.App.3d 611, 92 Ill.Dec. 178, 484 N.E.2d 
909; Cox v. Department of Natural Re-
sources, 699 S.W.2d 443 (Mo.App.); O'Con-
nor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184, 
447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485; Barratt 
v. Burlingham, — R.I. — , 492 A.2d 1219; 
Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 
Wash.2d 275, 669 P.2d 451; Hage v. Stade, 
304 N.W.2d 283 (Minn.); Riss v. City of 
New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 293 N.Y.S.2d 
897, 240 N.E.2d 860; and Motyka v. City of 
Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 256 N.Y.S.2d 
595, 204 N.E.2d 635. 
4. Negligence ®=>2f 10 
Where person should reasonably fore-
see that his act or failure to act will involve 
unreasonable risk of harm to another, 
there is duty to avoid that harm; there is 
no duty to prevent third person from harm-
ing another absent special relation between 
actor and wrongdoer or between actor and 
victim. 
5. Municipal Corporations <&=>747(3) 
Police officers had duty to prevent in-
toxicated person from harming others 
LEAKE 
Ciie a» 720 P.2d 
while he was handcuffed at party but they 
discharged their duty by restraining him 
until he calmed down and their duty began 
and ended at party and did not extend to 
period after he was released to his younger 
brother, who assured officers that he 
would drive intoxicated person home. 
6. Municipal Corporations <S=>747(3) 
Police officers who subdued apparently 
intoxicated person at party and then re-
leased him to his younger brother who 
assured officers that he would drive him 
home did not assume duty to persons there-
after killed when struck by automobile 
which intoxicated person was driving, did 
not induce any reliance on the officers' 
conduct, and did not create any peril or 
change the nature of any existing risk. 
7. Negligence <£=:>6 
Breach of statutory duty is actionable 
only by one who is a member of class 
which the statute was designed to protect 
and only where the injury suffered by that 
person is the type of injury which the stat-
ute was enacted to prevent. 
8. Municipal Corporations <s=»717(3) 
Police officers' failure to make emer-
gency commitment pursuant to statute 
does not create claim for relief by person 
who is injured by one who should have 
allegedly have been committed after offi-
cers have released intoxicated person into 
custody of apparently sober and respon-
sible relative. C.R.S. 25-1-310(1). 
9. Municipal Corporations <S=>170 
Public official performing discretion-
ary acts within scope of his office enjoys 
qualified immunity. 
10. Chemical Dependents <^1 
Municipal Corporations «=»747<3) 
Police officer who encounters intoxi-
cated person who is not driving an automo-
bile has no authority to take that person 
into protective custody unless he has prob-
able cause to believe that the person is 
clearly dangerous, and officer exercises 
dtecretion in determining to do so, and thus 
v. CAIN Colo. 153 
152 (Colo. !9S6) 
enjoys qualified immunity from negligence 
liability based on his decision. C.R.S. 25-1-
310(1). 
11. Municipal Corporations <£=>747(3) 
Decision of officers as to whether to 
take intoxicated person into custody or re-
lease him to custody of his brother, who 
promised to drive him home, was discre-
tionary and they were thus protected by 
official immunity in action brought by rela-
tives of those killed when struck by auto-
mobile driven by the intoxicated person. 
C.R.S. 25-1-310(1). 
Hall & Evans, Alan Epstein, Arthur R. 
Karstaedt, III, Denver, for petitioners. 
Leland S. Huttner, P.C., Anne M. Vitek, 
Denver, for respondents. 
ERICKSON, Justice. 
In this wrongful death action, respon-
dents seek damages for the deaths of their 
children, who were killed when they were 
struck by an automobile driven by Ralph 
Crowe. The trial court granted petitioners' 
motion for summary judgment. In Cain v. 
Leake, 695 l\2d 798 (Colo.App. 1984), the 
court of appeals reversed and remanded 
the case for trial. We granted certiorari, 
and we now reverse and remand to the 
court of appeals with directions to reinstate 
the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment. 
I. 
FACTS 
The tragic sequence of events leading to 
the accident in this case is undisputed. On 
the evening of September 9, 1978, Ralph 
Crowe, eighteen years of age, attended a 
large, outdoor party of teenagers in Com-
merce City.1 Over the course of three and 
one-half hours, Crowe drank eight cups of 
beer and three cups of alcoholic punch.2 
At approximately 11;30 p m., Commerce 
City police officers were dispatched to 
1. There weie between thirty and sixty youths at 2. In his deposition, Crowe stated that the cups 
the party. held four or five ounces of liquid. 
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break up the party after a neighbor com-
plained. When the officers arrived a t the 
party, they ordered the teenagers to dis-
perse. Ralph Crowe became disruptive and 
was handcuffed and detained by the offi-
cers. Shortly thereafter, the officers were 
approached by seventeen-year-old Eddie 
Crowe, Ralph Crowe's younger brother. 
Eddie Crowe requested that Ralph be re-
leased to him and told the officers that he 
would drive Ralph home. After noting 
that Eddie Crowe appeared sober and after 
checking his driver's license, the officers 
agreed to permit Ralph Crowe to leave the 
party with his brother. 
Ralph Crowe and another individual left 
the party as passengers in a vehicle driven 
by Eddie Crowe. The Crowe brothers took 
the individual home and then proceeded to 
a convenience store, where Ralph Crowe 
purchased some cookies. When the two 
youths left the store, Ralph Crowe drove 
the car. He proceeded to a location near 
Stapleton Airport, where the party which 
had been broken up by the Commerce City 
police was to continue. At the new site of 
the party, the car driven by Ralph Crowe 
struck six persons on the street, killing two 
of them (respondents' decedents). Ralph 
Crowe's blood alcohol content at the time 
of the accident was .20, well in excess of 
the legal presumption of intoxication in Col-
orado.* 
Respondents filed a wrongful death ac-
tion 4 in the Denver District Court against 
Ralph Crowe, James Crowe (the father of 
Ralph Crowe), the five Commerce City po-
lice officers who responded to the party 
which Ralph Crowe attended on September 
9, 1978, and the City of Commerce City.5 
Respondents alleged that the police officers 
3. Section 42-4-1202(l)(a), 17 C.R.S. (1984), pro-
vides: 
"It is a misdemeanor for any person who is 
under ihe influence of intoxicating liquor to 
drive any vehicle in this state." Under section 
42-4-1202(2)(c), "lijf there was (at the time of 
the offense or within a reasonable time there-
after] 0.10 or more grams of alcohol per one 
hundred milliliters of blood as shown by 
chemical analysis of such person's blood . . . 
it shall be presumed that the defendant was 
under the influence of alcohol." After the 
had reason to believe that Ralph Crowe 
was intoxicated at the time he was de-
tained, and that they negligently failed to 
take him into custody. Respondents fur-
ther alleged that the officers were negli-
gent in releasing Ralph Crowe to his 
younger brother, that it was foreseeable 
that Ralph Crowe would drive an automo-
bile in an intoxicated condition, and that 
injury to the public was a foreseeable con-
sequence of the officers' failure to arrest 
Ralph Crowe. 
The police officers and the City of Com-
merce City (petitioners) filed a motion for 
summary judgment, contending that the 
duty of the officers to enforce the law was 
a public duty, and that the officers' negli-
gence, if any, was not actionable because 
they did not owe a special duty to the 
respondents' decedents. After a hearing, 
the trial court granted petitioners' motion 
for summary judgment, stating that: 
in order for one to recover on a tort claim 
of negligence brought against a public 
official by an individual member of the 
public, they are required to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence . . . that 
the defendant owes a special duty to the 
plaintiff and that [the] duty was breach-
ed, resulting in damage or injury. 
The court concluded that the Commerce 
City police officers, in exercising their dis-
cretion to release Ralph Crowe, did not owe 
a special duty to the respondents' dece-
dents. 
The court of appeals reversed and held 
that petitioners were not immune
 s from 
suit. Cain v. Leake, 695 P.2d at 798. In 
denying immunity, the court of appeals rea-
soned that (1) the decision of the police 
officers to release Ralph Crowe was not a 
accident, Ralph Crowe's blood was tested for 
alcohol content. The test indicated .20 grams 
of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of 
blood. 
4. §§ 13-21-201 to -204, 6 C.R.S. (1973 & 1985 
Supp.). 
5. James Crowe was subsequently dismissed 
from the action by stipulation between Ihe par-
ties. Ralph Crowe is not a party to this appeal. 
LEAKE v. 
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discretionary act and (2) denying immunity 
would not unduly interfere with the gov-
ernmental function. The trial court's re-
liance upon the public duty/special duty 
distinction in granting summary judgment 
was not addressed by the court of appeals. 
II. 
DUTY 
Nothing is more basic to tort law than 
the requirement that, in order to recover 
for the negligent conduct of another, the 
plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of 
a duty owed by the defendant to the plain-
tiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) which actu-
ally and proximately caused (4) damage to 
the plaintiff. Franklin v. Wilson, 161 
Colo. 334, 422 P.2d 51 (1966); W. Keeton, 
D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts 164-65 
(5th ed. 1984). This case focuses on the 
first element. We must decide whether the 
Commerce City police officers owed a duty 
to respondents' decedents to take Ralph 
Crowe into custody. 
6. The public duty doctrine was apparently ac-
cepted by most state courts in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. The lead-
ing treatise on tort law during the era stated: 
The rule of official responsibility, then, ap-
pears to be this: That if the duty which the 
official authority imposes upon an officer is a 
duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or 
an inadequate or erroneous performance, 
must be a public, not an individual injury, 
and must be redressed, if at all. in some form 
of public prosecution. On thc^other hand, if 
the duty is a duty to the individual, then a 
neglect to perform it, or to perform it proper-
ly, is an individual wrong, and may support 
an individual action for damages. 
T. Cooley, A Treatise on ihe Law of Torts 379 
(1879). The author provides an example of 
particular relevance to this case; 
The rule stated does not depend at all on the 
grade of the office, but exclusively upon the 
nature of the duty. This may be shown by 
taking as an illustration the case of the police-
man; one of the lowest grade of public offi-
cers. His duty is to serve criminal wnnanls; 
to arrest persons who commit offenses in his 
view, to bring night-walkers to account, and 
to perform various offices of similar nature. 
Within his beat he should watch the premises 
of individuals, and protect them against bur-
glaries and arsons. But suppose he goes to 
sleep on his beat, and while thus off duty a 
CAIN Colo. 1 5 5 
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A. 
The Public Duty Doctrine 
In granting petitioners' motion for sum-
mary judgment, the trial court relied upon 
what has become known as the "public 
duty doctrine." The origin of the public 
duty doctrine can be traced to South v. 
Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 15 L.Ed. 
433 (1855). In South, the plaintiff alleged 
that he was kidnapped and held for a peri-
od of four days and released only when he 
secured the ransom money demanded by 
his kidnappers. He also asserted that the 
local sheriff knew that he had been unlaw-
fully detained yet did nothing to obtain his 
release. The plaintiff sued the sheriff for 
refusing to enforce the laws of the state 
and for failing to protect the plaintiff. The 
circuit court awarded plaintiff a substantial 
judgment. The Supreme Court reversed 
and declared that a sheriff's duty to keep 
the peace was "a public duty, for neglect of 
which he is amenable to the public, and 
punishable by indictment only." 59 U.S. 
(18 How.) at 403.* 
robbery is committed or a house burned 
down, cither of which might have been pre-
vented had he been vigilant,—who shall bring 
him to account for this neglect of duty? Not 
the individual who has suffered from the 
crime, certainly, for the officer was not his 
policeman; was not hired by him, paid by 
him. or controlled by him; and consequently 
owed to him no legal duty. The duty imposed 
upon the officer was a duty to the public—to 
the State, of which the individual sufferer was 
only a fractional part, and incapable as such 
of enforcing obligations which were not indi-
vidual but general. If a policeman fails to 
guard the premises of a citizen with due vigi-
lance, the neglect is a breach of duty of exact-
ly the same sort as when, finding the same 
citizen indulging in riotous conduct, he fails 
to arrest him; and if the citizen could sue him 
foi the one neglect, he could also for the 
other. 
Id. at 381 (footnote omitted). The public duty 
rule was repeated in subsequent editions of the 
treatise without criticism. Sec T. Coolev. A 
Treatise on the IMW of Torts 446 (2d ed. 1888); 2 
T. Cooley, A Treatise on the Ixtw of Torts 756-57 
(3d ed. 1906); 2 T. Cooley. A Treatise on the 
IMW of Torts 385-86 (4th ed. 1932). See also W. 
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts 1049 (5th ed. 
1984). 
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1. The Colorado Cases 
The public duty rule first surfaced in 
Colorado in Miller v. Ouray Electric Light 
& Power Co., 18 Colo.App. 131, 70 P. 447 
(1902). The plaintiffs decedent in Miller 
died while he was incarcerated in the Our-
ay County jail. The plaintiff alleged that 
defective wiring in the jail caused a fire 
which resulted in the death. Plaintiff 
sought to hold the county commissioners 
liable for the death based upon a statute 
that required the county commissioners to 
inspect the county jail and to correct irreg-
ularities. The court of appeals held that 
the statute created only a public duty to 
insure the safety of the jail, not an individ-
ual duty to any person who was incarcerat-
ed in the jail. The opinion stated that the 
obligation of the county commissioners was 
"an official duty, owing to the public by 
virtue of their office, and for a breach of it 
the statutes specifically provide a remedy 
by suit upon their official bonds." 18 Colo. 
App. at 138, 70 P. at 449. Without the 
protection afforded by the public duty rule, 
the court concluded, no person would be 
willing to serve as a public officer because 
of the fear of exposure to liability. 
In People v. Hoag, 54 Colo. 542, 131 P. 
400 (1913), we addressed the public duty 
rule when the plaintiff, the only newspaper 
in Prowers County, sued the county clerk 
for refusing to publish a list of candidates 
before an election. The plaintiff relied 
upon a statute requiring the county clerk 
to publish such a list and alleged that it 
suffered monetary damages as a result of 
the clerk's refusal to publish the list. The 
plaintiff conceded that the statute imposed 
a public duty but argued that the statute 
also imposed a duty to the publishing com-
pany, which suffered a special injury by 
virtue of the clerk's failure to employ the 
newspaper's services. We rejected the 
plaintiffs contention and affirmed the trial 
court's dismissal of the action against the 
clerk, stating: 
The statute requiring the clerk to pub-
lish the list of nominations was clearly 
intended for the benefit of the public, 
and not for the benefit of newspapers. 
The benefit to the latter was only inci-
dental. Certainly the law was not passed 
with the idea of benefiting publishers. 
So that the duty imposed was purely a 
public one. When the duty imposed upon 
an officer is one to the public only, its 
non-performance must be a public, and 
not an individual injury, and must be 
redressed in a public prosecution of some 
kind, if at all. 2 Cooley on Torts, (3d 
Ed.) 756. 
54 Colo, at 544, 131 P. at 401. The court 
distinguished cases outside of Colorado 
holding public officials liable where the 
plaintiff had parted with consideration in 
reliance on an official's representation or 
where the duty of the official was for the 
benefit of an identifiable class of persons 
to which the plaintiff belonged. Id. 
We subsequently held that the duty of a 
county to maintain its highways is a public 
duty, and that any breach of the duty is not 
actionable by a person who suffers dam-
ages as a result of negligent highway de-
sign and maintenance. Richardson v. 
Belknap, 73 Colo. 52, 213 P. 335 (1923). 
The court thus reaffirmed the public duty 
rule set forth in Miller v. Ouray Electric 
Light & Power Co. and People v. Hoag. In 
Richardson, the court added a new ratio-
nale for the rule, stating that since coun-
ties were not liable for tortious conduct, it 
would be inconsistent to impose liability on 
their officers. 
More recently, we discussed the public 
duty rule in the context of a claim against 
the Industrial Commission by an individual 
who was injured when a machine in the 
plant where he was employed malfunc-
tioned. Quintano v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137 (1972). 
The plaintiff relied on a statute charging 
the Industrial Commission with the respon-
sibility of inspecting factories to protect 
employees and guests against defective or 
dangerous machinery. After holding that 
the Industrial Commission was protected 
by sovereign immunity, we concluded that 
the commission members were not individu-
ally liable. The issue was whether "the 
statutory duty is public or is for the action-
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able benefit of an individual." Id. at 135, 
495 P.2d at 1138. We observed that the 
statutes in Miller, Hoag, and Richardson 
clearly imposed duties for the benefit of 
the public generally and not for that of 
particular individuals or classes. In con-
trast, the statute here under considera-
tion specifically designates the classes of 
individuals for whose benefit it is intend-
ed, viz.: employees and guests. Under 
|the public duty rule| it might be said 
that this duty was created for the benefit 
of the petitioner and that, therefore, non-
feasance by the individual members of 
the commission subjects them to liability. 
178 Colo, at 135, 495 P.2d at 1138-39. Re-
lying on Evans v. Board of County Com-
missioners, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 
(1971), we said that in the area of sovereign 
immunity, courts should not attempt to in-
fer the General Assembly's intent as to 
whether a statute may be relied upon as a 
source of duty in a civil action for dam-
ages. Because the statute in question did 
not authorize a private cause of action for 
its violation, we upheld the trial court's 
dismissal of the complaint. 
In refusing to resolve the case on the 
basis of the public duty rule, Quintano left 
the viability of the doctrine in this state in 
considerable doubt. Predictably, subse-
quent decisions by the court of appeals 
reached opposite conclusions as to the con-
tinued validity of the doctrine in Colorado. 
Compare Gold Run, Ltd. v. Board of 
County Commissioners, 38 Colo.App. 44, 
554 P.2d 317 (1976) (affirming dismissal of 
action on the basis of public duty rule) with 
7. In his special concurrence, Justice Rovira as-
serts that the validity of the public duty rule 
need not and should not be addressed in this 
case. He argues first that the issue was no; 
propcily identified when we granted certiorari 
and second that the issue was not briefed by the 
parties in this court. In granting certiorari, wc 
phrased the duly issue in the bioadcst possible 
language: "Whether the defendants owed a duty 
to the plaintiffs and their decedents such that 
the defendants' failure to protect them is action-
able." The public duty rule has been central to 
this case since the petitioners filed their motion 
for summary judgment in the trial court. In 
support of their motion, petitioners submitted a 
brief which fully discussed the public duty rule 
and argued that summary judgment should be 
v. CAIN Colo. 157 
152 {Colo. !986) 
Martinez v. City of Lakcwood, 655 P.2d 
1388 (Colo.App. 1982) (reversing summary 
judgment that was premised upon the pub-
lic duty rule). In Martinez, the court of 
appeals stated: 
[T|he concept of public duty, i.e., a gener-
al duty versus a special duty "is [merely] 
a function of municipal sovereign immu-
nity and not a traditional negligence con-
cept which has a meaning apart from the 
governmental setting. Accordingly, its 
efficacy is dependent on the continuing 
validity of the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity." Commercial Carrier Corp. v. 
Indian River [371 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 
1979)]. The concept of a public duty 
cannot stand either with the enactment 
of the statute abrogating sovereign im-
munity, nor in instances where there is a 
common law duty of a public entity to 
the plaintiff. As noted in numerous 
opinions from various jurisdictions, appli-
cation of the public duty—special duty 
dichotomy results in "a duty to none 
where there is a duty to all." Stewart i\ 
Schmieden 386 So.2d 1351 (La.1980); 
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian 
River, [371 So.2d at 1010]; Adams v. 
Alaska, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976). 
655 P.2d at 1390. In view of the trial 
court's reliance on the public duty rule in 
granting summary judgment in this case, 
and because of the conflicting decisions by 
the court of appeals in Gold Run and Mar-
tinez, we are squarely confronted with the 
question of whether the public duty rule is 
still good law in Colorado.7 
granted on that basis. Respondents, in turn, 
filed a brief in opposition to summary judg-
ment, contending that the public duty rule was 
no longer good law. As wc have noted, the trial 
court relied upon the public duty rule in grant-
ing summaiy judgment. See supra text pp. 154, 
155. 
Respondents appealed the trial court's ruling 
to the couit of appeals, where they again argued 
that the public duty rule was an improper basis 
for granting summary judgment. Thus, al-
though the trial court awarded summary judg-
ment on the basis of the public duty rule and 
although that rationale was contested on appeal, 
the court of appeals inexplicably did not address 
the issue. Justice Rovira correctly points out 
that the public duty rule was not briefed in this 
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2. Abolition of the Public Duty Rule 
The public duty rule is probably followed 
by the majority of courts. See, e.g., Shore 
v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 
A.2d 1379 (1982); Fryman v. JMK/Skewer, 
Inc., 137 Ill.App.3d 611, 92 Ill.Dec. 178, 484 
N.E.2d 909 (1985); Cox v. Department of 
Natural Resources, 699 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. 
App.1985); O'Connor v. City of New York, 
58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d 
485 (1983); Barratt v. Burlingham, — 
R.I. — , 492 A.2d 1219 (1985); Chambers-
Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash.2d 
275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983); Annot., Modern 
Status of Rule Excusing Governmental 
Unit from Tort Liability on Theory that 
On Iy General, Not Particular, Duty was 
Owed Under Circumstances, 38 A.L.R. 4th 
1194 (1985). The two principal rationales 
offered in support of the doctrine are (1) 
protection against excessive governmental 
liability and (2) the need to prevent hin-
drance of the governing process. J & B 
Development Co., Inc. v. King County, 
100 Wash.2d 299, 669 P.2d 468 (1983); Mil-
ler v. Ouray Electric Light & Power Co., 
18 Colo.App. at 131, 70 P. at 447. How-
ever, a growing number of courts have 
concluded that the underlying purposes of 
the public duty rule are better served by 
the application of conventional tort princi-
ples and the protection afforded by stat-
utes governing sovereign immunity than by 
a rule that precludes a finding of an action-
able duty on the basis of the defendant's 
status as a public entity. Adams v. State, 
555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State, 
134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982); Com-
courl. During oral argument, petitioners main-
tained, contrary to their position in the trial 
court, that the public duty rule was not at issue. 
In our view, however, it is necessary to address 
the public duly rule because it was the basis of 
the trial court's ruling and because it Tell within 
the issue that was formulated for review on 
certiorari. 
Judicial economy favors an immediate resolu-
tion of the issue which Justice Rovira would 
have us postpone until a later date. As we have 
pointed out, our last decision involving the pub-
lic duty rule, Quintano v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137 (1972). cast 
doubt on the viability of the doctrine in this 
state. Two court of appeals' decisions since 
Quintano have reached opposite conclusions re-
mercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River 
County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979); Wilson 
v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979); 
Schear v. Board of County Commission-
ers of Bernalillo County, 101 N.M. 671, 
687 P.2d 728 (1984); Brennan v. Eugene, 
285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); Coffey v. 
Milwaukee, 74 Wis.2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 
(1976). Significantly, the rule has been re-
pudiated by two courts whose earlier deci-
sions are frequently cited in support of its 
continued validity. See Ryan v. State, 134 
Ariz, at 308, 656 P.2d at 597 (overruling 
Massengill v. Yuma, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 
P.2d 376 (1969)); Commercial Carrier 
Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 
1010 (Fla.1979) (overruling Modlin v. City 
of Miami Beach, 201 So.2d 70 (Fla.1967)). 
The public duty rule has also been con-
demned by commentators and by judges 
dissenting to opinions upholding the doc-
trine. Chambers-Castanes, 100 Wash.2d 
at 275, 669 P.2d at 451, 460 (Utter, J., 
concurring); Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 
283, 288 (Minn.1981) (Scott, J., dissenting); 
Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 
293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861 
(1968) (Keating, J., dissenting); Motyka v. 
City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 256 
N.Y.S.2d 595, 598, 204 N.E.2d 635, 637 
(1965) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting); 1A C. 
Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law 
§ 11.74 (1986); Note, State Tort Liability 
for Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 Colum. 
J.L. & Soc. Probs. 303 (1977); Note, Court 
of Claims Act, 58 St. John's L.Rev. 199 
(1983). 
garding the continued validity of the rule. In 
this very case, the trial court expressed some 
hesitation in ordering summary judgment on 
the basis of the public duty rule. In view of the 
inroads on sovereign immunity and the attend-
ant increase in the number of lawsuits against 
public officials and governmental entities, we 
believe that the bench and bar are entitled to 
clear guidance on an issue which has in the past 
substantially controlled litigation involving tort 
claims against public entities and their employ-
ees. We are persuaded that this case provides 
the appropriate factual and legal basis for abol-
ishing the public duty rule and substituting the 
more conceptually satisfactory conventional 
tort analysis. See infra text p. 160. 
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[1, 2) Even where the rule still prevails, 
its scope has been substantially narrowed 
by the creation of significant exceptions. 
For example, the public duty rule cannot be 
used to avoid liability where a "special rela-
tionship" exists between the public entity 
and the plaintiff. Campbell v. Bellevue, 
85 Wash.2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975) (city 
electrical inspector knew of nonconforming 
underwater lighting system and of extreme 
danger to residence near stream but failed 
to disconnect the lighting system). Nor is 
the rule applicable where the tortious con-
duct of the public entity violated a statute 
or ordinance enacted for the benefit of the 
class of persons to which the plaintiff be-
longed. Compare Irwin v. Town of Ware, 
392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984) (stat-
utes created duty on the part of police 
officer to arrest intoxicated driver for the 
benefit of the motoring public) with Din-
sky v. Town of Framingham, 386 Mass. 
801, 438 N.E.2d 51 (1982) (building code did 
not create special duty to individual proper-
ty owners upon which an action for negli-
gent issuance of building permits could be 
predicated). 
The major criticism leveled at the public 
duty rule is its harsh effect on plaintiffs 
who would be entitled to recover for their 
injuries but for the public status of the 
tortfeasor. A duty to all, it has been said, 
is a duty to none. Commercial Carrier, 
371 So.2d at 1010; Adams, 555 P.2d at 235. 
Courts that have abandoned the rule have 
sometimes relied on provision^ in statutes 
abrogating sovereign immunity stating 
that public entities are to be treated like 
private parties for purposes of determining 
liability. E.g., Schear v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Bernalillo County, 687 
P.2d at 728. Cf § 24-10-107, 10 C.R.S. 
(1982) ("Where sovereign immunity is abro-
gated as a defense under section 24-10-
106, liability of the public entity shall be 
determined in the same manner as if the 
public entity were a private person."). In 
apparent contravention of these statutes, 
the public duty rule makes the public sta-
8. The Supreme Court of Washington has recent-
ly considered and rejected an attempt to discard 
the public duty doctrine. Chambers-Costanes, 
v. CAIN Colo. 159 
152 (Colo. 1986) 
tus of the defendant a crucial factor in 
determining liability. Courts rejecting the 
public duty rule reason that proof of one of 
the elements in an action for negligence 
should not be made more difficult simply 
because the defendant is a public entity. 
It has also been argued that the same 
rationales that were used to justify abso-
lute sovereign immunity—the financial im-
pact on government and interference with 
governmental operations—are asserted in 
defense of the public duty rule. Ryan, 134 
Ariz, at 308, 656 P.2d at 597; Chambers-
Castanes, 100 Wash.2d at 275, 669 P.2d at 
451, 460 (Utter, J., concurring) Those jus-
tifications were rejected with the abroga-
tion of absolute sovereign immunity and 
should likewise be rejected as a policy basis 
for the public duty rule. The argument is 
particularly compelling if the public duty 
doctrine is seen as a function of sovereign 
immunity, rather than as an independent 
concept of negligence. See Commercial 
Carrier, 371 So.2d at 1010. 
Perhaps the most persuasive reason for 
the abandonment of the public duty rule is 
that it creates needless confusion in the 
law and results in uneven and inequitable 
results in practice. Ryan, 134 Ariz, at 308; 
656 P.2d at 597; J & B Development Co., 
Inc. v. King County, 100 Wash.2d 299, 669 
P.2d 468, 474 (1983) (Utter, .1. concurring); 
Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent 
Fire Inspection, 13 Colum..).l>. & Soc. 
Problems 303 (1977); Note, Court of 
Claims Act, 58 St. John's L.Rev. 199 
(1983). As the Supreme Court of Arizona 
said in abandoning the public duty rule, 
"[w]e shall no longer engage in the specu-
lative exercise of determining whether the 
tort-feasor has a general duty to the in-
jured party, which spells no recovery, or if 
he had a specific individual duty which 
means recovery." Ryan, 656 P.2d at 597. 
Instead, the court stated, "the parameters 
of duty owed by the state will ordinarily be 
coextensive with those owed by others." 
/d.8 
100 Wash.2d at 275. 669 P.2d at 451. See also J 
A B Development Co., Inc. v. King County, 100 
Wash.2d at 299, 669 P.2d at 468. In addition to 
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In our view, the problems associated 
with the public duty rule far outweigh the 
benefits of the rule, which are more proper-
ly realized by other means. The fear of 
excessive governmental liability is largely 
baseless in view of the fact that a plaintiff 
seeking damages for tortious conduct 
against a public entity must establish the 
existence of a duty using conventional tort\ 
principles, such as foreseeability, in the 
same manner as if the defendant were a' 
private entity. City of Kotzebue v. Mc-
Lean, 702 P.2d 1309 (Alaska 1985). Anoth-
er hurdle the plaintiff must surmount in 
order to recover is proof of proximate 
cause. The traditional burdens of proof 
tied to tort law adequately limit govern-
mental liability without resort to the artifi-
cial distinctions engendered by the public 
duty rule. 
Nor do we believe that the abolition of 
the public duty rule will unduly interfere 
with governmental operations. By this de-
cision, we create no new cause of action 
which would make a public official hesitant 
in the performance of his duties. Public 
officials will continue to enjoy qualified im-
munity. See Trimble v. City and County 
of Denver, 697 P.2d 716 (Colo.1985). 
Finally, whether or not the public duty 
rule is a function of sovereign immunity, 
the effect of the rule is identical to that of 
sovereign immunity. Under both doc-
trines, the existence of liability depends 
entirely upon the public status of the de-
fendant. The doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity was abrogated in Evans v. Board of 
County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97, 482 
P.2d 968 (1971). Nothing in the provisions 
of the statutes dealing with governmental 
immunity, sections 24-10-101 to -118, 10 
C.R.S. (1982 & 1985 Supp.), leads us to 
the traditional rationales underlying the public 
duty doctrine, the Washington court discussed 
the use of the rule as a focusing device to 
determine whether a duty is owed to a specific 
individual or merely to the public at large. Id. 
The public duty rule serves to avoid the conclu-
sion that every duty owed to the public is a duty 
to the individual members of the public. The 
court rejected the contention that the public 
duty doctrine is merely a function of sovereign 
immunity and declared that the abrogation of 
conclude that the General Assembly intend-
ed to reintroduce a concept so closely relat-
ed to absolute sovereign immunity. Quite 
the contrary, section 24-10-107 instructs 
courts to resolve the plaintiff's claim with-
out regard to the public status of the de-
fendant. 
I [3] Accordingly, we reject the public 
I duty rule in Colorado. Henceforth, for 
1 purposes of determining liability in a negli-
\gence action, the duty of a public entity 
Vhall be determined in the same manner as 
n it were a private party. 
B. 
Duty of the Commerce City 
Police Officers 
Having discarded the concept that the 
existence and extent of the police officers' 
duty is dependent on status, we now ana-
lyze the duty question by applying conven-
tional tort principles. 
1. The Special Relation Rule 
[41 Where a person should reasonably 
foresee that his act, or failure to act, will 
involve an unreasonable risk of harm to 
another, there is a duty to avoid such harm. 
Metropolitan Gas Repair Service, Inc. v. 
Kulik, 621 P.2d 313 (Colo.1981); Mile High 
Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 
P.2d 308 (Colo.1971). However, there is no 
duty to prevent a third person from harm-
ing another, absent a special relation be-
tween the actor and the wrongdoer or be-
tween the actor and the victim. Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965). 
Here, the Commerce City police officers 
were summoned to a party of teenagers 
where alcoholic beverages were being 
sovereign immunity was not intended to create 
new claims for relief. 
We are unpersuaded that the public duty rule 
is necessary as a focusing device. The existence 
of an actionable duty can, in our view, be more 
effectively determined by resort to the familiar 
principles of foreseeability and by balancing the 
social utility of the defendant's conduct against 
the risk of harm resulting from such conduct. 
See infra text p. 160. 
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served. Ralph Crowe was handcuffed af-
ter he attempted to interfere with the offi-
cers' efforts to disperse the group attend-
ing the party. The officers in this case did 
not release an intoxicated person knowing 
that he would thereafter operate an auto-
mobile. Instead, the officers permitted 
Ralph Crowe's younger brother, Eddie 
Crowe, who appeared sober, to drive Ralph 
Crowe home. 
[5, 6] While the officers obviously had a 
duty to prevent Ralph Crowe from harming 
others while he was handcuffed at the par-
ty, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 
(1965) (duty of those in charge of person 
having dangerous propensities), the offi-
cers discharged their duty by restraining 
Crowe until he calmed down. The officers' 
duty, as it related to the conduct of Ralph 
Crowe, began and ended at the party. It 
did not extend to the period after Ralph 
Crowe was released to his younger brother, 
who assured the officers that he would 
drive Ralph Crowe home.9 The officers did 
not assume a duty to the respondents' de-
cedents, induce reliance, or create a peril or 
change the nature of an already existing 
risk. See Jackson v. Clements, 146 Cal. 
App.3d 983, 194 Cal.Rptr. 553 (1983).10 
In support of their contention that a spe-
cial relationship existed between the Com-
merce City police officers and the respon-
9. The record also reflects that Ralph Crowe 
promised the officers that he would allow his 
brother to take him home. 
10. In Jackson v. Clements, police officers investi-
gated a party where alcoholic beverages were 
being served to minors. Although the officers 
knew that two of the minors were intoxicated 
and that each intended to drive, the officeis 
failed to prevent the minors from driving. The 
plaintiffs, heirs and parents of three persons 
who were killed when the two minors were 
involved in a collision after leaving the party, 
sued the police officers and their employer, the 
county. The complaints asserted that, once the 
officers undertook to investigate the party and 
observed that the minors were intoxicated, the 
officers had a duty to prevent the minors from 
driving. Plaintiffs contended that a special rela-
tionship was created between the officers and 
the minors when the minors acted in a manner 
suggesting that they were too intoxicated to 
drive, which was evidenced by the detention of 
v. CAIN Colo. 161 
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dents' decedents, respondents cite Irwin v. 
Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 
(1984). In Irwin, police officers stopped a 
car suspecting that the driver was intoxi-
cated. Plaintiffs alleged that the officers 
negligently failed to arrest the driver, and 
that plaintiffs were entitled to recover for 
injuries sustained when the driver collided 
with the plaintiffs' car after he was re-
leased by the police. The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts held that "there is 
a special relationship between a police offi-
cer who negligently fails to remove an in-
toxicated motorist from the highway, and a 
member of the public who suffers injury as 
a result of that failure." 467 N.E.2d at 
1303-04. Contra Horns v. Smith, 157 
Cal.App.3d 100, 203 Cal.Rptr. 541 (1984). 
In finding a special relationship, the court 
relied on Massachusetts statutes relating 
to a police officer's authority to arrest in-
toxicated persons operating automobiles. 
The court determined that the statutes indi-
cated a legislative intent to protect intoxi-
cated persons and other members of the 
motoring public and concluded that the 
foreseeable consequences of releasing an 
intoxicated driver were all too obvious. 
Quite apart from the question of whether 
this court would recognize a special rela-
tionship under the circumstances of Invin 
v. Ware, the case is readily distinguishable 
one minor. The trial court dismissed the com-
plaints, and the court of appeal affirmed. Dis-
tinguishing prior cases thai found a special rela-
tionship bciwecn stale personnel and a wrong 
doer, the court of appeal staled thai in the 
instant case there was no allegation of an ongo-
ing custodial relationship between the officers 
and the inloxicaicd minors. Accordingly, the 
court concluded that a special relationship did 
not exist between the police officers and the 
minors. The court then considered and rejected 
plaintiffs' contention that a special relationship 
existed between the officers and one of the 
victims, who was a passenger in one minor's car 
at the time of the collision. The court said that 
such a relationship could not be found because 
the police (I) did not voluntarily assume a duty 
of care toward the injured parties, (2) did not 
induce the victims to rely on a promise that the 
police would protect them, and (3) did not cre-
ate the peril or change the nature of an existing 
risk against which the victims relied upon the 
police for prolcction. 
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from this case. Here, the Commerce City 
police officers did not contact Ralph Crowe 
while he was driving an automobile. Dur-
ing their entire encounter with Ralph 
Crowe, the officers had no reason to be-
lieve that he had been driving under the 
influence of alcohol or that he intended to 
do so in the immediate future. In fact, the 
officers released Ralph Crowe to his 
younger brother only after receiving assur-
ances from both men that Eddie Crowe 
would drive Ralph Crowe home. The po-
tential harm resulting from the release of 
Ralph Crowe was far less foreseeable than 
the release of the intoxicated driver in Ir-
win v. Ware. 
2. The Emergency Commitment Statute 
Respondents rely on section 25-1-310(1), 
11 C.R.S. (1982), as a source of the officers' 
duty in this case. The statute provides: 
Emergency commitment. (1) When 
any person is intoxicated or incapacitated 
by alcohol and clearly dangerous to the 
health and safety of himself or others, 
such person shall be taken into protective 
custody by law enforcement authorities 
or an emergency service patrol, acting 
with probable cause, and placed in an 
approved treatment facility. If no such 
facilities are available, he may be de-
tained in an emergency medical facility 
or jail, but only for so long as may be 
necessary to prevent injury to himself or 
others or to prevent a breach of the 
peace. A law enforcement officer or 
emergency service patrolman, in detain-
ing the person, is taking him into protec-
tive custody. In so doing, the detaining 
officer may protect himself by reason-
able methods but shall make every rea-
sonable effort to protect the detainee's 
health and safety. A taking into protec-
tive custody under this section is not an 
arrest, and no entry or other record shall 
be made to indicate that the person has 
been arrested or charged with a crime. 
Law enforcement or emergency service 
personnel who act in compliance with this 
section are acting in the course of their 
official duties and are not criminally or 
civilly liable therefor. Nothing in this 
subsection (1) shall preclude an intoxicat-
ed or incapacitated person who is not 
dangerous to the health and safety of 
himself or others from being assisted to 
his home or like location by the law en-
forcement officer or emergency service 
patrolmen. 
Id. Respondents contend that under sec-
tion 25-1-310(1), the Commerce City police 
officers had a duty to take Ralph Crowe 
into "protective custody" or to escort him 
to his home. The respondents claim the 
officers were guilty of a breach of duty in 
releasing Ralph Crowe to his younger 
brother. 
[71 A duty of care may be created by 
legislative enactment. Dare v. Sobule, 674 
P.2d 960 (Colo. 1984). However, the breach 
of a statutory duty is actionable only by 
one who is a member of the class the 
statute was designed to protect, and only 
where the injury suffered by such person is 
the type of injury which the statute was 
enacted to prevent. 
[8] Section 25-1-310(1) was enacted as 
part of a comprehensive legislative scheme 
dealing with alcoholism and intoxication 
treatment. See §§ 25^1-301 to -316, 11 
C.R.S. (1982). The legislative declaration 
preceding the statutory scheme states: 
(1) It is the policy of this state that 
alcoholics and intoxicated persons may 
not be subjected to criminal prosecution 
because of their consumption of alcoholic 
beverages but rather should be afforded 
a continuum of treatment in order that 
they may lead normal lives as productive 
members of society. The general assem-
bly hereby finds and declares that alco-
holism and intoxication are matters of 
statewide concern. 
§ 25-1-301(1). We recognize that a curso-
ry reading of the emergency commitment 
statute may suggest that the statute was 
intended to protect members of the public 
against intoxicated persons who appear 
"clearly dangerous." However, in our 
view, the General Assembly did not intend 
to create a claim for relief against police 
officers who, in their discretion, release an 
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intoxicated person into the "custody" of nn 
apparently sober and responsible relative. 
Since we conclude that the respondents' 
decedents were not included within the 
class of persons that section 25-1-310(1) 
was designed to protect, the respondents 
may not rely on the statute as a source of 
the officers' duty in this case. 
The respondents in this case have failed 
to establish that a duty was owed to their 
decedents by the Commerce City police of-
ficers. Therefore, they have not estab-
lished a prima facie case of negligence. 
Although the trial court granted summary 
judgment on the basis of the public duty 
rule, which we have repudiated in this deci-
sion, the order of summary judgment was 
proper since respondents failed to establish 
a legally cognizable duty. Accordingly, the 
court of appeals erred in vacating the trial 
court's order of summary judgment 
Our conclusion that the Commerce City 
police officers did not owe a duly to respon-
dents' decedents under the facts of this 
case is the basis for our decision reversing 
the court of appeals. However, it is neces-
sary to address the issue of immunity be-
cause the court of appeals erroneously nar-
rowed the scope of official immunity af-
forded police officers. 
III. 
IMMUNITY 
[91 A public official performing discre-
tionary acts within the scope bf his office 
enjoys qualified immunity. Trimble v. 
City and County of Denver, 697 I\2d 716 
(Colo. 1985). He is protected against civil 
liability if his conduct is not willful, mali-
cious or intended to cause harm. /(/. The 
court of appeals held that the Commerce 
City police officers were not protected by 
official immunity because the decision to 
take Ralph Crowe into custody was not 
discretionary. We disagree. 
The court of appeals relied on Irwin v. 
Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 
(1984). We have already determined that 
Irwin ia inapposite for purposes of deter 
mining the duty of the Commerce City po-
v. CAIN CoJo. 163 
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lice officers in this case. Irwin is also 
unpersuasive authority for the conclusion 
that the officers were not shielded from 
civil damages by official immunity. 
In Irivin, the court held that the decision 
of a police officer to arrest a driver he 
knows or reasonably should know is intoxi-
cated is not a discretionary act. The court 
said: 
No reasonable basis exists for arguing 
that a police officer is making a policy or 
planning judgment in deciding whether 
to remove from the roadways a driver 
who he knows is intoxicated. Rather, 
the policy and planning decision to re-
move such drivers has already been 
made by the legislature. 
Id. at 467 N.E.2d 1299. Relying on Irwin, 
the court of appeals concluded: "The same 
reasoning applies to a decision by a police 
officer to release a disputatious, intoxicat-
ed person from custody, and to send that 
person onto the roadway under the ostensi-
ble supervision of a younger brother as 
caretaker." Cain v. Leake, 695 P.2d at 
SOU-01. 
This case does not involve the question 
of whether a police officer's decision to 
arrest a person suspected of driving under 
the influence of alcohol is a discretionary 
decision. Although we express no opinion 
on the issue, we note that at least one 
other court has taken a position contrary to 
Irwin v. Ware. See Evert on v. Willard, 
468 So.2d 936 (Ha. 1985) (the decision to 
arrest is a basic judgmental or discretion-
ary governmental function that is immune 
from suit). 
110] Assuming that an officer's decision 
to arrest an intoxicated driver is not a 
discretionary decision, it hardly follows 
that the decision whether to take an intoxi-
cated person into protective custody under 
the emergency commitment statute is a 
nondiscretionary judgment. A person who 
operates an automobile under the influence 
of alcohol violates section 42-4-1202, 17 
C.R.S. (1984). When a police officer stops 
a person he knows, or reasonahly flhould 
know, is driving under the influence, the 
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officer arguably has no discretion but to 
arrest the suspect. By contrast, an officer 
who encounters an intoxicated person who 
is not driving has no authority to take such 
person into protective custody under sec-
tion 25-1-310(1) unless the officer has 
probable cause to believe that the intoxicat-
ed person is "clearly dangerous to the 
health and safety of himself or others." 
§ 25-1-310(1). While it may be said under 
Irwin v. Ware that the General Assembly 
has determined as a policy matter that an 
intoxicated driver is a public danger, and 
that an officer encountering such a person 
accordingly has no choice in determining 
whether to arrest or release the person, the 
same is not true with respect to the emer-
gency commitment statute. Under section 
25-1-310(1), it is the officer who must de-
termine whether the intoxicated person is 
clearly dangerous. The General Assembly 
plainly did not intend for the police to take 
into protective custody every intoxicated 
person they meet. Instead, the General 
Assembly designated a specific class of in-
toxicated persons who are subject to emer-
gency commitment and left the determina-
tion of whether a particular individual is 
clearly dangerous to the police. According-
ly, the decision to take a person into protec-
tive custody is discretionary and protected 
by official immunity. 
[11] Respondents have also asserted 
that since the officers did not take Ralph 
Crowe into protective custody, the officers 
should have at least escorted him to his 
home. Section 25-1-310(1) states: ''Noth-
ing in this subsection (1) shall preclude an 
intoxicated or incapacitated person who is 
not dangerous to the health and safety of 
himself cr ethers from being assisted to his 
home or like location by the law enforce-
ment officer or emergency service patrol-
man." Whether the officers should have 
taken the action suggested by respondents 
was a discretionary judgment. Therefore, 
the decision by the Commerce City police 
I. Neither of Ihc parties cited any of the cases 
discussed by the majority in part II A 1, The 
Public Duty Doctrine. This clearly reflects their 
lack of understanding that the public duty rule 
officers not to assist Ralph Crowe to his 
home is protected by official immunity. 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of ap-
peals and remand to the court of appeals 
with directions to reinstate the trial court's 
order granting summary judgment to peti-
tioners. 
ROVIRA, J., specially concurs. 
ROVIRA, Justice, specially concurring: 
I agree with the majority's conclusions 
that respondents' claims against the Com-
merce City police officers fail on conven-
tional tort principles and that the decision 
by the officers not to take Ralph Crowe 
into custody or assist him home is protect-
ed by official immunity. However, I dis-
agree with the conclusion that "we are 
squarely confronted with the question of 
whether the public duty rule is still good 
law in Colorado," majority op. at 157, and 
therefore do not join in part II A of the 
majority opinion. 
Since respondents' claims fail under tra-
ditional tort analysis, I see no need to ad-
dress the public duty issue in this case. As 
the majority points out, the public duty 
issue was not addressed by the court of 
appeals. Majority op. at 154. Moreover, 
the issue upon which certiorari was grant-
ed relating to petitioners' duty to respon-
dents did not specifically raise the public 
duty question. In granting certiorari we 
asked the parties to address: "Whether the 
defendants owed a duty to plaintiffs and 
their decedents such that the defendants' 
failure to protect them is actionable." 
Both parties responded by presenting tradi-
tional tort duty arguments, and neither ad-
dressed the public duty issue. 
In my view, the court should not decide 
an issue of considerable public importance, 
such as the abolition of the public duty 
rule, which was not briefed and is not 
necessary for resolution of the case at bar.1 
As the majority points out, the public duty 
rule is controversial; and while there may 
was to be considered due to the failure of the 
court to frame the certiorari issue in a manner 
which would result in a discussion by the par-
lies of the public duty doctrine. 
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be a trend towards abolition of the rule, 
majority op. at 158, the majority of states 
probably still adhere to the rule, majority 
op. at 158. Without the benefit of briefs 
by the parties and interested amici, the 
court is in a poor position to determine 
whether the public duty rule has force and 
content independent of the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity. A determination of the 
continuing vitality of the rule would be 
better left for a later day. 
Finally, I note that to the extent that the 
public duty rule is either a function of 
sovereign immunity or identical in effect to 
sovereign immunity, sec majority op. at 
160, the legislature clearly has the power 
to reimpose the public duty rule in statu-
tory form. "If the General Assembly 
wishes to restore sovereign immunity and 
governmental immunity in whole or in part, 
it has the authority to do so." Evans v. 
Board of County Coynmissioners, 174 
Colo. 97, 105, 482 P.2d 968, 972 (1971). 
o |K(YNUHIIK SYiHM> 
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Michael Anthony ARMSTRONG, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 84SA365. 
Supreme Court of Colorado, 
En Banc. 
June 9, 1986. 
Two counts of second-degree assault 
on a peace officer were dismissed by the 
District Court, Pitkin County, Judson E. 
DeVilbiss, J., and the People appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Vollack, J., held that: 
(1) statute proscribing assault on peace of-
ficer by one who is in custody applies to 
field arrest situations as well as to deten-
tion facilities; (2) one is in custody for 
purposes of the statute after arrest has 
been effected; and (3) conviction for both 
resisting arrest and assault on a police 
officer while in custody would not neces-
sarily result in different sanctions for the 
same criminal conduct, in violation of equal 
protection guarantees, but required consid-
eration of the facts of the case after evi-
dence had been presented at trial. 
Reversed and charges reinstated. 
Lohr, J., concurred specially and filed 
opinion. 
Dubofsky, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion. 
1. Statutes e=*217.2 
When meaning of statute is clear, it is 
unnecessary to examine its legislative his-
tory. 
2. Assault and Battery «3=*60 
Second-degree assault statute, which 
proscribes assault on a peace officer by one 
who is lawfully confined or in custody, 
applies to field arrest situations as well as 
to detention facilities. C R S. 18-3-
203(1X0. 
3. Assault and Battery <^>I8 
Definition of "in custody' as contained 
in pattern jury instruction is not controlling 
as to meaning of that term in second-de-
gree assault statute which proscribes as-
sault on a peace officer by one who is 
lawfully in custody. C.R.S. 18-3-203(l)(0. 
4. Criminal Law <s=*805(l) 
While pattern jury instructions carry 
weight and should be considered by trial 
court, opinion of an appellate court is con-
trolling. 
5. Constitutional Law <S=>250.3(1) 
Statute prescribing different sanctions 
for what ostensibly might be different acts, 
but offering no rational standard for distin-
guishing such different acts for purposes 
of disparate punishment, contravenes equal 
protection guarantees of the State Consti-
tution. Const. Art. 2, § 25. 
